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THE FEELING OF FAITH: A THOMISTIC ACCOUNT OF RELIGIOUS EMOTIONS 
John Dryden 
April 19, 2013 
 This dissertation is a philosophical analysis of religious emotions.  It draws upon 
Thomas Aquinas’s theory of the passions to build and apply a framework for thinking 
about religious emotions and their role in the spiritual life.  The first two chapters are 
dedicated to building the theoretical framework.  Chapter one outlines Aquinas’s theory 
of emotions in a very general way and compares this account to recent versions of 
cognitivism.  By placing Aquinas in conversation with contemporary accounts, I show 
that his theory is able to capture the central insights of this mainstream philosophical 
view.  According to the Thomistic account that emerges in this chapter, emotions are 
psychosomatic forms of concern.  In the second chapter, I begin to outline what makes an 
emotion a religious emotion.  Drawing on Robert Neville’s theory of religious symbols, I 
suggest that religious emotions are emotions that have religious symbols interpreted in a 
devotional context1 as their object.  With this account of religious emotions in hand, the 
next two chapters are dedicated to illustrating and applying this framework in a 
phenomenological and comparative mode.  In chapter three, I apply the framework to 
illustrate its promise in highlighting common emotional patterns across religious
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1  I am using “devotional context” in a technical sense to refer to the context of conforming oneself to 
ultimacy.  Devotional, in this sense, does not mean expressing love and adoration to some deity.  While this 
might be an example of a devotional context in my technical usage, my sense is much broader than this.  
See chapter two for more details.   
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traditions.  In chapter four, I show how this account can also illuminate the diversity of 
emotional religious life both across and within religious traditions.  In the final chapter, I 
use this model to explore the role of religious emotions in the religious life, particularly 
the relationship among religious emotion, cognition, and practice.  
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The academic study of emotions is currently experiencing a multidisciplinary 
resurgence.  Within the past decade, anthropology, experimental psychology, 
neuroscience, evolutionary biology, philosophy, musicology, and literary studies (just to 
name a few disciplines), have all made valuable contributions to our understanding of the 
emotions.  Recently, philosophers, theologians, and religious studies scholars have begun 
to apply these findings to specifically religious emotions or the role of emotions in a 
religious context.  However, the academic literature on religious emotions is still 
insignificant relative to the vast amount of work dedicated to religious belief and practice.  
This fact is peculiar given the longstanding assumption of a close and complex 
relationship between religion and emotion.  Remembering that ancient Greek theater was 
a form of worship, both Plato and Aristotle observed its ability to evoke emotional 
responses.  Additionally, the mainstream Christian interpretation of the spiritual life as a 
dialectic between fear and love is a notion that can be traced back to Plato’s late work 
Pheilbus.2  More recently, romantic philosophy emphasized this emotional and intuitive 
aspect of religion.  In his 1830 edition of The Christian Faith, Friedrich Schleiermacher 
famously identified the basis of religion in a feeling of absolute dependence.  “The piety 
which forms the basis of all ecclesiastical communions is, considered purely in itself, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Petri Järveläinen, “What are Religious Emotions?,” in Religious Emotions: Some Philosophical 
Explorations, ed. by Willem Lemmens and Walter Van Herck (Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars 
Publishing, 2008), 12. 
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neither a Knowing nor a Doing, but a modification of Feeling . . .”3  Building on 
Schleiermacher’s work, Rudolf Otto remarks on the general failure of orthodox 
Christianity to attend to the important, non-rational aspect of religious experience.  
“Orthodox Christianity manifestly failed to recognize [the value of the non-rational 
element in religion], and by this failure gave to the idea of God a one-sidedly 
intellectualistic and rationalistic interpretation.”4   
 However, during the middle of the twentieth century, academic work on religion 
and emotion was sparse for a number of reasons.  First, the rise of positivism resulted in 
little attention paid toward the emotions generally.  In terms of the social sciences, Ole 
Riis and Linda Woodhead write that this “led to a focus upon those aspects of religion 
that, like church attendance or neurological activity, can be observed and measured in a 
way that is dissociated from the personality and social position of the investigator.  From 
this perspective, even belief, in so far as it can be clearly articulated and recorded, seems 
more solid and significant than feeling.”5  Paul Tillich observed that philosophers and 
scientists accepted a distorted version of Schleiermacher’s emphasis on religion as 
feeling in order to privatize religion and reduce its influence.  “The word ‘feeling’ has 
induced many people to believe that faith is a matter of merely subjective emotions, 
without a content to be known and a demand to be obeyed.  This interpretation of faith 
was readily accepted by representatives of science and ethics, because they took it as the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Friedrich Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith, trans.  H. R. Mackintosh and J. S. Stewart (Edinburg: T. & 
T. Clark, 1999), 5.   
4 Rudolf Otto, The Idea of the Holy, trans. John W. Harvey (London: Oxford University Press, 1950), 3. 




best way to get rid of interference from the side of religion in the process of scientific 
research and technical organization.”6 
 In analytic philosophy, the renewed interest in emotion theory is often traced back 
to Robert Solomon’s 1976 work The Passions.7  In what he calls “the myth of the 
passions,” Solomon writes about misunderstandings of the emotions that have plagued 
Western philosophy from Plato forward.  Solomon argues that Christian theologians and 
Western philosophers have been prone to view the emotions negatively as irrational and 
involuntary bodily happenings.  According to this myth, the emotions present a challenge 
to rational thought and thus need to be subdued and controlled.  He then sets this 
traditional view as the foil to his own interpretation of the emotions as cognitive and, to 
some extent, voluntary.   In what has come to be known as cognitivism, Solomon argues 
that the emotions are not mere subjective feelings.  Instead, human emotions often 
contain cognitive content which, for Solomon, take the form of evaluative judgments.  In 
the wake of Solomon’s work, cognitivism has become the dominant theory in the 
philosophy of emotion.  While there are various versions of cognitivism, they all share 
and emphasize the recognition that emotions often possess intentionality.  Emotions are 
directed at objects and are not merely subjective bodily feelings.8  Moreover, cognitivist 
theories share the view that the higher cognitive content of important human emotions is 
a necessary condition for the emotion itself and not simply the stimulus from which 
emotional reactions occur. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Paul Tillich, The Dynamics of Faith (New York: Harper Row, 1957), 39. 
7 Robert Solomon, The Passions (Garden City, NY: Anchor Press, 1976). 
8 Important cognitivist philosophers (in some form or other) include the following: Robert Solomon, 
Martha Nussbaum, Robert Roberts, Ronald de Sousa, John Deigh, and Aaron Ben-Ze’ev.  
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 There are two important developments to note in analytic philosophy of emotion 
since the rise of cognitivism.  First, recent critics, while accepting a cognitivist 
understanding of the emotions, have attacked Solomon’s view of the history of 
philosophy as being too simplistic.  According to these criticisms, it was the departure 
from traditional views, not the traditional views themselves, that led to the conception of 
emotions as irrational forces acting upon us against our will.  For instance, Thomas 
Dixon argues that it was the secularization of psychology in the nineteenth century that 
led this view.9  Recent cognitivist philosophers of emotions have even returned to 
classical philosophy as a source of ongoing relevance to contemporary discussions of 
emotions.10  Within just the past two years, there have been three books published on 
Aquinas’ theory of emotions and its relevance to contemporary philosophy of emotion.11 
Secondly, this renewed interest in the emotions was quickly applied to other areas of 
philosophy, particularly ethics and aesthetics.  Through the work of philosophers such as 
Iris Murdoch, John Casey, Charles Taylor, and Martha Nussbaum, the insight that the 
virtues and the emotions are necessary components to the moral life gained ascendancy in 
analytic philosophy.12  In aesthetics, current topics of research such as the paradox of 
fiction and the paradox of tragedy explore the relationship between cognitive emotions 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Thomas Dixon, From Passions To Emotions: The Creation of a Secular Psychological Category 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 3. 
10 See Martha Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2001).  Nussbaum draws upon Aristotelian and Stoic resources to develop her cognitivist 
account of emotions. 
11 See the following: Diana Fritz Cates, Aquinas on the Emotions: A Religious-Ethical Inquiry (Washington 
D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2009).  Nicholas Lombardo, The Logic of Desire: Aquinas on Emotion 
(Washington D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2011).  Robert Miner, Thomas Aquinas on the 
Passions: A Study of Summa Theologiae, 1a2ae 22-48 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).   
12 See the following: Iris Murdoch, Existentialists and Mystics: Writings on Philosophy and Literature 
(London: Chatto & Windus, 1997).  John Casey, Pagan Virtue: An Essay in Ethics (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1990). Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1989).  Martha Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). 
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and the arts.13 Remarkably, however, little attempt has been made to apply recent 
developments in emotion theory to so-called religious emotions or toward central issues 
in the philosophy of religion.  As Willem Lemmens and Walter Van Herck write, until 
recently there as been “almost total negligence . . . of the relation between religion and 
emotions in contemporary philosophical theory of emotions.”14 
 It is in this light of the current state of philosophy of emotions that I would like to 
situate this current project. In broad terms, this work draws on classical resources, 
particular the thought of Thomas Aquinas, to build and apply a framework for thinking 
about religious emotions.  The first two chapters are dedicated to building the theoretical 
framework.  Chapter one outlines Aquinas’s theory of emotions in a very general way 
and compares this account to recent versions of cognitivism.  By placing Aquinas in 
conversation with contemporary accounts, I show that that his theory is able to capture 
the central insights of this mainstream philosophical.  According to the Thomistic 
account that emerges in this chapter, emotions are psychosomatic forms of concern.  In 
the second chapter, I begin to outline what makes an emotion a religious emotion.  
Drawing on Robert Neville’s theory of religious symbols, I suggest that religious 
emotions are emotions that have religious symbols interpreted in a devotional context as 
their object.  With this account of religious emotions in hand, the next two chapters are 
dedicated to illustrating and applying this framework in a phenomenological and 
comparative mode.  In chapter three, I apply the framework to illustrate its promise in 
highlighting common emotional patterns across religious traditions.  In chapter four, I 
show how this account can not only illuminate common emotional patterns, but also the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 See Mette Hjort and Sue Laver, ed., Emotion and the Arts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997). 
14 Willem Lemmens and Walter Van Herck, ed., Religious Emotions: Some Philosophical Explorations 
(Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2008). 
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diversity of emotional religious life both across and within religious traditions.  In the 
final chapter, I use this model to explore the role of religious emotions in the religious 





AQUINAS AND CONTEMPORARY EMOTION THEORY 
 
Introduction 
 There are several reasons why scholars interested in emotion theory might want to 
examine Thomas Aquinas’s treatment of the passions.  From a historical perspective, 
Aquinas’s treatise is significant in that, at the time of its composition, it probably 
constituted the longest and most systematic discussion of the passions ever written.15  
Susan James argues that this comprehensive account of the passions had tremendous 
influence on early modern philosophy and was widely read and discussed throughout the 
seventeenth century.16  Robert Miner explains that the rationalist philosophers of the 
early modern period were “responding to the non-mechanistic, teleological concepts of 
the passions articulated by Thomas Aquinas.”17  According to Miner, if we are fully to 
understand the contemporary concept of emotion, we must see how it emerged from this 
long history of multiple transformations.18 
 Besides historical concerns, the resurgence of virtue ethics in moral philosophy 
has led to a renewed interest in Aquinas as a principal representative of virtue theory.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Nicolas Lombardo, The Logic of Desire: Aquinas on Emotion (Washington D.C.: The Catholic 
University of America Press, 2011), 1. 
16 Susan James, Passion and Action: The Emotions in Seventeenth Century Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1997), 30.   
17 Robert Miner, Thomas Aquinas on the Passions: A Study of Summa Theologiae 1a2ae 22-48 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 1. 
18 Robert Miner, Thomas Aquinas on the Passions, 4. 
 
	   8 
Given the centrality of the emotions in his ethical theory, recent scholarship in moral 
philosophy has witnessed renewed interest in Aquinas’s treatise.  For instance, Eleonore 
Stump identifies Aquinas’s emphasis on the role of the passions in virtue as what 
distinguishes his theory from Aristotle’s.  “Aquinas goes so far as to maintain that the 
passions — or the suitable formulated intellectual and volitional analogues to the passions 
— are not only the foundation of any real ethical life but also the flowering of what is 
best in it.”19  Similarly, Diana Fritz Cates argues that for Aquinas “human emotions are 
matters of ethical concern and are, to a limited extent, subject to ethical formulation.”20 
 Aquinas’s account of the emotions also might be of particular interest to scholars 
who are sympathetic toward his theological commitments, for Aquinas’s treatise is 
embedded in and plays an important part in his larger systematic theology.  According to 
Nicolas Lombardo, “Aquinas’s account of emotion centers on his account of desire.  In 
turn, it is desire that gives the Summa Theologiae its exitus-reditus structure: Aquinas 
begins with God and then traces how creation flows from God’s desire and returns to him 
through ours.  Consequently, to follow the theme of emotion through the Summa is to 
follow the guiding principle around which Aquinas organized his most mature thought.”21  
Given the explicitly theological import of Aquinas’s account, it might be of particular 
interest to scholars who, like Lombardo, work within the Christian tradition or to scholars 
of religion working in either a historical or comparative mode.   
 I have chosen to use Aquinas’s theory of the passions as a resource for my 
account of religious emotions, not because of its historical influence or because of any 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Eleonore Stump, “The Non-Aristotelian Character of Aquinas’s Ethics: Aquinas on the Passions,” Faith 
and Philosophy 28 (2011): 31. 
20 Diana Fritz Cates, Aquinas on the Emotions: A Religious-Ethical Inquiry (Washington D.C.: Georgetown 
University Press, 2009), 27. 
21 Nicholas Lombardo, The Logic of Desire, xi.  “Exitus-reditus” can be translated as ‘going forth-return.” 
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theological commitments, but because I perceive his theory of the passions to be a 
plausible account of the emotions generally and can be particularly illuminating when 
applied to emotions in a religious context.  To show the plausibility of his account, I will 
compare his theory to various versions of cognitivism, a mainstream contemporary view 
in analytic philosophy.  I will argue that Aquinas’s account, while not a cognitivist view, 
is able to capture the same central insights.  The goal of this chapter is not to offer a full 
exposition or a close reading of Aquinas’s “Treatise on the Passions.”22  Instead, the 
focus is on placing Aquinas in conversation with contemporary philosophy of emotion.  
In so doing, a more robust and adequate account becomes available, and it is this broadly 
Thomistic account that I will apply to my analysis of religious emotions in later chapters.  
In this chapter, I will begin by offering a brief examination of the state of contemporary 
philosophical emotion theory, focusing on various versions of the mainstream cognitivist 
theory.  I will then turn my attention toward Aquinas’s account of the passions.  Finally, I 
will compare these two approaches, outlining the contributions Aquinas’s theory can 
offer contemporary philosophy of emotion. 
 
Feeling, Behavior, and Psychoanalysis 
 Currently, the most widely accepted theory of emotions in analytic philosophy is 
cognitivism.  William Lyons defines a cognitive theory of emotions as “one that makes 
some aspect of thought, usually a belief, central to the concept of emotion and, at least in 
some cognitive theories, essential to distinguishing the different emotions from one 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 For an excellent example of such a project, see Robert Miner, Thomas Aquinas on the Passions: A Study 
of Summa Theologiae Ia2ae 22-48 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).  
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another.”23  Of course, cognitivism does not go uncriticized and there are many 
competing theories.  However, there is general agreement that, as the non-cognitivist 
philosopher Jenefer Robison states, “the insights of the cognitive theory have to be 
preserved in any satisfactory theory of emotion.”24  Understanding the value of 
cognitivism requires viewing it as a response to previous views, particularly the “feeling” 
theory, behaviorism, and psychoanalytic accounts.  Thus, I will begin by focusing on an 
analysis of three early works that both challenge these previous theories and were 
important to the rise of contemporary cognitivism and the revival of philosophical 
interest in the emotions generally.25  The first two philosophers, Errol Bedford and 
Anthony Kenny, do not set out to give an account of emotion.  Working squarely within 
the Wittgensteinian ordinary-language tradition, they are primarily concerned with how 
we come to know the meaning of specific emotion terms like ‘shame,’ ‘anger,’ and ‘fear.’  
Given this focus, it is unclear whether they should be properly categorized as cognitivists.  
However, their criticism of feeling and behaviorist theories, namely that they do not 
allow us to make sense of emotion words, were influential in later, clearly cognitivist, 
theories.  Working from the phenomenological tradition, Robert Solomon does offer an 
account of emotion on cognitivist lines.  However, in this section I will focus on his 
criticism of psychoanalytic theories.  
 In Errol Bedford’s 1957 article “Emotions,” criticism is directed toward the two 
prevailing views of emotions: 1) emotions as feelings and 2) emotions as behavioral 
dispositions.  His criticisms of both theories follow similar lines.  First, both theories do 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 William Lyons, Emotion (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 33. 
24 Jenefer Robinson, Deeper Than Reason (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005), 3. 
25 See Errol Bedford, “Emotions,” in The Philosophy of Mind, ed. V. C. Chappell (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: 
Prentice Hall, 1962), and Anthony Kenny, Action, Emotion, and Will (New York: Routledge and Kegan 
Pall, 1963). 
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not account for how we can distinguish among various emotions.  Second, they cannot 
account for the intuition that particular emotions are often open to rational assessment.  
Bedford specifically targets William James’s theory as a typical example of the feeling 
theory according to which, as James’s writes,“an emotion is a feeling, or at least an 
experience of a special type which involves feeling.”26  In his essay “What is an 
Emotion?” James explains that “our natural way of thinking about these standard 
emotions is that the mental perception of some fact excites the mental affection called the 
emotion, and that this later state of mind gives rise to bodily expression.  My thesis on the 
contrary is that the bodily changes follow directly the PERCEPTION of the exciting fact, 
and that our feeling of the same changes as they occur IS the emotion.”27  For James, an 
emotion is simply the feeling of bodily changes that occur as automatic responses to the 
perceived environment.  However, identifying emotion with bodily feeling does not allow 
us to distinguish among different emotions.  Beford observes that indignation and 
annoyance are different emotions even though, on introspection, the feeling element in 
each is indistinguishable.28  Not only is he claiming that feeling is inadequate to 
distinguish different emotional states, but he even goes so far as to claim that feeling is 
neither necessary nor sufficient for the proper use of an emotional term.   For example, 
we often ascribe jealousy to individuals while admitting that they might not feel jealous.29  
According to the Thomistic theory I will argue in favor of latter, feelings are a necessary 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Errol Bedford, “Emotions,” in The Philosophy of Mind, ed. V. C. Chappell (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: 
Prentice Hall, 1962), 110. 
27 William James, “What is an Emotion?” in  What is an Emotion?: Classic and Contemporary Readings, 
ed. Robert Solomon (New York: Oxford University Press), 67. (Emphasis James’.) 
28 Errol Bedford, “Emotions,” 111. 
29 Errol Bedford, “Emotions,” 112-3. 
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condition for emotion.  However, Bedford’s central point is well taken: emotions are 
more than mere feelings. 
 The understanding of emotions as feelings not only fails to explain how we 
distinguish among various emotions, it also fails to account for why we consider 
particular emotions, or the lack thereof, to be (un)justified,(in)appropriate, or otherwise 
open to rational assessment.  Such expression as “you ought to be ashamed” or “you have 
no reason to be afraid” would be nonsensical if emotions were nothing more than the 
feeling of bodily changes.  Beford rhetorically asks “what reasons could be given for or 
against a feeling, or for or against its ‘inappropriateness’ to a situation?  If someone were 
to say ‘I felt a pang this afternoon,’ it would be meaningless to ask whether it was a 
reasonable or unreasonable pang.”30  Bodily feelings, such as an itch or toothache, are not 
open to moral or rational assessment in the way the emotions often are.  The feeling 
theorist could of course deny that such expressions have literal meaning, but at the cost of 
the common understanding of such expressions.   
 Bedford also rejects behaviorist accounts of emotion on the same two fronts.  Just 
as the feelings of indignation and annoyance are too similar to account for our ability to 
distinguish the two, we cannot distinguish between shame and embarrassment based on 
their nearly identical behavior responses.31  Distinguishing such emotions requires more 
than the knowledge of the psychological behavior involved.  We need to analyze the 
logical and narrative structure in which the emotions occur.  Shame is distinguished from 
embarrassment in that shame implies a moral failing, whereas embarrassment implies 
merely being in a socially awkward situation.  The feeling and behavior of shame and 
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embarrassment may be identical, but the thought content is the crucial differentiating 
factor.   
 Finally, Bedford argues that behaviorist accounts also fail to account for the fact 
that emotions are often open to rational assessment:  “The way in which a man behaves 
will determine whether he is or is not angry.  But if he is angry, the behavior evidence for 
this is not in itself relevant to the question whether his anger is justified or unjustified.”32  
Reducing emotion to behavior or behavioral disposition eliminates the possibility of 
assessing the emotions in terms of their appropriateness.  The thought content of an 
emotion is not only the crucial differentiating factor between two emotions, it is also the 
crucial element in assessing the appropriateness of an emotion.  Bedford asks us to 
consider a case of unjustified resentment where “B does something that is to A’s 
advantage, although A thinks that it is to his disadvantage.”33  Not only is A’s belief that 
she has been taken advantage of necessary to classify it as a case of resentment, but the 
rational ground of this belief is necessary to determine whether the resentment is 
appropriate in the given circumstances.  Thus, for Bedford, the meaning of emotion terms 
cannot be reduced to purely somatic feelings and behaviors.  Instead, reference must be 
made to value judgments.  
 In his book Action, Emotion, and Will, Anthony Kenny also critically responds to 
feeling theorists (particularly David Hume) and behaviorists (particularly Gilbert Ryle) 
for roughly the same reasons as Bedford.  However, Kenny is more explicit in where 
these theories go wrong, and, in being more explicit, places emphasis on the concept of 
intentionality — a concept that becomes a hallmark of contemporary cognitivist theories 
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of emotion.  Highlighting the criticism that feeling and behavior are inadequate to 
distinguish various emotional states, Kenny makes a distinction between sensations 
(feelings) and emotions, arguing that only emotions have an intentional structure—
emotions are directed at objects whereas sensations are not.  A fluttering in the stomach 
(a sensation) is not about anything beyond itself, whereas my fear is always a fear of 
something.  Emotions have a property, intentionality, that both sensations and actions 
lack and thus emotions cannot be reduced to either sensations or behavior dispositions.  
The central problem with theories equating the emotions with feelings or behavior is that 
they fail to capture the intentionality of emotions—emotions are directed toward objects.   
 There are two additional yet related points to note in Kenny’s understanding of 
emotions that will become important in later cognitivist theories.  First, Kenny makes a 
distinction between material and formal objects.  The formal object of xing is the object 
under that description which must apply to it if it is to be possible to x it.34  For example, 
there are multiple potential material objects of my gratitude.  I can feel gratitude towards 
my mechanic fixing my car at no charge, toward my professors helping me in revising 
my papers, or toward my wife for remaining married to me during my PhD program.  But 
the formal object of gratitude is what must apply in order for it to count as gratitude.  So 
we might say the formal object of gratitude is some perceived good which is freely given 
by some person who is also perceived as good in some respect.  Thus, emotions are 
distinguished based on their formal rather than their material object, the evaluative 
category under which the material object is placed, rather than the particular object as 
such.  The second important point to note is that, for Kenny, the intentionality of 
emotions is a necessary feature of the concept of emotion itself.  It is not a mere 
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contingent matter of fact that one fears what one perceives as dangerous, but does not 
fear what one perceives as pleasant. Rather there is a necessary and logical relationship 
between fear and the dangerous.  It is logically impossible for me to be angered at 
someone’s action that I simply perceive as a benefit towards me.  It is logically 
impossible for me to fear something that I know has already occurred.  This observation 
is important for Kenny because if emotions were nothing but sensations or behavioral 
dispositions, there would be no logical constraints on the type of object each emotion 
could have.  The fact that I am angered at perceived slights rather than benefits would 
simply be a contingent fact rather than a logical necessity.35 
 In his 1976 work The Passions, Robert Solomon offers his influential and 
controversial theory of emotions as evaluative judgments.36   I will have more to say 
about this theory in the next section of this chapter, but here I want to focus on 
Solomon’s criticism of the alternative views.  Since we have seen the general line of 
attack against feeling and behaviorist theories, I will limit myself to his criticisms of 
psychoanalytic theories of emotions.  Solomon primarily targets Freud in this criticism, 
although he admits that Freud’s theory is too complex to sum up easily.  However, he 
identifies three major conceptions of the emotions in Freud, all of which are based on a 
hydraulic model where pressures from the unconscious build up and attempt to discharge 
by entering consciousness.37  Freud sometimes conceives emotions as these unconscious 
forces themselves; other times he thinks of the emotions as the forces when they erupt 
and are directed toward some particular person or event; and still other times, Freud 
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conceives these emotions as the feeling of these erupting forces, a mere 
epiphenomenon.38   
 Solomon claims that the net result of this hydraulic model is the minimization of 
the importance of consciousness in behavior.  If the emotions are unconscious forces 
building pressure until they discharge in behavior, then there is little room for conscious 
agency and moral responsibility in human behavior and human emotions.39  Working 
within the existentialist tradition, Solomon argues that the acceptance of the 
psychoanalytic model is an instance of bad faith.  “But whatever its popularity, [the 
hydraulic metaphor] . . . emerges as a hollow technical pretense which again attempts to 
reduce our emotions to something less than wholly human and distinctly beyond the 
range of our own responsibility. . . . Every time one adopts such a viewpoint, . . . he or 
she is guilty of precisely this self-serving and irresponsible self-deception.”40   The 
central defect of the psychoanalytic theory, according to Solomon, is the passivity it 
assumes.  It assumes the emotions are something not truly our own for which we are 
morally responsible. 
 Dissatisfaction with the views that the emotions are feelings, behavior 
dispositions, or non-rational forces erupting from the subconscious led to a recognition 
that an adequate understanding of the emotions needs to capture the intentionality of 
emotions and thereby the ability to explain how we distinguish subtle differences among 
various emotions.  Additionally, a theory of emotions must explain the fact that emotions 
are often open to rational and moral assessment.  In what would become the mainstream 
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philosophical position, cognitivism attempts to capture these features by equating the 
emotions with forms of cognition.   
 
Cognitivism and Contemporary Emotion Theory 
 The idea that thoughts are central to or involved in the emotions or the passions is 
nothing new.  William Lyons writes that “Aristotle’s account is a cognitive account, not 
because he believed that emotions affected our judgment, but because he also believed 
that judgments or cognitions were central to emotions.”41  In her Upheavals of Thought, 
Martha Nussbaum traces the idea that emotions are appraisals or value judgments back to 
the Stoics.42  Even Plato argues that hope and fear involve assertions, and thus can be 
evaluated in terms of truth and falsity.43  However, contemporary cognitivism, which will 
be the focus in this chapter, arose in response to the theories criticized above and as a 
result of change in philosophical methodology.44  There are many different versions of 
cognitivism distinguished by the form of cognition they take to be central to the concept 
of emotion and by whether the theory takes any other elements, such as feeling or desire, 
to be necessary to the concept of emotion.  The first classificatory division I wish to make 
is between “strong cognitivism” and “weak cognitivism.”  Strong cognitivism claims that 
cognition in the form of judgment or belief is a necessary condition of the concept of 
emotion.  Weak cognitivism, on the other hand, takes a broader view of cognition to 
potentially include both perceptual and conceptual cognition.  The second division is 
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between what I will call conservative and liberal cognitivism.  Conservative cognitivism 
identifies emotions with cognitions, whereas liberal cognitivism introduces further 
elements (feelings, desires, etc.) into the analysis of emotion.  This makes for four 
possible categories: strong/conservative cognitivism, strong/liberal cognitivism, 
weak/conservative cognitivism, and weak/liberal cognitivism.  While not all specific 
cognitivist theories would fit neatly into one of the four categories, this classification will 
be useful in evaluating the strength and weaknesses of various versions of cognitivism 
and to show what an analysis of Aquinas’s theory can contribute. In this section I will 
argue that the weak/liberal version of cognitivism is the most plausible.  To show this, I 
will begin by comparing representative examples of the two versions of strong 
cognitivism and argue that the liberal version is more plausible.  Secondly, I will compare 
this strong-liberal version of cognitivism with a weak-liberal version and argue that the 
weak version is superior.  This method will allow the strengths and weaknesses of 
cognitivism to become clear and prepare the ground for placing Aquinas’s theory in 
conversation with contemporary views. 
 In his 1976 work The Passions, Robert Solomon offers what he calls “a subjective 
theory of the passions.”  Solomon grounds this theory of emotions in the 
phenomenological concept of intentionality.45  All emotions are about something and that 
which they are about is called its intentional object.  Whereas Kenny’s central distinction 
is between material (the particular) object and the formal (the classificatory) object, 
Solomon’s central distinction is between the material object (the object as it exists in 
objective reality) and the intentional object (the object as it is experienced, interpreted 
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and evaluated).  This distinction becomes necessary upon the realization that, in many 
instances, the “object” of our emotion is a nonexistent object.  I may fear the government 
spies who have infiltrated my classroom disguised as students, even if there are no such 
government spies.  If no distinction between material and intentional object is made, then 
it is difficult to analyze such situations in a satisfying manner.  We would be forced to 
suggest that either 1) such emotions have no object (since there are no government spies 
in my classroom), 2) that the object of the emotion is simply “in my head”, or 3) that I do 
not know what I am afraid of (I think I am afraid of government spies, when in actuality I 
am afraid of innocent students).  But no option is satisfactory because I am afraid of 
government spies which are not simply in my head.  It should be noted that this is 
decidedly not a Cartesian distinction between mental representation and physical object; 
in fact, it is a rejection of such a distinction.  He writes: “This is not to defend an absurd 
‘two-worlds’ view, a ‘private’ world within which we enact our emotional dramas and a 
public world of ‘the facts.’  There are rather two standpoints, one detached and one 
personally involved.”46  It is from the standpoint of personal involvement that the 
emotions have their place.  But this does not make emotions merely subjective.  Even the 
most delusional emotions, Solomon writes, “virtually always have some basis in Reality 
(the most extreme paranoid does not make up the objects of his fear), and no object of an 
emotion is simply what it is ‘in Reality.’”47  Thus, the objects of emotions are in his view 
always intentional rather than material objects.   
 In order to account for this intentionality, Solomon argues that the emotions are 
self-involved, evaluative judgments.  “What is an emotion? An emotion is a judgment (or 
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a set of judgments), something we do.  An emotion is a (set of) judgment(s) which 
constitute our world, our [subjectivity], and its ‘intentional objects.’  An emotion is a 
basic judgment about our Selves and our place in our world, the projection of values and 
ideals, structures and mythologies, according to which we live and through which we 
experience our lives.”48  Solomon makes clear that on his analysis, the emotions are not 
somatic responses to cognition; rather they are forms of cognition.  My fear is my 
judgment that I am in a dangerous situation.  My grief is my judgment that I have 
suffered a severe loss.49   
 Solomon rejects identifying the emotions with feelings on the same grounds 
articulated by Bedford and Kenny, and he is explicit that not only is feeling insufficient, 
it is also not necessary.  One can have an emotion without any detectable sensation or 
feeling, and one can have the sensations that often accompany emotions (fluttering in the 
stomach, etc.) without having an emotion.50  Similarly against the behaviorist, behavior is 
neither necessary nor sufficient according to Solomon, for we can pretend to have an 
emotion we do not have and some emotions are never manifested in behavior.51  Nor is 
desire necessary for emotions, although on this point Solomon is less than clear.  He 
claims that emotions and desires are two species of passions.52  However, he also claims 
that emotions are “filled with desires which sometimes become intentions and 
commitments.”53  It seems that, for Solomon, the emotions are more fundamental than 
desires for he claims that while natural desires such as thirst and hunger are not based on 
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emotions, the desires which are not pure biological needs (desire for happiness, 
friendship, success) “are built upon the structure provided by our emotions.”54  These 
desires emerge from our self-involved evaluative judgments — the emotions.  Thus, for 
Solomon, the emotions are identified with self-involved, evaluative judgments.  
 We can now begin to compare Solomon’s position to another strong cognitivist 
position, but of the liberal variety.  In his 1980 book Emotion, William Lyons offers a 
“causal-evaluative theory of emotion.”55  According to Lyons, emotions paradigmatically 
include the subject’s beliefs about the situation he/she is in and an evaluation of that 
situation in relations to him/herself.  However, an emotion is more than an evaluative 
judgment according to Lyons.  At least certain emotions also necessarily include the 
wants or desires that are caused by the evaluative judgment and lead to behavior.  Finally, 
the evaluative judgments and the desire cause somatic changes, which results in feeling.56  
The crucial differentiating factor between Lyons’ and Solomon’s theory is the “causal” 
aspect of the causal-evaluative theory, which refers not to the fact that emotions in 
general cause abnormal physiological changes and feelings.  As Lyons states, “for X to 
be an emotional state, X must include an evaluation which causes abnormal physiological 
changes.  Both the evaluation and the physiological changes are necessary conditions for 
X being an emotional state, but neither are separately sufficient.  Jointly they are.”57 
 Adding physiological changes and their accompanied feeling as a condition for 
emotion is an improvement to Solomon’s theory.  In his attempt to distinguish emotional 
evaluative judgments from other disinterested evaluative judgments, Solomon writes that 
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“the key to the difference is the adverbs, ‘disinterestedly,’ ‘causally,’ and ‘calmly.’  
Emotions are self-involved and relatively intense evaluative judgments.”58   But what can 
account for this intensity if not either feeling or desire?  Perhaps Solomon could reply 
that the intensity lies in the strength of the conviction of the evaluative judgment.  
Perhaps my fear becomes less intense as I become less convicted that my students are 
government spies.  But this doesn’t explain why two people might have varying levels of 
intensity with very similar evaluative judgments.  Two siblings may have two very 
different levels of intensity to their grief of a passing parent, even though the evaluative 
judgment is similar in both cases.  This difference in intensity could occur even if both 
siblings were equally convinced that the parent had in fact died and both placed a similar 
value on this event.  In short, emotions are psychosomatic, and Solomon’s theory, in the 
attempt to refute the “feeling theory,” places too little emphasis on the somatic aspects of 
emotions.  If feelings were as peripheral to emotions as Solomon suggests, then the 
feeling I have when I am angry would be scarcely more related to my anger than the 
feeling of cottonmouth I might happen to have at the same time.59 
 One final important difference between Solomon’s and Lyon’s theory is their 
understanding of intentionality and the distinction between a material and an intentional 
object.  While Lyons makes important clarifications between formal and particular 
objects, Solomon’s understanding of intentionality and intentional object is to be 
preferred.  Lyon’s distinction between formal and particular objects is identical to 
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Kenny’s distinction between formal and material objects.  The formal object is the 
conceptual object that is non-contingently related to it.60  For instance, the formal object 
of fear is the dangerous.  In other words, the formal object is the evaluative category 
under which a particular object falls on a particular occasion.  Lyons defines the 
particular object as “some particular item — such as a thing, a person or animal, an event, 
or the content of one’s own beliefs or imaginings, to name a few possibilities — which is 
the target or focus of an actual emotional state.”61   
 Lyons then distinguishes between material and intentional objects.  This 
distinction is similar to Solomon’s, but the way these objects relate to the emotions is 
importantly different in the two theories. For Lyons, as opposed to Solomon, the object of 
an emotion can be a material object.  A particular object is also a material object when 
this object really exists in the world, otherwise it is an intentional object.62  So, the object 
of my classroom fear is a material object if and only if the students are, in fact, 
government spies.  This is not to say that all intentional objects are illusory objects, for I 
may love my dead grandmother even though I fully recognize she does not exist.  In this 
case, my grandmother is an intentional, but not an illusory object.  The object of my 
classroom fear, on the other hand, is both intentional and illusory because they are not 
government spies and my fear involves the illusory belief that they are government spies.   
The problem with Lyons distinction is that it is a sharp one and it fails to allow for 
degrees of subjectivity.  Examining an example similar to the classroom example above, 
Lyons writes that the object is intentional because the object is “in some way 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 William Lyons, Emotion, 101. 
61 William Lyons, Emotion, 104. 
62 William Lyons, Emotion, 107. 
 
	   24 
manufactured by my mind.”63  But all emotional cognition is in some way manufactured 
by the mind.  There is a distinction to be made between the object as it is in reality and as 
someone experiences, interprets, evaluates, and relates it to him/herself.  But all 
experience, emotional and otherwise, is as someone experiences it.  Even Solomon’s 
unemotional, detached standpoint is still a human standpoint.  
  There have been a number of objections raised against identifying the cognitive 
content of emotions with evaluative judgments.  As we saw, the initial impetus toward 
contemporary cognitivism was the result of a dissatisfaction of feeling and behavior 
centered theories on the grounds that they could not explain the intentionality of 
emotions.  However, this criticism of revival theories, while accurate, does not by itself 
warrant equating the cognitive content of emotions with evaluative judgments.  John 
Deigh observes that “something can be an intentional object even if the subject has no 
beliefs about it and even if the subject’s state of mind is such that only certain things can 
be its object. . . . When a dog relishes a bone, the bone is the object of delight.  Yet it 
does not follow that the dog has any beliefs about the bone.”64  While equating the 
cognitive content of emotions with evaluative judgments does capture the intentionality 
of emotions, it has the unfortunate implication that animals lacking the ability to make 
evaluative judgments do not experience emotions.  This observation has led many 
scholars toward a more qualified version of cognitivism that models the cognitive content 
of emotions on perception rather than propositional thought.  A successful theory that 
treats the emotions as a kind of perception would still be able to account for 
intentionality, without limiting the phenomenon to human emotions.   
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 In response to such criticisms, Robert Roberts offers a “mildly ‘cognitive’ 
account” of emotions where the “basic paradigm is that emotions are a kind of 
perception, and perceptions in the relevant sense may, but need not, be propositional.”65  
More specifically, Roberts claims that the kinds of perception that constitute emotions is 
“concerned-based construals.”  The concept of construal escapes easy definition, but 
Roberts’s most direct statement is that “a construal is a perceptual event or state in which 
one thing is grasped in terms of something else.  The ‘in terms of’ relation can have as its 
terms any of the following: a sense perception, a thought, an image, a concept.”66  For 
example, suppose a cab driver is approaching a woman who is standing on the curb when 
she begins to wave her arm.  Seeing this as “hailing a cab,” the driver slows down only to 
realize the woman was greeting a friend across the street.  The cab driver may have made 
the judgment that the woman was hailing a cab, but the experience was more than the 
judgment.  It was a perceptual experience seen in certain terms (as hailing a cab). Roberts 
clarifies that “construals have an immediacy reminiscent of sense perception.  They are 
impressions, ways things appear to the subject; they are experiences and not just 
judgments or thoughts or beliefs.”67  
 Emotions, for Roberts, are a particular type of construal, namely construals that 
are based on and permeated with concern: “I use ‘concern’ to denote desires and 
aversions, along with attachments and interests from which many of our desires and 
aversions derive.”68  On this account, fear involves construing an event, person, object, 
etc. as aversive where the aversive “look” depends upon concern(s) of the subject.  
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Remorse is a construal of some particular action or omission as a culpable violation of 
standards that the subject is concerned (i.e. desires) to honor.  Sadness is a construal of 
some event or state of affairs as a loss of something to which one is attached.  Like the 
strong cognitive theories discussed above, the cognitive content is the central and 
distinguishing element of emotional occurrence.  However, for Roberts, the cognitive 
content is a construal rather than judgment.   
 Roberts offers several reasons to prefer the identification of the cognitive content 
of emotions as construal rather than judgment.  First, there are instances in which the 
cognitive content of an emotion clashes with one’s judgment. Roberts explain that “we 
might say that the emotion makes a judgment (a proposal about reality); but this 
‘judgment’ is just the appearance or phantasia.  The subject’s judgment often coincides 
with the emotion’s ‘judgment,’ but often it does not.”69  A particular Epcot attraction 
offers guests the virtual reality experience of hang gliding.  Acrophobics will experience 
fear despite their judgment that they are not actually hundreds of feet of the ground.  On 
Roberts’s analysis, this would be due to the fact that the guests construe the situation as 
one of hang gliding.  And while there are cases where a change in judgment amounts to a 
change in emotion, Roberts is correct that this does not entail the emotion is the 
judgment.  He observes: “It may be, instead, that the change of judgment tends to carry 
with it a changed view of things.”70   Secondly, it is possible to assent to all relevant 
evaluative judgments without having a corresponding emotion.  Consider a case of faded 
grief.  If grief centrally is the judgment that “someone has been irrevocably lost and that 
this person is deeply important to me,” then how are we to explain the lack of grief after 
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it fades?  I still believe I irrevocably lost a friend in an auto accident ten years ago and 
this person is still deeply important to me, but I no longer feel grief.  Of course, the 
liberal version of strong cognitivism could point to the fact that the judgment no longer 
causes abnormal bodily changes that result in feeling.  Also, it might at first glance seem 
that this objection could apply to Roberts’s own theory, for the construal of the situation 
in the grief and post-grief periods remains constant.  However, Roberts claims the 
element of concern is both the reason why the grief fades and what protects him from this 
criticism.  After the grief has faded, the element of concern no longer permeates the 
construal.  On the other hand, Roberts notes that evaluative judgments can be made 
without concern for what is evaluatively judged.71  Similarly, Roberts points out that it is 
difficult to explain forgiveness on the evaluative judgment model.  In forgiveness, the 
judgment that one has negatively offended you remains, but the anger does not.  Roberts 
notes that it is “one of the many advantages of the view that emotions are appearances 
and not judgments that it explains phenomena like forgiveness.”72 
 Finally, we have control over our emotions in a way that we do not with our 
judgments.  For instance, I can mitigate my fear by the way in which I construe the 
situation, even while the judgment regarding the dangerousness of the situation stays 
constant.  It is much more difficult to change or abandon one’s judgments.73  Thus, the 
weak version of cognitivism that identifies the emotions as a kind of perception avoids 
the standard criticisms of the strong cognitivist theory while still being able to capture the 
intentionality of emotions and the subtlety of our emotional lives in a way the feeling and 
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behaviorist theories could not.  As we shall see, it is also the version of cognitivism that 
is closest to Aquinas’s theory. 
 
Aquinas’s Account of the Passions  
 Reconstructing Aquinas’s account of the emotions presents a number of 
difficulties.  First, Aquinas’s understanding of what he calls “the passions” is couched in 
a rather complex philosophical psychology.  It is impossible to come to even a cursory 
understanding of Aquinas’s thought on the human passions without at least discussing his 
understanding of apprehension (in both its sensitive and intellective forms), his 
understanding of the appetite (also in both its sensitive and intellective forms), the 
relationship between apprehension and the appetite, and the relationship between 
sensitive and intellective apprehension.  Moreover, this philosophical psychology has a 
long and distinguished history of critical engagement.  All I can do here is to present a 
very basic account of Aquinas’s theory of the passions and those elements of his 
psychology which are absolutely necessary for such a basic reconstruction of his theory.  
 However, even if I am successful in this regard, a further difficulty arises in 
comparing Aquinas’s thought with contemporary theories of emotions because the 
concept of emotion is a modern one that Aquinas does not employ. As Nicolas Lombardo 
notes, “The central difficulty in reconstructing Aquinas’s account of emotion is that 
Aquinas never wrote about emotion.  He wrote about appetites, passions, affections, 
habitus, virtues, vices, grace, and many other subjects that relate to the contemporary 
category of emotion, but the word ‘emotion’ has no direct parallel in the Latin vocabulary 
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of the thirteenth century.”74  There are two central Thomistic concepts that might 
correspond to the modern concept of emotion: passions and affections.  Lombardo notes 
that Aquinas scholars unanimously interpret affection as a broad category that includes 
both the passions, which are movements of the sensitive appetite, and movements of the 
will or intellective appetite.75  So, affection refers to a broad category that includes the 
passions, but also includes the non-passional affections of the intellective appetite.  There 
is also general scholarly agreement that particular psychological states that Aquinas 
refers to as passions (love, hope, despair, fear, anger, etc.) refer to particular states that 
correspond to particular emotional states.  The central debate concerns whether particular 
non-passional affections would also correspond to particular emotional states.  If so, it 
would be appropriate to compare Aquinas’s account of the affections in general with 
modern accounts of emotion.  If not, restricting the comparison to the passions would be 
more appropriate.   
 Diana Fritz Cates agrees with Lombardo that the term ‘affectus’ denotes a broad 
category that includes movements of both the sense and intellective appetites.  Non-
passional affections are simple movements of the will that do not involve a commotion of 
the soul.  Moreover, she assumes that the narrow category of passions is coextensive with 
the modern category of emotion.  “I am interested,” she acknowledges, “in emotions, 
rather than affections.  I analyze as emotions what Aquinas calls passions (passiones), 
which are mediated by the body and do involve a ‘commotion of the soul.’”76  According 
to Lombardo, this is a mistake because he does not accept the assumption that emotions 
necessarily involve physiological change.  This assumption, which Lombardo rejects, 
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makes it seem as if there is a correspondence between the concept of emotion and the 
concept of passion because Aquinas is clear that passions, by definition, involve the body 
and physiological change, whereas non-passional affections do not.  But if we do not 
make the assumption that emotions involve physiological change and its feeling 
accompaniment, this leads to Lombardo’s view that there is a “conceptual 
correspondence between emotion and [Aquinas’s] category of affections.”77 
 As the above debate indicates, the problem lies less with Aquinas’s distinction 
between passions and affections and more with our rather blunt and ambiguous concept 
of emotion.  Questions that would need to be asked to resolve this debate are about the 
concept of emotion, not the concepts of passions or affections.  For instance, can one feel 
emotions toward universal concepts of the intellect (i.e., can one feel angry at injustice in 
general as opposed to some particular act of injustice)?  Do the emotions necessarily 
involve bodily feeling?  Do the emotions necessarily involve physical change?  I will 
primarily focus on Aquinas’s theory of passions as emotions, although I am unable to 
give an essentialist definition of emotion that would fully justify this.78   Instead, I think a 
more fruitful way of approaching the concept of emotion is to elucidate paradigmatic, but 
non-essential, characteristics of emotions.79  For instance, the emotions are 
paradigmatically felt, are typically accompanied with bodily changes, and are usually 
directed toward particular objects or events.  Additionally, part of my claim in chapter 
three will be that Aquinas’s account of the passions in particular can help illuminate the 
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nature of religious experience.  It can serve as a reminder to the phenomenologist of 
religion that religious experience is often first and foremost an experience of a material 
context rather than a rarefied mystical experience.  For all of these reasons, my focus will 
be on the category of the passions.   
 Aquinas’s most extended treatment of the passions appears in the Summa 
Theologiae I-II 22-48.  However, Aquinas never offers a comprehensive definition of 
passion.80  Perhaps the closest he comes to such a definition is in his approving quote of 
John Damascene: “Passion is a movement of the sensitive appetite when we imagine 
good or evil.”81  However, this definition does not fully capture Aquinas’s view, for it 
does not make explicit the somatic aspect of the passions which Aquinas holds to be a 
necessary component.  He explains: “Passion . . . is not found in the soul, except 
accidentally: but the composite [of body and soul], which is corruptible . . . .”82  For 
Aquinas, the passions do not belong properly to the mind or to the body, but to the living, 
embodied (human) animal as a whole.83   This view has contemporary advocates as well.  
For instance, Peter Goldie, reacting against what he perceives as an over-
intellectualization of emotions in cognitivism, writes that “our entire mind and body is 
engaged in the emotional experience, and all the feelings are ‘united in consciousness’ in 
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being directed toward its object: united ‘body and soul,’ ‘heart and mind.’”84  Aquinas’s 
emphasis on the emotions belonging to the composite leads Nicolas Lombardo to 
reconstruct Aquinas’s basic position as follows: “A passion is a physiological and 
psychological response to the apprehension of a sensible good or a sensible evil, that is, 
an object that is known through the senses, and judged to be good or evil.”85  This is a 
fair working definition of Aquinas’s understanding of the passions, although, as we shall 
see, it requires some qualification.  To flesh this out, I want to begin by discussing the 
concept of the appetite in general and the sensitive appetite specifically.  Given the 
appetite’s close interaction with apprehension, I will then discuss Aquinas’s 
understanding of sensitive apprehension and the relationship between sensitive and 
intellective apprehension.  This will put us in a position to compare Aquinas’s theory 
with the versions of contemporary cognitivism discussed above.   
  Eleonore Stump observes that “it is not easy to provide a satisfactory translation 
of ‘appetitus,’ especially in a single word: ‘desire,’ ‘tendency,’ ‘inclination,’ ‘attraction,’ 
are all more or less unsatisfactory possibilities.”86  The reason for such difficulty is the 
fact that the appetite can take so many different forms based upon the nature of the 
objects toward which the appetite responds and the type of knowledge necessary for the 
appetite to respond to the object.  One temptation I want to avoid at the outset is thinking 
of the appetite as most basically forms of hunger, thirst, and sex drive.  Taking this as our 
model will distort Aquinas’s understanding of the passions.  The various forms of 
appetitive motion are too subtle and complex to be modeled in this way.  Cates observes 
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that the forms of appetitive motion include “being-attracted-to, tending-away-from, 
rising-up-against, being-crushed-by, being-at-rest-in, being-ill-at-ease-with, and the like.  
Unfortunately, when many people who study the emotions hear the term ‘appetite,’ they 
think ‘hunger’ or ‘sex’, and at that point they stop thinking clearly and creatively about 
the relationship between appetite and emotion.”87  
 Perhaps we can get a clearer picture of Aquinas’s concept of the appetite by 
marking his distinction between three broad types of appetite.  Aquinas writes that:  
 all things in their own way are inclined by appetite towards good, but in different 
 ways.  Some are inclined to good by their natural inclination, without knowledge, 
 as plants and inanimate bodies.  Such an inclination towards good is called ‘a 
 natural appetite.’  Others, again, are inclined towards good, but with some 
 knowledge; not that they know the aspect of goodness, but that they apprehend 
 some particular good; as in the sense, which knows the sweet, the white, and so 
 on.  The inclination which follows this apprehension is called ‘a sensitive 
 appetite.’  Other things, again, have an inclination towards good, but with a 
 knowledge whereby they perceive the aspect of goodness; this belongs to the 
 intellect.88  
 
Here Aquinas distinguishes the various types of appetites based on the type of 
apprehension/cognition, or lack thereof, involved in the inclination.  By identifying the 
passions as movements of the sensitive appetite, Aquinas suggests that passions are 
inclinations towards or away from some sensory cognition of concrete particular objects 
perceived as good or bad in some respect.  Thus, in order to fully understand various 
forms of appetitive motion, we must understand the nature of apprehension, particularly 
the distinction and relationship between sensory and intellective apprehension.   
 For Aquinas, sensory apprehension is broader than simply perceiving particulars 
through the senses.  Aquinas notes that in higher animals, a particular object needs to be 
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apprehended not only at the time of its sensation, but also when it is absent.  Otherwise, 
the appetite would never be moved to seek something absent.  As Aquinas states it: 
“Therefore an animal through the sensitive soul must not only receive the species of 
sensible things, when it is actually affected by them, but also must retain and preserve 
them.”89  Thus, objects of memory and imagination are also objects of sensory 
apprehension.   
 Additionally, it is necessary for the sensitive apprehension to apprehend 
properties of both present and imagined objects that are not immediately available to the 
five external senses.  Aquinas writes: “But the animal needs to seek or to avoid certain 
things, not only because they are pleasing or otherwise to the senses, but also on account 
of other advantages and uses, or disadvantages.”90  The sheep must in some way be able 
to apprehend the wolf as dangerous, for it does not flee the wolf based on its sensible 
properties.  Likewise the bird must perceive the straw as useful for nest building.    
Aquinas recognizes that nonhuman animals “perceive these intentions only by some 
natural instinct,” but claims that humans perceive them by means of a “coalition of 
ideas.” 91  Unfortunately, Aquinas only minimally elaborates on what he means by a 
“coalition of ideas,” but he labels this power the cogitative power or the particular reason, 
“for it compares individual intentions, just as intellectual reason compares universal 
intentions.”92   The important point here is that the sensory apprehension does not include 
only sense perception of some particular object.  Nor is it confined to sense perception, 
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memories, and imaginings.  The objects of sense apprehension can include all such 
objects combined with an evaluation of their relevance to the subject’s concerns and 
interests.  Aquinas refers to such a combination as an “intention.”93  He claims: “The 
apprehensive power is not drawn to a thing, as it is in itself; but knows it by reason of an 
‘intention’ of the thing, which ‘intention’ it has in itself, or receives in its own way.”94 
In his analysis of human nature, Aquinas distinguishes between sensory and 
intellective apprehension. The simplest way to make the distinction between the two is to 
say that sensory cognition apprehends particulars whereas intellective cognition 
apprehends universal concepts which are abstracted from sense perceptions.  However, 
the fact that Aquinas makes this theoretical distinction should not imply that the two 
forms of cognition operate independently of one another.  As Lombardo notes, “it is a 
structural clarification, and they should be understood as usually simultaneous and 
mutually interpenetrating.”95 Similarly, Cates remarks that “in the final analysis, it is not 
the ‘intellect’ or the ‘sense’ that apprehends an object; it is the person who apprehends 
it.”96  Not only do we form concepts by abstracting universal features from particular 
sensory cognitions, but acts of the intellective apprehension can influence the way in 
which sensible objects appear.  This last point is important for understanding how 
Aquinas’s account can capture emotional subtlety, and thus requires some explanation. 
 Paralleling the sensitive appetite, Aquinas’s psychology also contains the 
intellective appetite (i.e., the will).  Whereas the sensitive appetite responds to cognitions 
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or particular objects as they are perceived as good or bad in some way, the intellective 
appetite responds to universal concepts of the intellect.  He writes: “Now the sensitive 
appetite does not consider the common notion of the good, because neither do the senses 
apprehend the universal. . . . But the will [the intellectual appetite] regards good 
according to the common notion of the good.”97  Aquinas writes that the will can long for 
wisdom98 or rejoice in justice.99  But highlighting the close and interactive relationship 
between the sensitive and intellective parts of the soul, he says: “And if this joy [of the 
will] be increased though the perfection of justice, it will overflow into the sensitive 
appetite, in so far as the lower powers follow the movement of the higher.”100  
Commenting on this “overflow” theory, Lombardo writes: “The will first moves the 
intellect by the vehemence of its affections regarding some object, so that the intellect 
causes the particular reason to form some intentional object that engages the passions.  
This intentional object then immediately prompts a response from the sense appetite.”101 
 On Lombardo’s interpretation, it is not simply that the will overflows to the 
sensitive appetite, but also that the intellect overflows to sensory apprehension.  This 
seems necessary given that the sensitive appetite always responds to some intentional 
object.  Moreover, it is not difficult to see how the intellect could change intentional 
objects of the sensory appetite.  Suppose I find a stray dog in my neighborhood.  Given 
that I am a dog lover, I would probably respond with joy of having made a new friend.  
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However, if my neighbor then informs me that the dog has rabies, the intentional object 
would immediately change.  This change would not be a result of any change in sensory 
input.  Rather the concept of rabies would change the evaluation of the object in relation 
to my concerns and interests.  Thus, my joy might immediately change to fear, 
compassion, or both.  This close interaction between the sense and intellect is necessary 
for a charitable interpretation of Aquinas’s theory and will help address criticisms 
highlighted later in this chapter. 
 Now that we have examined Aquinas’s notion of the sensitive appetite in general, 
we can begin to explore how the various “movements” and objects of the sensitive 
appetite allow Aquinas to distinguish between various passions.  The two principal 
movements of the sensitive appetite, according to Aquinas, are attraction and repulsion: 
“Now, in the movements of the appetitive faculty, good has, as it were, a force of 
attraction, while evil has a force of repulsion.”102  When an animal perceives an object as 
good in some way (useful, suitable, pleasing), it is attracted to the object; when it 
perceives an object as bad in some way (harmful, unsuitable, discordant), it is repulsed.  
From the two principles, Aquinas identifies six first-order passions, which I will refer to 
as the ‘moments’ of attraction and repulsion.  The three moments of attraction are love, 
desire/longing, and joy/delight.  “The first change the object produces in our appetite,” he 
says, “is a feeling of its agreeableness: we call this love.”103 Out of this feeling of 
agreeableness arises desire which is the striving for some sort of union (physical, 
communal, possessive, etc.) with the object of attraction.  He continues: “So a 
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pleasurable object by attuning our appetite to itself makes us love, by attracting us to its 
absent self makes us desire.”104 Joy or delight results when the desired union has been 
achieved.  The three corresponding moments of repulsion are hate, aversion, and sorrow.  
Hate is the orientation away from that which is perceived as bad in some way.  Aversion 
is the striving away from the object of hate, and sorrow results when the striving away 
has been unsuccessful.   
 In addition to these six first-order passions, Aquinas also identifies five second-
order, irascible passions that result from perceived difficulties in the three-fold movement 
of attraction and repulsion.  The two irascible passions of attraction are hope and despair.  
Hope occurs when the object of desire is perceived as difficult, but possible, to obtain.  
Despair occurs when the object of desire is perceived as so difficult as to be nearly 
impossible to obtain.  The three irascible passions of repulsion are daring, fear, and anger.  
Daring occurs when the object of aversion is perceived as possible and worth trying to 
overcome.  Fear results when the object of aversion is perceived as virtually impossible 
to either overcome or escape.  Anger is a special case for Aquinas.  It occurs when the 
evil is already upon the subject (where sorrow would normally be), but the object is still 
deemed worth trying to overcome in some way. 
 This is clearly meant simply as a basic formal framework.  The phenomenological 
characteristics of two instances of the same passion might be quite different depending 
upon the subject or object of the passion and the circumstances in which the passion 
occurs.  But it is the formal structure that makes a passion one of a particular type.  Also, 
Aquinas does not limit his analysis to these eleven basic passions.  He is able to analyze 
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many other passions on this same basic framework by either specifying the object of the 
passion or expanding the narrative structure in which the passion occurs.  For instance, 
Aquinas defines shame as a form of fear where the object of fear is external disgrace.105  
Envy is a form of sorrow at another person’s joy.106  Dismay is a sort of neutral despair 
where the failed attempt at attainment of the object is not perceived as harmful (as is the 
case with despair).107  Compassion is a mixture of sorrow and desire.  It is a sorrow that 
results from identifying with another person who has been harmed which results in the 
desire to help.108  Also, Aquinas seems to suggest that one experience can be analyzed in 
multiple ways depending upon one’s point of view.  For instance, often desire or longing 
can be seen as a kind of sorrow because one perceives the absence of the desired object 
as present.109     
 Some contemporary scholars reject this long tradition of attempting to identify 
basic passions upon which more complex emotions are built.  Robert Roberts argues 
while lists of basic emotions do highlight certain relationships between emotions, they 
also hide certain similarities and differences.  He suggests that we will be more readily 
able so see the variety of ways in which various emotion types relate to one another if we 
avoid the temptation of creating a schema of basic emotions.110  While I agree that there 
are many ways to fruitfully organize various emotions in order to illuminate similarities 
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and dissimilarities, some organizational pattern is better than none.  Roberts goes on to 
classify emotions based on offense, fault, defect, loss, etc., which presumably highlights 
certain similarities at the cost of others.  So while there are certainly other ways to 
fruitfully organize particular emotion types, Aquinas’s account is one that allows for 
great flexibility and the ability to capture the subtlety of our emotional lives.   
  
Comparing Aquinas’s Theory and Cognitivism 
 With Aquinas’s basic account of the passions in place, we can begin to compare 
his theory to the various versions of cognitivism explored above.  However, further 
important nuances of the theory will emerge during the process of comparison.  We saw 
that cognitivism arose out of the difficulties of alternative views in capturing the 
intentionality and rationality of the emotions.  I will begin by arguing that Aquinas’s 
theory is able to capture these central insights.  I will then compare Aquinas’s theory with 
the previously considered views, showing how Aquinas is able to avoid central criticisms 
directed against cognitivism and how a more robust understanding of the emotions can 
emerge from such a comparison.  I will conclude by addressing various criticisms raised 
against Aquinas’s theory. 
 In the criticisms of non-cognitivist views above, we saw the importance of 
intentionality in explaining how various emotions are distinguished from one another.  
Emotions as both thoughts and perceptions capture the intentionality of emotions, for 
thoughts and perceptions are obviously intentional.  But Aquinas, for reasons to be 
discussed later, clearly wants to distinguish cognition, broadly construed, and emotion.  
But he is nonetheless able to account for intentionality of emotions by appealing to their 
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conative, rather than their cognitive, properties.  The passions depend upon and respond 
to apprehensions of intentional objects, giving the passions themselves their intentional 
character.  And as we saw, Aquinas distinguishes particular emotions based on the formal 
object they are conatively directed toward or away from.   
 The second charge against the feeling and behavioralist theories was that they 
cannot account for how the emotions can be proper objects of rational assessment.  If the 
emotions are nothing more than bodily feeling, it would be nonsensical to speak of them 
as rational or irrational, appropriate or inappropriate. Of course, strong cognitivism is 
well-poised to explain this feature, since propositional thought, the essential element in 
emotions on this theory, can be rational or irrational.  The problem with this response is 
that not all emotions are open to rational assessment.  As John Deigh points out regarding 
animal and infant emotions, “If a creature lacks reason, it lacks the faculty whose 
operations are presupposed in descriptions of states of mind as rational or irrational, 
reasonable or unreasonable.”111 
 Aquinas claims that there is even a certain sense in which animal passions can be 
said to be reasonable in a very limited sense:  “[The passions] obey the reason in their 
own acts, because in other animals the sensitive appetite is naturally moved by the 
estimative power; for instance, a sheep, esteeming the wolf as an enemy, is afraid.”112  
Animal emotions naturally follow an instinctive judgment that aids their well-being and 
flourishing.  But in human beings, the emotions are rational in an extended sense.  He 
writes: “The sensitive appetite is naturally moved by this particular reason [the cogitative 
power].  But this same particular reason is naturally guided by the universal reason. . . . 
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Therefore it is clear that universal reason directs the sensitive appetite . . . and this 
appetite obeys it. . . . Anyone can experience this in himself: for by applying certain 
universal considerations, anger or fear or the like may be modified or excited.”113   As 
one reflects and thinks about one’s own situation, this reflecting and thinking shapes the 
way the situation intentionally appears.  Cates observes that  “one is more likely to 
apprehend a particular comment as hurtful and as a cause for anger if one believes that 
the person who made it is one’s friend (rather than a mere acquaintance), and the friend 
could have known the comment would expose a painful vulnerability.”114  Thus the anger 
is rational to the extent that the beliefs that shape the apprehension are rationally 
grounded.  But this does not entail that the emotions are the beliefs.   
 The rational functions of the soul not only shape the emotions we experience, but 
also can direct which emotions we experience.  Aquinas writes that “from the 
apprehension of something by the intellect there can follow a passion in the lower 
appetite . . . in so far as that which is understood by the intellect in a universal way is 
represented in the imagination in particular, thus moving the lower appetite.”115  In the 
example of the rabid dog above, my understanding of rabies directed my joy to fear 
through the sense perception and imagination.  Thus my fear was rationally grounded to 
the extent that my belief that the dog had rabies was rationally grounded.  Aquinas is able 
to deal with the challenges because of the rich interplay between the sensory and 
intellective apprehension.  However, unlike strong cognitivism, Aquinas’s theory allows 
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human emotions to be open to rational assessment without denying that non-rational 
animals experience emotions.   
 Like the various versions of cognitivism, Aquinas is able to capture the 
intentionality and rationality of the emotions.  However, the central difference between 
Aquinas’s theory and cognitivism is the way these features are accounted for.   Unlike 
cognitivist philosophers, Aquinas explicitly distinguishes cognition and emotion.  
However, his rationale is not so easy to determine.  Question 22, article 2 asks whether 
passion is in the appetitive part rather than the apprehensive part.  Quoting Aristotle’s 
Metaphysics, Aquinas writes “that ‘good and evil,’ i.e. the objects of the appetitive 
power, ‘are in things themselves.’  On the other hand the apprehensive power is not 
drawn to a thing, as it is in itself; but knows it by reason of an ‘intention’ of the thing. . . . 
Hence we find it stated that ‘the true and the false,’ which pertain to knowledge, ‘are not 
in things, but in the mind.’ Consequently it is evident that the nature of passion is 
consistent with the appetitive, rather than with the apprehensive part.”116  Aquinas claims 
that in apprehension, we are not drawn to the object; rather we ‘know’ the object, truly or 
falsely.  However, the passions somehow involve being moved by the object.  As Miner 
states, “Apprehension brings the thing to us, as it were, through its sensible or intelligible 
species.  Appetite, by contrast, moves us toward the thing itself.”117  But how are we to 
make sense of Aquinas’s notion of the passions as a movement of the sensitive appetite.  
Surely Aquinas’s theory is not so crude as to suggest that I locomotively move every time 
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I experience fear, longing, and the like.  This language is even more strange given that 
joy and sorrow are described in the language of rest.118 
 Robert Miner notes three reasons behind Aquinas’s language of movement.  First, 
while the passions are not equated with bodily and physiological change, they do involve 
such change.119   Aquinas would agree with Lyons that bodily change is a necessary 
condition of emotions, for there is an ordered and intimate connection between the body 
and mind.  The language of motion can remind us of the bodily aspect of the passions.  
Secondly, the passions often do move us toward ends.  Miner writes,  “Aquinas privileges 
the category of ‘motion’ . . . because he wants the likeness of motion to evoke the pattern 
of human life itself, conceived as a return to the end.”120  In this sense, Aquinas observes 
with Roberts that the emotions involve concerns: desires, aversions, attachments, and 
interests.121  But given that we can, as Roberts admits, have construals without concerns 
(and therefore without emotions), why should we identify emotions primarily with 
construals rather than with concerns?  If we were to translate Aquinas’s theory into the 
language of Roberts, we could say that the human emotions are construal-based concerns 
rather than concern-based construals.  Or perhaps more accurately we should say 
emotions are concerns in response to intentions, where intentions are the objects of sense 
apprehension (perceptions, memories, imaginings, etc.) combined with an appraisal of 
their relevance to the subject’s interests. By equating the emotions with cognitions, 
cognitivism over-intellectualizes the emotions, neglecting their somatic and conative 
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character.  A satisfactory theory of emotions needs to capture not simply intentionality, 
but what Maurice Merleau-Ponty referred to as motility.122  Like intentionality, motility 
involves being directed toward objects, but motility also makes essential reference to the 
body and bodily movement.  The emotions are not only about objects, they also move us 
— to tears, to laughter, to contemplation, to action.   
 However, the primary reason behind Aquinas’s language of movement is that 
Aquinas is drawing on Aristotle’s definition of motion as an actualization of potentiality.  
In this sense, movement means something like alteration or transformation.  Miner says, 
“A passion is an alteration that involves a change either from one contrary to another 
(e.g. from pleasure to sorrow), or from a privation to a quality (e.g. from being calm to 
being angry).”123  However, I would add to Miner’s account that emotions involve not 
only alterations of psychological states, but are also centrally involved in alterations or 
transformations of character.  For instance, if I have been habituated into evaluating a 
large range of sensory objects as dangerous resulting in many occasions of inappropriate 
fear, this will shape my character as a coward.  A common method of transforming one’s 
cowardly character is to deliberate illicit experiences of fear in order to be able to more 
accurately evaluate an object’s potential affect on one’s well-being.  Thus, emotions not 
only move us toward external ends, but the cultivation of emotions move us toward 
internal ends of character.   
Given Aquinas’s emphasis on the conative character of emotion and his language 
of movement, I propose to reconstruct his definition of emotion as psychosomatic forms 
of transformational concern toward objects of sensory apprehension.  While a full 
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justification of this reconstruction will emerge only after I discuss Aquinas’s account of 
particular emotions in chapters three and four, let me here offer preliminary support by 
discussing some of the key terms of this definition, beginning with ‘concern.’  I am 
drawing on Roberts use of the term ‘concern’ “to denote desires and aversion, along with 
the attachments and interests from which many of our desires and aversions derive.”124  I 
have chosen to replace “appetite” with “concern” in order to dislodge the common 
misconception that Aquinas’s models the passions on basic drives like hunger, thirst and 
sex.125 When we examine Aquinas’s treatment of particular passions in later chapters, we 
will see that his understanding of appetitive movement is much too subtle to be 
understood in this way.126   
By “transformational,” I am attempting to capture Aquinas’s use of the language 
of “movement” while avoiding the misconception that this refers to locomotion.  Peter 
King explains that “in medieval philosophical jargon, an emotion is a potency whose 
principle of actualization is external to its subject; in contemporary terms, an emotion is a 
reaction.”127 Having an emotion involves a change from one state to another.  That is to 
say, the passions are occurrent rather than dispositional.  We can distinguish my 
disposition to fear at the sight of birds from the occurrent state of fear.  Aquinas has much 
to say about habits and dispositions in the five questions directly following his treatment 
of the passions, but he distinguishes between the passions and dispositions.  In addition to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
124 Robert Roberts, Emotions: An Essay in Aid of Moral Psychology, 142.  Again, Roberts, unlike Aquinas, 
identifies emotions with construals based on concerns, not the concern itself. 
125 We will see below that Roberts falls prey to this misconception in his reading of Aquinas. 
126 I have already given some indication for why the emotions are better understood as concerns rather than 
construals based on concerns.  However, I offer further justification for this in my discussion of Aquinas’s 
account of love in chapter three. 
127 Peter King, “Aquinas on the Emotions,” in The Oxford Handbook of Aquinas, ed. Brain Davies and 
Eleonore Stump (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 211. 
 
	   47 
capturing notion that passions are reactions and occurrent, “transformational” is also 
intended to capture the idea that emotions motivate action and move us toward external 
ends.  Additionally, “transformational” conveys the idea that the cultivation of emotions 
results in internal change of character.   
Finally, the term psychosomatic is used to remind us of Aquinas’s insistence of 
the importance of the body in emotions.  For Aquinas, the emotions involve both a formal 
and material element.  He writes that “in the passions of the soul, the formal element is 
the movement of the appetitive power, while the bodily transmutation is the material 
element.  Both of these are mutually proportionate; and consequently the bodily 
transmutation assumes a resemblance to and the very nature of the appetitive 
movement.”128  For Aquinas, the emotions necessarily involve bodily change and its 
feeling accompaniment.  Moreover, there is a close connection between the two.  As 
Peter King explains, “the physiological changes . . . are what make the associated 
psychological state an emotion: a desire is only a desire if its motivational force is felt in 
the proper way, and mutatis mutandis for the other emotions.”129 
 I will now conclude by addressing common criticisms raised against Aquinas’s 
theory.  Each of the three cognitivist philosophers examined above offers criticisms of 
Aquinas’s account.  In The Passions, Solomon only briefly mentions Aquinas.  When he 
does, he lumps him in with Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, Kant, Spinoza, and 
Schopenhauer as philosophers who thought the main business of philosophy to be “to 
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develop the powers of reason to enable us to control the raging forces ‘from below.’”130  
However, the passions are not treated by Aquinas as raging forces from below.  The 
passions are not a challenge to rational thought.  First, the emotions for Aquinas are not 
irrational in the sense that they are always acting against reason.  To the contrary, the 
emotions generally attract us toward that which is beneficial and away from that which is 
harmful.  The emotions may conflict with the dictates of reason, but they need not and 
generally do not.  In fact, it is precisely this view of the passions as resistant to reason 
that Aquinas argues against in question 83 article 3 of I-II of the Summa.   
 Williams Lyons addresses Aquinas’s theory in more detail.  Lyons writes that 
“the difficulties of [Aquinas’s] theory derive from its jettisoning of the cognitive-
evaluative aspects of emotion . . . in favor of a pared-down causal chain from object to 
perception to impulse and its physiological accompaniments.  Aquinas must ultimately 
account for the differences between, say, love and hate, in terms of impulse alone.”131  
Lyons operates with an example of MacGregor, who loves a particular dog, and MacKay, 
who hates the same dog.132  On his analysis of Aquinas’s theory, the sole fact that 
explains the difference between the love and hate is that MacGregor is drawn toward the 
dog and MacKay is not.  But this is not what differentiates love and hate according to 
Aquinas.  Rather, it is the formal object.  In love, the response is toward an object seen as 
good; in hate, the object is perceived as evil.  Lyons doesn’t see how this can be the case 
on Aquinas’s account because “this would imply that there has taken some process by 
which it has been decided that or judged that [the object] is good [or bad].  This, we have 
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seen, is not the case.”133  However, there has been such a process according to Aquinas, 
namely sensory apprehension (which includes the cogitative power) operating in 
conjunction with the intellective faculties.  Lyons mistakes sensory apprehension with a 
very simple form of sense perception, and thus fails to appreciate the nuance of 
Aquinas’s theory. 
 Lyons also claims that Aquinas cannot accommodate backward-looking emotions, 
for there is generally no impulsion with such emotions:  “Sorrow at a loss, such as the 
death of a best friend, does not impel a person towards or away from anything, or even to 
do anything at all.  After all one cannot do anything.  One cannot bring back the dead.  
Action is irrelevant, and so must be any impulse to action.”134  One could respond that 
grief involves the desire or wish that the person was not irrevocably lost.  But even this 
move is not totally necessary to save Aquinas’s account, for as we saw the primary usage 
of movement (which I take Lyons to mean by impulse) is not a movement of locomotion 
or action, but Aristotle’s definition of movement as “the actualization of what exists 
potentially, insofar as it exists potentially.”135  By “movement,” Aquinas does not 
primarily mean “impulse to action” (although that may be a type of movement), but 
actualization of potential.  Thus, appetitive movement is the actualization or activation of 
potential concerns.  Understood in this way, Lyon’s criticism loses its force. 
 Robert Roberts attacks Aquinas’s theory for relegating the emotions to the 
sensitive appetite.  He offers four reasons for rejecting such a proposal, two of which 
have to do with the relationship between emotions and the body.  The first of these is 
essentially the same line presented by Lyons: the emotions need not incline us to move 
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physically toward or away from the object.136  I will let my reply to Lyons on this same 
issue stand.  A second criticism is that “it is at least questionable whether an emotion-
episode must, to be a genuine emotion, generate or be accompanied by some bodily 
change analogous to penile arousal or salivation.”137  The example used to illustrate this 
objection points to a larger problem with Roberts’s analysis of the sensitive appetite.  As 
mentioned previously, modeling the sensitive appetite on the sex and food drive, as 
Roberts does, oversimplifies Aquinas’s account of the passions.  But Aquinas does claim 
that bodily change (and its feeling accompaniment) is a necessary feature of the passions, 
which is the central issue of Roberts’s criticism:  For instance, “nostalgia seems to be an 
emotion with a minimal arousal dimension.”138  In response to Roberts’s criticism, one 
could classify such cases, with a heavy dose of exegesis, as, in Aquinas’s terms “simple 
affections without passion or commotion of the soul.”139  Roberts anticipates this move 
when he writes that “[Aquinas’s] response to these examples is to deny they are 
emotions.”140  However, Aquinas never denies simple affections of the intellectual 
appetite are emotions; he denies they are passions.  Whether or not non-passional 
affections are instances of modern emotions is an entirely separate question.  Still, I do 
not think cases of nostalgia could be for Aquinas non-passional affections, for he 
distinguishes the sensitive and intellective appetite by claiming that the sensitive appetite 
(passion) is a response to some apprehended particular good, whereas the intellective 
appetite (non-passional affection) is a response to the intellectual apprehension of the 
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good in general.141  Nostalgia seems to necessarily involve the memory of some 
particular event or person.  So, I think the better response is to grant Roberts that there 
may be emotions without a noticeable feeling element,142 but deny that this is a 
devastating critique.  Feelings are at least paradigmatic of emotional occurrences such 
that Thomas’s theory can serve as an important corrective on overly cognitivist theories 
in this regard.   
 The second two criticisms offered by Roberts concern the relationship between 
the emotions and the intellect.  Roberts writes that “virtually all human emotions are 
inseparable from conceptual or rational powers in a way that most instances of the 
sensory appetites are not.”143  But as I argued above, understanding the seamless 
interaction between the intellective and sensitive functions is crucial for an adequate 
understanding of Aquinas’s theory.  Aquinas can admit that, in the human animal, the 
conceptual and rational powers shape our sensory apprehension and thereby shape human 
emotions.  Roberts focuses on anger in this critique because Aquinas specifically states 
that the provocation to anger is always something that is regarded as unjust.144  He 
concludes: “This suggests that to be angry  . . . requires a minimal mastery of some moral 
concepts: just, responsible, blameworthy, etc. . . . The implication of what I am saying is 
that most of the emotions that humans experience are never experienced by animals, and 
do not, therefore, belong to a non-rational appetite.”145  However, Aquinas agrees, first of 
all, that anger is a special case: “Anger is a desire for vengeance.  Now vengeance 
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implies a comparison between the punishment to be inflicted and the hurt done. . . . Now 
to compare and to draw an inference is an act of reason.  Therefore anger, in a fashion, 
requires an act of reason.”146  Aquinas’s allows for something like anger in animals based 
on the natural instinct of the estimative powers,147 but would obviously deny that animals 
experience human anger or any other human emotion.  There is an analogical 
relationship between animal and human emotions, such that animal fear, sorrow, anger 
are like but not identical to human fear, sorrow, and anger.  Our higher cognitive abilities 
do change our emotional experiences, but that does not mean they are rational in a strong 
sense.  What Aquinas primarily intends to convey by placing the human passions in the 
sensory appetite is that they are directed at particulars.  I do not get angry at injustice in 
general or the concept of injustice, but at particular acts of injustice.  
 A final criticism by Roberts of placing the emotions in the sensory appetite is that 
“the objects of emotions are not always represented sensorily or in sensory-like 
images.”148  He offers an example of Mary who is indignant at the president for always 
choosing the most bellicose “peace plans.”    In these moments of indignation, Mary is 
not necessarily subject to any sense impressions of the president, nor to any imaginal 
counterpart of such sense impressions.  Such impressions may increase the likelihood or 
strength of the impressions, “but no such sense object is the object of the emotion in the 
way that another’s body is an object of sexual desire, or a salmon steak is an object of 
gustatory desire.  Even if she can see [the president’s] face, it is not that she is mad at; 
she is mad at [the president], and furthermore she is mad at him for a reason that cannot 
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be represented to the senses.”149  However, like the previous criticism, this fails to notice 
the rich intentionality of Aquinas’s notion of sensory apprehension.  Aquinas never 
suggests that the intentional object of sensory apprehension is limited to sense data, a 
sensory object, or a mental image. It can also include value laden perceptions, memories, 
and imaginings.  But it is limited to particulars, and Mary is indignant at this particular 
president for this particular peace plan.  Nor do we have passional reactions toward 
general concepts.  Despite the truth in Roosevelt’s claim, we do not fear, in an emotional 
sense, fear itself.     
 
Conclusion  
 I agree with Roberts that “no theory of emotion . . . accommodates [all the facts 
about emotions] gracefully.”150  However, Aquinas’s account of the passions does 
capture  paradigmatic emotional states fairly well.  But more importantly, he provides 
significant correctives on mainstream cognitivist accounts.  Aquinas’s account enables us 
to view the emotions as intentional, but in a way that captures important symmetries 
between human and nonhuman emotions.  He forces us to attend to the embodied aspect 
of emotional experience, a feature too often overlooked in the cognitivist attempt to 
correct feeling and behavioralist theories.  Like Roberts, he brings to our attention the 
importance of concern in emotional experience.  But unlike Roberts, he places concern at 
the very center of emotional experience, rather than cognitions and construals that arise 
out of concerns.  For Aquinas, the emotions are psychosomatic forms of transformational 
concern which are differentiated based upon the formal nature of their intentional object.   
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In further chapters, I will show how this conception of the emotions generally can help 
illuminate the nature of religious emotions specifically.  On this account, what makes an 
emotion a religious emotion is the intentional object, in this case religious symbols.  But 
before we can flesh this out, we must look first at the nature of religious symbols.   
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CHAPTER TWO 
RELIGION, RELIGIOUS SYMBOLS, AND RELIGIOUS EMOTIONS 
 
Introduction 
 According to the Thomistic account of the emotions outlined in chapter one, the 
emotions are psychosomatic forms of transformational concern (desires, aversions, 
attachments, interests, etc.) toward intentional objects of sensory apprehension.  
Moreover, particular emotions and emotion-types are distinguished in terms of their 
formal object.  If we are to apply this account of the emotions generally to consider what 
a religious emotion might be or what makes a particular emotion religious, at least some 
appeal will have to be made to the formal object.  In this chapter, I will combine the 
Thomistic theory of emotions generally with Robert C. Neville’s theory of religious 
symbols to begin to develop an account of religious emotions.  According to this theory, 
religious emotions are psychosomatic forms of transformational concern with religious 
symbols interpreted in a devotional context as their formal object.   The primary goal of 
this chapter is to clarify what I mean by “religious symbols interpreted in a devotional 
context” and how this understanding of the object of religious emotions can contribute to 
recent philosophical work on religious emotions. This will put me in a position to offer an 





The project of this chapter requires me to begin by offering a brief working 
definition of religion.  The concept of religion is, of course, notoriously vague, and there 
is no shortage of proposed definitions of religion or proposals that academics should 
abandon the category all together.  I want to be clear that I am not offering an essentialist 
definition of religion, nor do I want to suggest my definition should be considered 
normative for other projects.  However, it is important to offer a tentative and heuristic 
definition for the purposes of this project.  In this context, I take religion to be a set of 
interrelated and traditional human practices performed in response to perceived ultimacy 
with the end of individual, social, and/or global transformation.151   
The concept of ultimacy is perhaps more vague than religion, and it needs to be if 
it is going to be a category of cross-cultural comparison.  One could take a denotative 
approach and define ultimacy as the perceived reality symbolized by concepts of God, 
Brahman, the Dao, Buddha Nature, etc.  But this would fail to say what makes these 
perceived realities “ultimate.”  Perhaps we could better define ultimacy as that which 
conditions and gives meaning to all of existence or the absolute value that conditions all 
other values.  Robert Neville suggests it is better to think of two related senses of 
“ultimacy.”  In the ontological sense, ultimacy refers to the ultimate ground or principle 
of being.  In the anthropological sense, it refers to the ultimate goal of human 
existence.152  Of course, many traditions symbolize ultimacy in both of these senses and 
the two senses are often connected even if one sense receives greater emphasis.  The 
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ultimate reality symbolized as God in the monotheistic traditions determines an ultimacy 
of human life which might be symbolized as communion with God.  In non-theistic 
traditions, great emphasis might be placed on the anthropological sense.  For example, as 
Robert Neville and Wesley Wildman note, in some forms of Buddhism “it is ultimately 
important to realize there is no ontological ultimate, or at least nothing ontological to 
refer to ultimately.”153  By transformation, I am referring to the process of change from 
some non-ideal state of existence to an ideal state of existence.  In this respect, I am 
highlighting the soteriological dimension of religion, whether understood as a 
transformation from exile to shalom, sin to righteousness, pride to submission, samsara to 
moksha, suffering to nirvana, chaos to harmony, etc. Finally, by practices I am referring 
to the means by which this transformation is thought to occur, although I will have to 
give a fuller account of practices in the final chapter of this project. 
It is also important to briefly explain what I mean by the qualifiers “traditional” 
and “interrelated.” By “traditional” I simply mean that the practices and the symbols used 
in practices are culturally embedded and acquired.  I do not mean that the practices are 
necessarily institutionalized, although they often are. A recent Pew Research survey 
found that one-fifth of all adult Americans and a third of adults are “religiously 
unaffiliated.”154  Of these unaffiliated adults, many described themselves as “spiritual but 
not religious.”155  My qualification of traditional is not meant to exclude those practices 
that do not take place in an institutionalized setting.  But it is designed to suggest that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
153 Robert C. Neville and Wesley J. Wildman, “Introduction,” in Ultimate Realities, ed. Robert C. Neville 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 2001), 2. 
154 Luis Lugo, “‘Nones’ on the Rise: One-in-Five Adults Have No Religious Affiliation,” The Pew Forum 
on Religion and Public Life (Washington D.C.: Pew Research Center, 2012), 9. 
155 Luis Lugo, “‘Nones’ on the Rise: One-in-Five Adults Have No Religious Affiliation,” The Pew Forum 
on Religion and Public Life (Washington D.C.: Pew Research Center, 2012), 9. 
 
 58	  
those who practice some sort of religiously unaffiliated spirituality acquire the symbols 
used in practice from their surrounding community and culture, even if they do not 
always recognize that this is the case.  For example, half of those unaffiliated adults 
claimed to feel a deep or spiritual connection with nature.156  This identification with 
nature (which may well count as a practice) involves symbols (nature, mother earth, etc.), 
which are culturally and communally acquired.  By “interrelated” I mean that the various 
practices are all related to, in some way or another, some sort of transformational goal, 
even if that goal remains inchoate to those engaged in the practices.  
 
Neville’s Theory of Religious Symbols 
 The primary thesis of Neville’s work on religious symbols is that religious 
symbols are to be understood through three related but different kinds of analyses.157  
According to Neville, “the first is the study of what religious symbols refer to and how 
they refer.  Only by distinguishing a class of religious referents is it possible to say in any 
more than a conventional form what makes a symbol religious.”158  The second element 
in Neville’s theory is interpretation. Drawing on Charles Peirce’s semiotics, Neville 
claims that all interpretations involve an irreducible triadic structure.  In addition to the 
signified and the signifier, an analysis of interpretation must take into account the 
interpreter.159  In addition to reference and interpretation, the third type of analysis 
concerns the meaning of religious symbols as defined by their place within a semiotic 
system.  Neville explains that “the meaning-analysis involves showing how symbols are 
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embedded within symbol systems, and how symbol systems relate to one another, 
interdefining and overlapping.”160  Given the close relationship between interpretation, 
reference, and meaning, it is difficult to treat each area independently, but, in what 
follows, I will try to do this as far as it is possible, showing how each of them can provide 
conditions for the concept of religious emotions. 
 For my purposes, it makes most sense to begin with the element of interpretation.  
Neville defines interpretation as “an interaction between interpreters and their world 
guided by the signs and semiotic systems of their culture.”161  According to Neville, one 
of the unique and valuable aspects of Peirce’s semiotics is his thesis that interpretation is 
a triadic relation of sign, object, and interpreter.  While much modern philosophy focuses 
on the dyadic relation of mental image to real object, Pierce emphasized the fact that a 
sign relates to its object because an interpreter takes it to do so.162  Neville argues that it 
is particularly important to keep in mind the purposes of the interpreter when considering 
religious symbols.  He identifies three broad interpretive contexts, each one distinguished 
from the others based on the purpose of the interpreter.  “The theological context,” writes 
Neville, “is shaped by concerns for intercommunicability across all contexts [and] for 
universality of statement.”163  The primary goal in the theological context is theoretical 
understanding, clarity, and systemization.  The product of interpretation in the theological 
context is generally abstract doctrine and theory.  Concerning the communal context, 
Neville writes that “the dominant purpose . . . is the shaping and direction of the life of 
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the community.”164  In this context, religious symbols presented in songs, liturgies, art, 
and architecture can serve to bind the community together and shape communal identity.  
Finally, Neville claims that “the devotional context for religious symbols is dominated by 
the purposes of conforming the soul or self to the religious object in whatever respects 
the symbols can represent the object.”165   It is important to note that Neville uses 
“devotional context” as a technical term, and by devotion he does not mean expressing 
love and adoration to some deity.  He means using religious symbols to conform oneself 
to ultimacy, regardless of how this ultimacy is conceived.  In this context, the concern is 
not so much about gaining a theoretical understanding of the divine or whether such 
symbols bind together and give shape to the community, but rather the attempt to engage 
such symbols in a pragmatic way in order achieve certain religious ends.  Religious 
symbols in this context are supposed to transform the interpreters to be in better accord 
with what they symbolize.  
Neville notes that  “symbols for devotional contexts can be far more fantastical 
and imaginatively extreme than those in theological or social contexts. Not believing in 
gods in any literal sense, Tibetan Buddhists meditate on horrific images of bloody gods 
girdled with skulls in order to become awakened from their sleep.  Christians, Daoist, and 
Muslims meditate on hells for similar reasons.”166  As we will see, this is not to suggest 
that symbols on the devotional level lack reference.  However, the existential concern 
that permeates the devotional level shapes the way in which these symbols refer and often 
the very symbols utilized.  Not paying enough attention to the context can result in 
misinterpretation and confusion. The symbols of bloody gods with skulls will not be an 
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effective symbol if one’s purpose is gaining a theoretical understanding of the divine.  
Conversely, Neville notes that “the high abstractions at the outcome of theological 
investigation are likely to be so removed from symbolic powers of transformation as to 
be inefficacious and symbolically barren” in a devotional context.167  Given my focus on 
the soteriological dimension of religion, my focus will be on symbols operating in a 
devotional context and religious emotions, as I will explore them, have as their object 
symbols interpreted in this context.  More will have to be said about the analysis of 
interpretation later on, but first we must turn our attention to reference. 
The analysis of reference is important according to Neville, for what makes a sign 
a religious symbol is its reference to ultimacy.  However, the issue of religious reference 
is highly problematic.  Many religious traditions have a point at which they claim that 
ultimacy is not an object or a thing.  Rather, the ultimate transcends all finite things.  
Neville puts the problem of reference succinctly when he asks, “If the religious object . . . 
is beyond reference to finite things, is [the religious object] beyond reference?  If the 
answer is yes, then [the religious object] cannot be engaged, and Peirce’s theory of 
interpretation is of no help.  If the answer is no, then we have to speak to the issue of 
nonfinite reference.”168  Neville’s proposed solution to this difficulty is to suggest that 
religious symbols do not refer to the infinite as such.  Rather they refer, directly or 
indirectly, to what he calls “finite/infinite contrasts.”  Neville defines a finite/infinite 
contrast as “some finite thing to which reference can be made that is taken to be a 
boundary line or world-founding element in the culture, community, or person bearing 
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the referring symbol.”169  While it is a finite object that is primarily referred to in a 
religious symbol, the term ‘contrast’ is meant to suggest that the object is taken to be of 
such importance that the symbol, through negation, also points beyond the finite world-
founding element.  Thus, the object of a religious symbol is neither the infinite as such 
nor the finite world-founding element as such, but to the finite in contrast to the infinite.  
As Neville proposes, the real object of a religious symbol is “the situation that would 
obtain if the finite thing did not exist or have its world-constructing importance.  In short, 
the contrast has to do with the importance of the finite thing for the contingent existence 
of the world, in some respect, or the world of human meaningfulness.”170  While this 
account of religious symbolic reference is obviously vague and abstract, it is purposefully 
so because Neville wants a theory that is open to the various ways cultures and religious 
traditions articulate this contrast.  To clarify, Neville writes: 
The obvious grand example of a finite/infinite contrast in the West is the 
existence of the physical cosmos: without that there would be the infinite, or 
nothing.  In Western monotheisms, the infinite is often given a positive 
interpretation as creator.  East Asian religions such as Daoism and Confucianism 
often do not identify the existence of the cosmos per se as a finite/infinite contrast 
but rather its internal order and processive principles such as the Dao. . . . Some 
South Asian traditions, for instance Vedanta and Vaishnava, focus the existence 
and creation theme in ways analogous to [the West].  But others such as 
Buddhism are careful  to deny the possibility of focusing referentially on the 
existence of the cosmos and deny anything positive in the infinite or emptiness 
that is the true condition of form.171 
 
In addition to the physical cosmos as a whole, the grounds for the world of human 
meaningfulness can serve as the site of a finite/infinite contrast, for without such grounds 
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of value and meaning (whether symbolized as God or in some other way) the physical 
world might exist, but a meaningful and purposeful world would not.   
 To clarify this concept of “finite-infinite contrast,” Neville, drawing on Kant’s 
epistemology, distinguishes it from schema and schema images.  For Kant, a schema is a 
rule by which a non-empirical category of the understanding is associated with a mental 
image.  Similarly, a schema of a finite-infinite contrast is a “set of symbols that 
schematizes the finite/infinite contrast to finite proportions.”172  For example, 
representations of heaven or paradise schematize the finite/infinite contrast as the goal of 
human life to a spatial image.  The divine is not really a king on a throne in a place with 
streets paved with gold.  But imagining the infinite in this way may (depending on certain 
conditions of the interpreter) help structure the relationship between the interpreter and 
the religious end.173  Finally, schema images are specific symbols of finite/infinite 
contrasts.  Neville explains that “a schema is a rule for generating a schema image.  If 
heaven as a spatialized place for the infinite is a schema, the schema images might be a 
garden place, a throne room, a mansion, a banquet table, and so forth.”174   
 On Neville’s analysis, there are three modes of reference: conventional, iconic, 
and indexical.  However, it is the distinction between iconic and indexical reference that 
is crucial for my purposes.  In iconic reference, Neville writes that “the symbol, broadly 
conceived, has an inner structure and the reality referred to is taken to be like that 
structure.”175  In iconic reference, the object is taken to be like the symbol in some 
respect.  There are various ways in which the object may be taken to be like the symbol, 
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but it will only be so in certain respects and not in others.  Neville cites myths and 
narratives as having iconic reference and, as such, they are taken to be disclosive of 
reality by the engaged interpreter.  But this disclosure is not a simple isomorphic 
mirroring of reality.  Dostoevsky’s Crime and Punishment can tell us something about 
reality despite the fact that there is no historical personage corresponding to the character 
of Raskolnikov.  When we read the novel, we might recognize that psychological or 
social reality is, in some respects, like the narrative, all the while knowing it to be a work 
of fiction.  Religious myths and narratives work in similar fashion, except that the 
referent is not simply a psychological or social reality, but a finite/infinite contrast.  
 Neville writes that indexical reference involves “a symbol’s pointing to or 
indicating its object, whatever else it says iconically or conventionally.”176   Peirce’s 
paradigm example of indexicality was the way an effect refers to its cause (although not 
all indexical signs are taken to be caused by the object).  Smoke billowing from a house 
is an indexical sign of fire.  In such cases, the symbol points toward something other and 
unlike the symbol. While all forms of reference operate in all three interpretive contexts, 
in the devotional context, indexical reference is emphasized.  Neville explains, “In 
general, indexically referring signs connect interpreters causally with the realities 
interpreted. . . . For religions, indexical reference is important because it is crucial for 
attunement to ultimate realities.”177  In a devotional context, a symbol refers indexically 
to ultimacy when the symbol allows the devotee to engage with ultimacy even though the 
devotee does not take the symbol to be iconic of ultimacy.  For example, devotees might 
meditate on horrific images of hell in order to be aroused from complacency, which 
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prevents the end of transformation.  Thus, the image of hell points the devotee toward 
ultimacy, even though the devotee would certainly not think the image of hell is iconic of 
the divine.  Of course this distinction often causes confusion because symbols which are 
effective when taken as indexical can mistakenly be taken as iconic.  Neville explains 
that “a person indexically related to Jesus such that love of God and neighbor animates 
the person’s life has a true reference, even though the person might be hopelessly naïve 
and prone to error when ascertaining who the historical Jesus was.”178   
 This leads me to a final important distinction in Neville’s analysis of reference: 
the distinction between primary and secondary referents.  Neville explains that “the 
primary referent [of a religious symbol] is the religious object, which is best understood 
as a contrast joining something finite and something infinite. . . . The secondary referent 
is to the symbolizers’ own culture, stage of life, and state of soul.  That a finite thing can 
function in a finite/infinite contrast is relative to the nature of the interpreter referring to 
it.”179  For instance, parents as religious symbols will probably not be able to refer to God 
for someone who has been abused by their parents.  Creation ex nihilo can serve as a 
symbol only for those cultures that place importance on physical cosmology.  Western 
students often find it difficult to see how the Hindu goddess Kali, who is always 
portrayed as a wild-eyed, frightening figure with a belt made of human limbs and 
wearing a garland of skulls, could possibly refer to the divine.  However, it is not simply 
accidents of birth or culture that determine if a symbol can engage the interpreter.  There 
is also the issue of cultivated competency.  Neville analogizes that “musical connoisseurs 
have the competence to hear things their novices miss.  Westerners, until trained, cannot 
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hear what ordinary Chinese people hear in traditional Chinese music.”180  Learning to 
semiotically engage reality requires cultivation of potentialities, which, according to 
Neville, involves “learning though imitation and association what cannot be said 
significantly in words.”181   
 Learning through imitation highlights the third element in religious symbolism: 
meaning.  Neville’s makes a distinction between network and content meaning.  He 
writes that “network meaning is the meaning structure defined by a semiotic code, 
according to which there is a range of signs to which a given sign can refer. . . . Content 
meaning, by contrast, are those by which reality is engaged.”182  Grasping network 
meaning involves understanding the intracode relations among symbols.  An analysis of 
network meaning consists in making explicit these intracode relationships between 
various symbols, not the relationship between symbols and reality.  Neville writes that 
network meaning “is not an intentional study of actual interpretations, in which real 
objects are engaged, but only of possible interpretations as these are made possible by 
semiotic structures.  The symbols in their extensional structure are referred to other signs 
of objects, not to real objects themselves.”183  To take a religious example, I might begin 
an analysis of the network meaning of the Gospel of Mark’s description of the baptism of 
Jesus by making explicit that the symbolic image of the Spirit descending upon Jesus 
refers to the symbolic image of the Spirit hovering over the waters in Genesis.  I could 
continue this for as long as my familiarity with the semiotic code allowed without ever 
leaving the system of symbols that make up the Christian scriptures — without ever 
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engaging with reality.  But this is not to suggest, in post-structuralist fashion, that there is 
nothing beyond the text.  This suggestion confuses the structure of network meaning with 
the structure of content meaning.184   Neville writes that “signs have content meaning 
when a person is able to use them, along with the relevant referents and interpretants in 
their coded network, to refer to and interpret realities so as to shape and be shaped 
through engagement.”185  Thus, the ability to grasp the content meaning of a symbol 
system is relative to the secondary referent, as outlined above.  And while content 
meaning is the more important in the sense that through content meaning, reality is 
engaged, this is not to deny the importance of network meaning in interpretative 
engagement.  For often it is a network of symbols that an interpreter uses to engage 
reality rather than a single, isolated symbol.   
 Neville observes that network meaning is often learned in religious community 
long before the symbols might be used to interpret finite/infinite contrasts.  For instance, 
Neville writes that “childhood vests one with a host of . . . symbols of religious matters.  
These symbols are picked up from the media, from school, perhaps from participation in 
a religious community, and from friends who have their own religious communities.”186  
One often becomes acquainted with the network meaning of religious symbols to some 
degree in community and only later have an experience that, as Neville phases it, “shocks 
the person suddenly to see the limits, the particularity, the peculiarity, the finiteness of 
the life-world.”187  This might be an experience of natural sublimity, an awareness of 
deep moral obligation, or the facing of disease or death.  Either way, the person becomes 
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somewhat conscious of the spiritual dimension of life.  If they have inherited religious 
symbols from their community, they may quite naturally translate such experiences in 
terms of these ready-made systems.  Keeping in mind that for Neville the term ‘divine’ 
simply means a finite/infinite contrast, he notes that “the point to be emphasized is the 
shift from merely interpreting one’s life within the play of religious symbols to using 
those symbols to engage the divine.  This requires actual interpretive engagements of the 




 With this much of Neville’s theory of religious symbolism in place, we can begin 
to explore how it can contribute to a philosophical analysis of religious emotions.  To 
illustrate this potential, I will begin by reviewing one of the few, if not the only, 
philosophical analyses of the concept of religious emotion.  I will then show how 
understanding religious emotions as psychosomatic forms of transformational concern 
with religious symbols interpreted in a devotional context as their object can contribute to 
this work.   
 In his article “What are Religious Emotions?”, Petri Järveläinen employs a 
weak/liberal version of cognitivism to offer an account of religious emotions.  In 
considering the conditions for an emotion in general, he writes that “all emotions involve 
an affective feeling component and an evaluative cognitive component,” where the 
cognitive component is conceived broadly to include thoughts, images, memories, 
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perceptions, etc.189 In addition to these two generic conditions, Järveläinen identifies 
three specific conditions for religious emotions.  According to the cognitive object 
condition, Järveläinen states that “religious emotions involve a thought of the divine as 
their essential component,” where “the term divine is an open term that does not define 
strictly any theological content.  It just refers to something outside the human mind and 
world.”190  Secondly, according to the depth condition, Järveläinen writes that “in order 
to be deemed religious, emotions have to be self-regarding” in the sense that they are 
existentially significant.191  For example, suppose someone stumbles upon a living 
nativity scene and experiences delight.  This delight is not religious if it is simply a 
response to the quaintness of the scene.  If a tourist in a Japanese temple experiences 
wonder at the sight of the images of the gods, this is not a religious wonder if the object 
of this wonder is merely the extraordinary craftsmanship of the temple and the 
representations of the gods or if the representations of the gods do not in some way 
signify one’s commitments, personality, and ultimate concern. Finally, the existential 
significance of certain narratives, images, hymns, etc. are derived from the practical 
religious life.  According to this pragmatic condition, Järveläinen writes that “emotions 
are religious if they are situated in, or are reminiscences of, religious practices.”192  Thus, 
according to Järveläinen, emotions are religious when the object of the emotion involves 
a thought of the divine that is apprehended as existentially significant though 
participation in a religious community. 
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 For reasons given in chapter one, I do not fully accept Järveläinen’s cognitivist 
understanding of emotion and do not think he pays enough attention to conative elements 
of emotion.  However, I do think that Järveläinen’s three conditions for religious 
emotions at least provide a good starting point for discussing the concept of religious 
emotion.  According to Järveläinen’s cognitive object condition, the object of religious 
emotions is a thought of the divine, where the divine refers to the transcendent, 
“something outside the human mind and world.”193  However, it is difficult to see how 
the transcendent, as such, could possibly serve as an object of experience, much less of 
sensory apprehension in the Thomistic sense.  This difficulty is acute only if one 
recognizes the categorical difference between ordinary objects and the transcendent.  For 
instance, in his book Perceiving God, William Alston assumes that a non-sensory 
perception of God is possible and argues that this type of religious experience is 
normative based on the nature of God. He writes, “It seems clear that a non-sensory 
appearance of a purely spiritual deity has a greater chance of presenting Him as He is 
than any sensory presentation.”194   However, Alston’s language of ‘a purely spiritual 
being’ fails to appreciate this categorical difference (by making the transcendent out to be 
some sort of all-powerful ghost) and, as a result, fails to appreciate the problem of 
religious experience.  As Nick Zangwill argues, “[God] is so different that we should 
doubt whether there are and could be perceptual experiences of [God].”195  Järveläinen’s 
definition of the divine as something outside the mind and world recognizes this 
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categorical transcendence, but he does not offer an explanation for how the divine so 
conceived could possibly serve as an object of emotion.   
 Applying Neville’s theory, I want to suggest that the transcendent as such is not 
and could not be the object of religious emotions, for it cannot be the object of cognition.  
Qualifying Järveläinen’s cognitive object condition, I define the object of religious 
emotions not as the infinite or the transcendent as such, but as intentionally interpreted 
schema images of finite/infinite contrasts in a devotional context.  This revision of the 
cognitive object condition not only allows for the object to be a possible object of 
emotion, but it also explains why the depth condition and the pragmatic condition are 
necessary for the concept of religious emotion.  Precisely because the symbolic images 
refer (directly or indirectly) to limit experiences and are interpreted as having content 
meaning, such emotional concerns will be existentially significant and meet Järveläinen’s 
depth condition.  Finally, symbolic intentional interpretations of finite/infinite contrasts 
are only possible when one has achieved a certain degree of fluency in the network 
meaning of some symbolic system.  These symbolic systems and network meaning are 
always culturally embedded and acquired through participation in community.  As a 
result, religious emotions will be, as Järveläinen states, “situated in, or are reminiscences 
of, religious practices.”196  Thus, Neville’s theory of religious symbolism contributes to 
Järveläinen’s discussion of religious emotion not only by qualifying the cognitive object 
of the emotion, but also by allowing us to see the connection between the three specific 
conditions of religious emotion.   
 There is an additional contribution made by Neville’s distinction between the 
iconic and indexical modes of reference.  His emphasis on indexical reference in the 
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devotional context allows for a wide variety of images to potentially serve as religious 
symbols.  Indexical reference allows religious symbols to be “far more fantastical and 
imaginatively extreme than those in theological or social contexts.”197 As a result, there 
are a wide variety of religious emotions.  Scholars studying religious emotions from a 
variety of disciplines increasingly hold the view that religious emotions are not limited to 
a particular type.  For instance, Robert Roberts writes that “Religious emotions . . . come 
in most standard emotion-types: joy, sorrow, fear, gratitude, hope, anger, awe, reverence, 
compassion, contrition, hatred.”198  Similarly, sociologists Ole Riis and Linda Woodhead 
state that “[a religious emotion] is not some distinctive experience, sensation, or 
identifiable set of emotions.  When a writer like Rudolf Otto (1994/1931) tries to identify 
authentic religion with a particular type of feeling (a sense of mysterium tremendum et 
fascinans), or when Karen Armstrong (2007) says that ‘all religions are designed to teach 
us how to live, joyfully, serenely, and kindly, in the midst of suffering,’ they take a 
wrong turn.”199  There is no religious emotion per se; rather, any emotion can be 
religious.  Like Armstrong, I focus on the transformative aspect of religion, but joy and 
serenity are not the only emotions aroused by religious objects.  Nor do all traditions 
share the same conception of the soteriological end.  In continuing to develop this 
account of religious emotions, the next two chapters illustrate this wide diversity of 
religious emotions, religious ends, and the connection between the two.  
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AN ANALYSIS OF RELIGIOUS EMOTIONS OF ATTRACTION 
 
Introduction 
 In chapter one, I articulated and argued for the Thomistic account of the emotions 
as psychosomatic forms of transformational concern toward objects of sensory 
apprehension. Chapter two was primarily concerned with specifying the object of 
religious emotions as religious symbols interpreted in a devotional context.  My primary 
aim of the next two chapters is to argue that understanding religious emotions as 
psychosomatic forms of transformational concern toward devotional symbols of ultimacy 
can provide a fruitful framework for analyzing specific religious emotions and comparing 
religious emotional experiences across religious traditions.  In order to illustrate the wide 
diversity and variety of religious emotions, the organization of this chapter and the next 
mirrors Aquinas’s list of basic passions.  This chapter will consider the five passions of 
attraction (love, longing, joy, hope and despair) and the next will consider five passions 
of repulsion (hate, disgust, sorrow, fear and anger).  One advantage of Aquinas’s theory, 
which I hope will become apparent, is its ability to illustrate not only the logic of 
particular emotions considered by themselves, but also the various relationships and 
connections among particular emotions.  These connections will be particularly 
illuminating when considered in a religious context. Since the first chapter was primarily 
focused on Aquinas’s account of the emotions generally, I will begin by offering an 
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analysis of Aquinas’s account of the specific passions of attraction. I will then analyze 
religious examples of these passions (or close analogues of these passions) from diverse 
traditions (Judaism, Islam, Hinduism, and Buddhism) on the framework developed in the 
previous two chapters. Considering each emotion in its generic form first will allow me 
to illustrate how sensitivity to the relationship between the passions and common patterns 
of emotion can illuminate commonalities and diversity of values within and between 
religious traditions.  While this chapter is focused on the passions of attraction, there are 
also important connections and patterns between certain passions of attraction and 
passions of repulsion, for example between love and hate or between longing and sorrow.   
These connections will be addressed in the following chapter.  Once this analysis and 
application is illustrated for both the passions of attraction and repulsion, I will be in a 
position to begin to explore the relationship between religious emotion and religious 
belief and practice. 
   
The Passion of Love 
 Usage of the term ‘love’ is highly varied.  We speak of loving a spouse, loving 
our child, loving a pet, loving wine, the love of reading, the love of wisdom, and the love 
of God.  For Aquinas, love (amor), in its most proper sense, is a passion.  As such, the 
passion of love is a principle or fundamental inclination of the sensitive appetite toward 
some particular cognized good.  However, other usages of the term love are legitimate by 
way of analogy.  For instance, we may speak of a plant loving the sun because, like love 
in its proper sense, this natural love exhibited in the plant is a principle of movement 
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toward some suitable end,200 but unlike love proper, this suitable object is not perceived 
by the plant.  It can be analogously said that the philosopher loves wisdom or that the 
prophet loves justice, but, like natural love, this is love only in “a wider and extended 
sense,”201 for the object, while cognized, is not particular.  Aquinas thus avoids the claim 
that the usages of the term ‘love’ in these widely varied contexts are complete 
equivocations.  They are all fundamental inclinations toward some good.  But in its 
proper sense, amor refers to the passion of love.  As a passion, Aquinas writes that “the 
first change wrought in the [sensitive] appetite by the appetible object is called ‘love,’ 
and is nothing else than complacency in that object; and from this complacency results a 
movement towards that same object, and this movement is ‘desire;’ and lastly there is rest 
which is ‘joy.’”202   For Aquinas, the passion of love is not a movement of the appetite 
towards an object, but a principle of movement.  Love, in this sense, is the root of and 
grounds for all the other passions.  This description of love as a principle of movement 
allows Aquinas to explain how, according to the ordinary usage of the term, love can 
persist through various emotional states.  For instance, a parent’s love for their child 
persists whether the parent is missing (longing for) or enjoying the company of the child. 
 Robert Roberts reserves the term ‘attachment’ to refer to this principle at the root 
of other passions, but observes some of the same central features as Aquinas.  “A 
significant part of the evidence that a person has an attachment to someone is the 
emotions that he or she experiences in response to the vicissitudes of the attachment’s 
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object.”203  For example, out of attachment (love) for my wife, I experience joy at her 
success, anger at those who mistreat her, fear when she is endangered, etc.  Given that 
attachment is a concern rather than a concern-based construal (as Roberts takes joy, 
anger, fear, and emotions generally to be), he resists identifying attachment as an 
emotion.  “So far, I have suggested that love, in the dispositional sense of attachment, is 
not an emotion but a disposition to a range of emotions.”204  But Aquinas makes explicit 
that love in the sense of attachment is a passion.  “Since, therefore, love consists in a 
change wrought in the appetite by the appetible object, it is evident that love is a 
passion.”205  This is consistent with my reconstruction of Aquinas’s theory of emotions as 
forms of concern (rather than construals) toward objects of sensory apprehension.  
Roberts even admits that we often correctly identify cases of simple attachment and 
appreciation as emotions of love.  Roberts simply marks these experiences as exceptions 
to his paradigm where such experiences are the concern itself rather than a construal 
based on a concern.206   By identifying the emotions generally with the conative concern 
element rather than the cognitive construal element, the Thomistic theory captures our 
intuition that such cases are emotions.   
 Aquinas identifies two necessary elements involved in the passion of love: amor 
concupiscentiae (desirous love) and amor amicitiae (friendship love).  Aquinas remarks 
that “the movement of love has a twofold tendency: towards the good which a man 
wishes to someone (to himself or to another) and towards that [person] to which he 
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wishes some good.  Accordingly, man has love of concupiscence towards the good that 
he wishes to another [or herself], and love of friendship towards him [or her] to whom he 
wishes some good.”207  For Aquinas, every instance of the passion of love will contain 
both of these elements.  Also, it is important to emphasize that the friend in friendship 
love is often simply oneself, not necessarily another person.  I love the beer I am drinking 
at the moment with desirous love, but it is because I love myself with friendship love 
(because I desire good for myself) that I love the perceived good of beer.  Additionally, 
friendship love is always primary and desirous love is derivative.  If I did not love 
myself, I would not love the beer.  Finally, our love for others can take either form.  If I 
love someone merely for what they can do for me, the other is the object of my desirous 
love, not my friendship love.  In such a case, the object of my friendship love is myself.  
Aquinas assumes that love of another for their own sake is possible and that the love of 
friendship can reach beyond the boundaries of the self.  But if we love someone merely 
for the way their qualities fulfill some desire we have (they make us laugh, their wit is 
intellectually stimulating, their physical beauty is pleasing), the primary object of love is 
not the other person but the self.   
 Aquinas’s distinction between desirous love and friendship love separates his 
account from what Eleonore Stump refers to a “the responsiveness account of love.”208  
On this account, love is simply a response to qualities the lover values in the beloved. 
One major weakness of such an account concerns its difficulty in explaining the 
specificity of love.  If my love for my wife is a response to her physical beauty, her 
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charm, or her intelligence, then why do I not love others who have these qualities in an 
even greater abundance?  For Aquinas, such an account may be able to explain desirous 
love of another, but in such a case the primary object of love is the self, not the other.  
But if it is not because of the perceived qualities of the other that I have friendship love 
for the other, then how is genuine friendship love of another possible? 
 Aquinas’s implicit answer to this question can be gleaned in his elaboration on the 
nature of friendship love as a union of affection (secundum affectum), which is 
distinguished from real union (secundum rem).209  Real union involves the lover being in 
the presence of the beloved, which is simply an effect of love because “love moves man 
to desire and seek the presence of the beloved, as of something suitable and belonging to 
him.”210  The union of affection, however, is a richer notion and part of the very nature of 
friendship love.  Whereas real union is caused effectively by love, Aquinas states that 
union of affection is “caused formally by love, because love itself is this union or 
bond.”211  In terms of how the union of affection applies to friendship love of others, 
Aquinas writes, “in love of friendship the lover identifies with his friend, regarding his 
fortunes and his very will as his own. . . . Loving takes us out of ourselves.  It disposes us 
to intense preoccupation of thought with the beloved and abstracts us from other 
things.”212  The union of affection that constitutes love occurs in friendship when the 
distinction between the lover’s interest and the interests of the beloved breaks down such 
that the lover “reckons what is good or evil to his friend, as being so to himself; and his 
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friend’s will as his own will.”213  This results in a kind of sober ecstasy, according to 
Aquinas, for the lover is taken out of herself by caring and providing for the beloved for 
their own sake.214  When this occurs, the lover transcends his or her predisposition to 
desire things merely as a means to his or her own gratification.  According to Thomas 
Miner’s interpretation of Aquinas’s account, friendship love may begin with desirous 
love but goes beyond it.  We may be initially attracted to another for how they fit into our 
plans and how they serve our own ends.  But friendship love moves beyond this to an 
affirmation of the other for their own sake.215  
 Love as union also has its modern defenders.  For example, Roger Scruton, 
writing more specifically on romantic love, writes that the “friendship of esteem becomes 
love just so soon as reciprocity becomes community: that is, just so soon as all distinction 
between my interests and your interests is overcome.”216  Critics of this type of union 
theory of love charge that it implies a loss of individual autonomy of the sort which is 
necessary for love.217  However, Aquinas can avoid some of the force of this criticism 
because he would not go so far as to say all distinctions between the lover’s and the 
beloved’s interests are overcome.  Individuality is not lost in the type of union Aquinas 
describes.  Instead, lovers “seek a suitable and becoming union — to live together, speak 
together, and be united together in other like things.”218  Notice Aquinas does not say 
lovers seek to be united in all like things.  Perhaps Aquinas’s account of the union of love 
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is closer to Neil Delaney’s theory, who argues that love is like a wish among sovereign 
sates to form a republican nation.  A sovereign state recognizes that their own well-being 
is intimately connected with the well-being of the other states, but also appreciate the 
independence and sovereignty of the others.  Similarly, in friendship love, the lover can 
appreciate the distinctiveness of the beloved, while also understanding that their own 
interest is intimately connected with the interests of the beloved.219   
 A related criticism of union theories claims that having concern for another 
simply for their own sake, which is taken to be at the very essence of love, is 
unintelligible on the union view.  Bennett Helm writes that “by doing away with the 
distinction between my interests and your interests they have in effect turned your 
interests into mine and vice versa.”220  The crux of this criticism as it applies to Aquinas 
is that friendship love of another is impossible if love formally is this union, and thus all 
love of others would be forms of desirous love.  If the lover regards the fortunes of the 
beloved as her very own, then the good of the beloved is in the interest of the lover, and 
the lover fails to love the beloved simply for their own sake.  While Aquinas does hold 
that friendship love is loving another for their own sake, he never claims such love is 
simply for the other’s sake.  We can make a distinction between disinterested love, which 
I think Aquinas would find unintelligible as a passion, and loving another for their own 
sake.  In distinguishing friendship love from desirous love, Josef Pieper writes that “the 
test question . . . is not: Do you find the other person likable, capable, ‘nice’?  Rather, the 
test question is: Are you glad for his existence, or do you have anything against it; can 
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you honestly say, ‘It’s good that he exists’?”221  For Aquinas, it is the union of affection 
that allows for an affirmative answer to this question, but this will necessarily entail that 
the lover is interested in the good of the beloved.   Aquinas explains, “When a man loves 
another with the love of friendship, he wills good to him, just as he wills good to himself: 
wherefore he apprehends him as his other self.”222  I may desire the good for my friend 
and, due to the union of interests, perceive the good of my friend to also be in my 
interest.  But, in the love of friendship, I do not desire the good of my friend because it is 
in my interests, but because it is for the good of my friend.   
 Aquinas further analyzes particularly human forms of the passion of love by 
exploring its relationship to reason and the will.  In this context, Aquinas distinguishes 
between the concepts of amor, dilectio, and caritas.  “For love [amor] has a wider 
signification than the others, since every dilection [dilectio] or charity [caritas] is love, 
but not vice versa.  Because dilection implies, in addition to love, a choice made 
beforehand . . . and therefore dilection is . . . only in the rational nature.  Charity denotes, 
in addition to love a certain perfection of love, in so far as that which is loved is held to 
be of great price.”223  When Aquinas states that every dilection is love (amor), but not 
necessarily vice versa, he is referring to love in its wider usage as a principle of 
movement toward some suitable end.  Given Aquinas’s psychology, dilection as a pure 
affection of the will could not be a sensitive passion.  So, every dilection is a principle of 
movement toward some suitable end, but no dilection is amor in the proper sense of a 
passion.   
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 I want to suggest that the distinction Aquinas makes between the passion of love 
(amor) and rational love (dilectio) is similar to a distinction Bennett Helm makes 
between caring and valuing.  Caring, for Helm, involves both seeing something as worth 
pursuing and to have a projectable pattern of emotional responses involving the object, 
i.e. “to be afraid when its accomplishment is threatened, to be hopeful when it might well 
be achieved, to be angry at those who impede one’s progress, to be frustrated at repeated 
failures, etc.”224  Like Aquinas’s love, caring provides the foundation for other emotional 
responses.  Helm continues by observing that “there is a difference between those things 
one happens to care about and those things one cares about at least in part because of an 
understanding of the kind of person one finds worth being.  We therefore need to 
distinguish between what one cares about and, I shall say, what one values: to value 
something is to be concerned with caring about it . . . because of such an 
understanding.”225  To illustrate this distinction, Helm offers an example of a workaholic 
father whose career drive is negatively affecting his relationship with his family.  He is 
able to understand on an intellectual level he and his children are missing out on 
something important given his focus on his career, but he feels no great loss.226  He 
values family relationships in that he intellectually judges it to be important, but he does 
not care for his family on an emotional level.  
 Being housed in the rational soul, the objects of dilection are universals (courage, 
kindness, beauty, etc.), as are values.  When Aquinas notes that dilection involves a 
choice, he is observing that we freely assent to our values in a way we do not with what 
we care about.  The workaholic father, given his values, may want to care about his 
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family, even though he does not.  Aquinas also notes that dilection involves a choice 
made before love.  This is in concert with his view that the intellective soul (reason and 
will) has limited and indirect control over the passions.  For example, reason can control 
the passions though its influence on the imagination as discussed in chapter one.227   
Also, Helm’s example of the workaholic father can explain why Aquinas warns the 
reader against supposing that dilection is a superior form of love simply because it occurs 
in the rational appetite: “But it is possible for man to tend to God by love, being as it 
were passively drawn by Him, more than he can possibly be drawn thereto by reason, 
which pertains to the nature of dilection, . . . .  And consequently love is more Godlike 
than dilection.”228  Thomas Miner notes how this passage undermines the conventional 
wisdom that the most relevant form of love for rational creatures is one that proceeds 
from an act of will.  “Amor sensitivus cannot be neglected by the rational creature in its 
motion toward God. . . . Lacking the energy of the sensitive appetite, the amor 
intellectualis Dei will be weak.”229  
  Helm’s distinction can also help us understand Aquinas’s remark on charity as 
the perfection of love.  In Helm’s language, charity is the freedom of the heart: “One’s 
heart is free just in case one is able successfully to control what one in fact cares about, 
what heart one in fact has, and it is one’s values that motivate this control.”230  Charity, 
like freedom of the heart, occurs when “that which is loved is held to be of great price 
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[value].”231  Charity is present when our values ground and give shape to our love.  This 
is precisely why charity, unlike amor or dilectio considered in themselves, is a virtue.  
Suppose the workaholic father, in a manner reminiscent of Kant’s (in)famous 
philanthropist, has no emotional care for his family, but still manages to fulfill his duties 
as a father by showing up to every little league game, music recital, and birthday party 
(despite feeling guilt for being away from the office for even short period of time) simply 
because he intellectually recognizes the value of such actions.  For Aquinas, the father 
may display continency and perseverance, but he lacks moral virtue because his rational 
values have not given proper shape to his passions.232 
 Thus far, Aquinas has only remarked on the formal aspects of love and its relation 
to reason and will.  However, he also has much to say on the instrumental value of love.  
Aquinas notes the transformational nature of love on the subject, but is explicit that this 
transformation can be either for the better or for the worse.  “Love of a suitable good 
perfects and betters the lover; but love of a good which is unsuitable to the lover wounds 
and worsens him.”233  Aquinas observes that love can bring ecstatic fulfillment, selfless 
attitudes, and is necessary for friendship,234 but it can also cause excessive zeal, jealousy, 
envy, and even hatred.235  Nancy M. Martin and Joseph Runzo similarly note this duality 
of love in a religious context: “If the power of the emotion of love is not harnessed for 
self-transformation, then rather than enhancing the other-regarding perspective prescribed 
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by religion, this emotion can increase attachment, partiality, and self-centeredness.”236  
Finally, for Aquinas, love is the source of all human agency.  “Every agent acts for an 
end, . . . .  Now the end is the good desired and loved by each one.  Wherefore it is 
evident that every agent, whatever it be, does every action from love of some kind.”237  
As the qualifier ‘of some kind’ suggests, Aquinas does not hold that every human action 
is rooted in the passion of love, but love in the broader sense as a principle of movement 
toward some end.  The workaholic father’s attendance at the little league game was 
rooted in rational love, but not the passion of love.   This is not to dismiss the passion of 
love as superfluous.  As we saw, Aquinas holds the passions to be necessary for virtuous 
action.  Also Robert Miner notes, “Amor sensitivus constitutes the natural starting-point 
for love as experienced by the embodied creature.  It is . . . the soil from which rational 
love grows.”  Given this, sensitive love also serves as the foundation for the virtue of 
charity.   
 
The Passion of Longing 
 While Aquinas devotes three full questions with a total of fourteen articles to the 
passion of love, the passion of longing demanded only a third of this treatment.238  But in 
this short space, Aquinas makes a couple of important distinctions that will clarify not 
only the logic of longing, but other passions as well, particularly as they occur in the 
human animal.  In a manner similar to his treatment of amor, Aquinas begins by 
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distinguishing concupiscentia in its proper sense as a passion from its extended sense as a 
pure affection of the will.  He defines concupiscentia as “a craving for that which is 
pleasant,” but notes this could refer to something intelligible (the desire for wisdom) or 
something perceptible to the senses.  He writes, “Now concupiscence seems to be the 
craving for this latter pleasure, since it belongs to the united soul and body, as is implied 
by the Latin word ‘concupiscentia.’  Therefore, properly speaking, concupiscence is in 
the sensitive appetite, which takes its name from it.”239  Aquinas’s insistence that 
concupiscentia is a passion leads me to prefer the term longing to desire.  Aquinas notes 
the term desiderium (desire) can be used properly as a pure affection, whereas 
concupiscentia is only used this way in an extended sense.  Likewise, the term “desire” 
can refer to non-emotional states like motivation or preference, while longing has an 
emotional connotation.   
 Aquinas further elaborates the structure of longing by showing it in relation to 
love and delight.  All three of these passions are directed at some object perceived to be 
valuable in some way.  But since specific passions are distinguished by their formal 
object, more needs to be said to distinguish longing from love and delight.  Aquinas 
argues that it is possible to perceive a single sensible good under difference aspects, and 
it is these aspects that distinguish the formal objects of love, longing and joy.  Aquinas 
explains, “Wherefore the object of sensible pleasure causes love, inasmuch as, so to 
speak, it attunes and conforms the appetite to itself; it causes concupiscence, inasmuch as, 
when absent, it draws the faculty to itself; and it causes pleasure, inasmuch as, when 
present, it makes the faculty to find rest in itself.  Accordingly, concupiscence is a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
239 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 30, a. 1, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province 
(New York: Benzinger Bros., 1948). 
 
 87	  
passion differing in species from both love and pleasure.”240  Longing entails seeing the 
good as absent; and delight or joy involves perceiving the suitable object as obtained or 
present.  Successfully writing a published book may be an object of longing (and hope), 
but it would not be in the logic of joy for me to rejoice now at successfully getting a book 
published months from now.   
 Aquinas concludes his treatment of longing by examining particularly human 
forms of the passion as it interacts with the intellect and will.  In this context, Aquinas 
draws an important distinction between natural and non-natural longing.  Natural longing, 
which is common to animals and humans, has as its object something suitable to the 
nature of the animals, i.e. food, drink, etc.  The object of non-natural longing, which is 
peculiar to the human animal, is “pleasurable because it is apprehended as suitable to the 
animal: as when one apprehends something as good and suitable, and consequently takes 
pleasure in it.”241  One aspect of this distinction involves the notion that natural longing 
has as its object something that is naturally pleasurable based on the biology of the 
organism, whereas the object of non-natural longing results in joy only because the object 
is understood as good and suitable.  For example, I would be joyous upon winning this 
week’s lottery, but only because I understand money as instrumentally valuable.  Thus, 
my longing to win the lottery is a non-natural form of longing.  This distinction will be 
important to religious forms of longing, for at least at first glance they will be of the non-
natural variety.   Aquinas goes on to explain the close interaction of non-natural longing 
with reason and the imagination: “Man has not only universal reason, pertaining to the 
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intellectual faculty, but also particular reason pertaining to the sensitive faculty, . . . so 
that even rational [non-natural] concupiscence may pertain to the sensitive appetite.  
Moreover the sensitive appetite can be moved by the universal reason also, through the 
medium of the particular imagination.”242  Here again Aquinas notes the rich interplay 
between reason and perception.  Like Wittgenstein’s notion of ‘seeing-as,’ Aquinas holds 
that we perceive particular objects as instances of universal concepts.  Additionally, 
universal concepts give shape to our imagination and move the sensitive appetite by 
means of these images.  
 Before considering joy, one particular form of human longing needs to be 
considered—compassion.  Aquinas writes that “compassion is heartfelt identification 
with another’s distress, driving us to do what we can to help.”243  For Aquinas, 
compassion is a type of combination of sorrow and desire.  It is sorrow in that its object is 
the suffering of another (an evil), but it is also the longing to alleviate the suffering, and 
alleviation of suffering is a good.  So it can be analyzed from two perspectives.  I will 
have more to say about compassion as a sorrow in the next chapter, but here I want to 
notice that compassion depends not just on love generally (as all passions do), but on 
friendship love of another specifically.  Only through the union of affection is the lover 
able to identify with the distress of the beloved.  If that identification were not possible, 
the longing to alleviate the suffering would not be possible either.  It is only in the sober 
ecstasy of love that compassion has a home.   
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The Passion of Joy 
 In his treatment of delight, Aquinas’s method is similar to his treatment of love 
and longing such that I can abbreviate my exegesis.  He begins by analyzing delight as a 
passion generally, and then proceeds to examine particularly human forms of delight as it 
interacts with reason and the imagination, for which he reserves the term ‘joy.’  He 
begins by defining delight generally as a movement of the sensitive appetite in response 
to a perception of achieving a state becoming to the subject’s nature and he again notes 
the relationship between longing and delight: “just as before it desired that which it had 
not, so afterwards does it delight in that which it possess.”244  He then distinguishes 
delight in general from the particular human form of it, joy.  This distinction is made on 
the same grounds as he distinguished natural from non-natural concupiscence.  “For we 
take delight both in those things which we desire naturally, when we get them, and in 
those things which we desire as a result of reason.  But we do not speak of joy except 
when delight follows reason.”245  As in the case of non-natural concupiscence, when 
reason is brought to bear on particulars, delight transforms into joy.  But in this context, 
Aquinas adds a further complexity.  “Now whatever we desire naturally, can also be the 
object of reasoned desire and delight, but not vice versa.”246   
 The qualifier ‘not vice versa’ serves to distinguish the passion of joy (which 
occurs when reason bears on particulars though the imagination) from the pure affection 
of joy.  As in the case of love, there is a pure affection corollary of both desire and joy 
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which Aquinas describes as “the mere movement of the will.”247  Again, I want to 
suggest that the relationship between the pure affection of desire and the passion of 
longing and the relationship between the pure affection of joy and the passion of joy is 
similar to the relationship between valuing and caring cited above.  We might think of the 
pure affection of desire as something similar to what Harry Frankfurt terms a second-
order desire.248  For instance, someone may intellectually desire an improved relationship 
with their spouse, without ever being emotionally moved by this object.  Or, perhaps 
more accurately stated, they have a desire to have a longing for an improved relationship 
with their spouse.  They may, through sheer force of will, attend marriage counseling, 
while their longings pull them elsewhere.  Aquinas quotes approvingly of Augustine 
when he writes that the pure affections of “desire and joy are nothing else but a volition 
of consent to things we wish.”249  In this passage, Aquinas seems to be citing a case 
where the will and the passions are in harmony such that one consents to the longings and 
passionate joys that they actually have.  In his discussion on the will itself, Aquinas 
makes the second-order nature of the will in this respect even more explicit when he 
writes that “it is in the power of the will not to will to desire or not to consent to 
concupiscence.  And thus it does not necessarily follow the movement of 
concupiscence.”250 
 
The Passions of Hope and Despair 
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 Aquinas considers hope and despair under one question divided into eight articles.  
He begins by distinguishing hope from longing, joy, and despair.  He offers four 
necessary conditions for hope, which taken together are sufficient.  First, like all other 
passions of attraction, the object of hope is some perceived good.  Secondly, hope is 
distinguished from joy in that the perceived good is some future good.  Thirdly, while 
hope presupposes longing, it is distinguished from longing in that that future good is 
perceived to be difficult to obtain.  Finally, hope is distinguished from despair in that the 
perceived good is not considered impossible to obtain.251  For Aquinas, despair is, in a 
sense, contrary to hope, which might make it seem odd to classify it as a passion of 
attraction.  However, despair (along with love, longing, joy, and hope) has some 
perceived good as its object.  However, in despair the perceived good is seen as 
impossible to obtain.  Precisely because both hope and despair share a difficult to obtain 
good object, hope can quickly turn to despair.  But despite its sometimes negative 
connotation, for Aquinas, despair can be a valuable passion and is often crucial for 
survival.   Despair can prevent us from chasing pipe dreams and redirect our energy to 
more worthwhile pursuits.252 
 This observation on despair is related to a seemingly odd question raised by 
Aquinas: “Whether Hope Abounds in Young Men and Drunkards?”253  Aquinas’s 
objectors argue that since hope implies steadiness and power, which drunks and youth 
clearly lack, they obviously do not abound in hope.  The point of this strange question 
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and even stranger objection is the issue of false hope.  Aquinas answers his objectors by 
observing that since the youth lack wisdom and experience, because they have not 
suffered defeat or become aware of their own shortcomings, they are prone to see 
unattainable goods as attainable.  Likewise, drunks are foolish and thoughtless of dangers 
and, therefore, “attempt everything and are full of hope.”  For Aquinas, not only is 
despair not necessarily counter to human flourishing, hope is not necessarily conducive to 
human flourishing.  If hope is the result of a false judgment about what is rational and 
appropriate to pursue, it is not a rational and virtuous hope.  But if the object of hope is, 
in fact, possible to obtain and worth pursing, it serves the efficacy of action.   Aquinas 
explains that “the thought of its being difficult arouses our attention; while the thought 
that it is possible is no drag on our effort.”254  Ronald de Sousa notes this feature of 
emotions generally which he sees as “species of determinate patterns of salience among 
objects of attention, lines of inquiry, and inferential strategies.”255 
 Before turning to the religious context, one final passion, which is often 
associated with religion and spirituality, bears mentioning.  Aquinas defines wonder as “a 
kind of desire for knowledge; a desire which comes to man when he sees an effect of 
which the cause either is unknown to him, or surpasses his knowledge or faculty of 
understanding.”256  As a form of desire, wonder can lead to joy in much the same way 
that longing in general leads to joy when the object of longing is obtained.  But in this 
context, Aquinas argues that wonder can cause joy even if the object of wonder 
(knowledge) is not obtained. In addition to the joy of getting what one longs for, Aquinas 
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states that the “very increase of desire brings with it an increase of pleasure, according as 
it gives rise to the hope of obtaining that which is loved.”257  Aquinas had previously 
argued that there can be delight in hope because hope involves a present appraising of 
some future good.258  Thus when wonder involves the hope of attaining knowledge, it too 
can produce pleasure.  But Aquinas even suggests that wonder can involve joy when 
there is no hope due to the cause surpassing our knowledge or understanding.  This 
occurs not because we obtain the knowledge we desired or because we hope to obtain it, 
but simply because “the wonderer learns something new, that the cause is other than he 
had thought it to be.”259  In such cases, the cause of the joy in wonder is the knowledge 
that we do not and cannot know. 
 While Aquinas does not offer different terms for wonder-with-the-hope-of-
knowledge and wonder-without-the-hope-of-knowledge, Robert Fuller offers a similar 
distinction between curiosity and wonder.  Curiosity is associated with attempts to 
understand and perhaps manipulate one’s environment.  Wonder, on the other hand, is 
more passive.  In wonder, one is more reflective on the meaning of the unexpected.260  
This understanding of the logic of wonder leads Fuller to suggest that wonder is a 
particularly important emotion to study in a religious context.  In response to unexpected 
stimuli, wonder engages cognitive reflection that is predisposed to grant reality to an 
unseen order that lies behind or beyond the mundane level of existence.”261      While I 
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agree that wonder is an important emotion to study in a religious context, I am not sure it 
is any more important than other emotions.  In fact, I hope to show in this chapter that 
paying close attention to the connections between various emotional states can be 
illuminating in a religious context.  It is to this part of the project that I now turn. 
 
Religious Passions of Attraction 
 In chapter two, I offered a working definition of religion as a set of interrelated 
and traditional human practices performed in response to perceived ultimacy with the end 
of individual, social, and/or global transformation.  Robert Neville offers three models of 
spiritual transformation and perfection which, he claims, cuts across religious boundaries, 
although certain religious currents may stress one model over the others.  The first model, 
which he labels the soldier, is centrally concerned with the purification of the will. 
“According the ancient model, a soldier in the heroic mold must have psychic integrity to 
such a high degree as to be able to wholly devote himself or herself to life-threatening 
tasks.”262 Joshua, Arjuna, the samurai, and medieval knights are paradigm religious 
examples of this model.  The second model, the sage, is a model of spiritual 
enlightenment and wisdom.  Finally, the saint, is the model of the perfection of impulses 
of the heart.  “Psychic integrity can keep these impulses in check, and enlightenment plus 
wisdom can tell what they ought to be; but altering them so as to have only good 
impulses is another kind of spiritual perfection.”263  Of course the ideal of religious 
transformation is often held to be a transformation of the entire self — of knowing, 
doing, and feeling; of heart, soul, and might.  But we can focus on the model of the saint 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
262 Robert C. Neville, Solider, Sage, and Saint (New York: Fordham University Press, 1978), 1. 
263 Robert C. Neville, Solider, Sage, and Saint, 2. 
 
 95	  
to explore how religious traditions use religious symbols to transform the sensitive 
appetite to better conform to perceived ultimacy. 
 My main objective in this section is to show how the Thomistic emotional 
framework and Neville’s theory of devotional symbols can be applied in comparative 
religious projects focused on religious emotional experience.  What follows is simply an 
attempt to briefly illustrate the potential.  For this application, my guiding thesis is that in 
the emotional lives of the ideal saints across religious traditions (here I will focus on 
Judaism, Islam, bhakti Hinduism, and Mahayana Buddhism), one can detect a common 
emotional dialectical pattern: an oscillation of religious joy and religious longing. This 
pattern often transfers to a similar oscillation of religious hope and despair.  Of course, 
none of these traditions are single, uniform entities, but long histories of experience and 
thought.  I hope the reader will forgive my generalizations, but I hope focusing on the 
ideal-type of saint makes this generalization more justifiable. But either way, this is all in 
the interest of illustrating the application of the theoretical framework.  Even if I do not 
convince the reader of my guiding thesis, I hope that, in my failure, I still illustrate the 
framework’s promise.   
 
Judaism 
 The central goal of the love of God in Judaism is illustrated in the Shema, the 
fundamental command and statement of faith in Judaism: “Here, O Israel: The Lord our 
God is one Lord.  You shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, and with all your 
soul, and with all your might.”264  Moses Maimonides notes the passional nature of this 
command, with its emphasis on the heart as well as the mind and will.  “And what is the 
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proper love?  It is that a person shall love the Lord with a very mighty and overflowing 
love so that his soul shall be attached to the love of God, constantly dwelling on it, as one 
who is lovesick and cannot take his mind away from his love for a particular woman.”265  
Aquinas notes the somatic feeling of sickness as the material aspect of the passion of love 
generally.  “But in respect of the material element in the passion of love, i.e. a certain 
bodily change, it happens that love is hurtful, by reason of the change being 
excessive.”266   By emphasizing the somatic aspects of the love of God, Maimonides 
suggests that one should love God passionately as opposed to simply value God through 
an affection of the will.  Apparently Maimonides, unlike Kant, thinks pathological love 
can be commanded.  But how is passionate love, which according to our framework is 
always directed at an object of sensory apprehension, possible at all in a Jewish context 
given the transcendent nature of the ultimate as its “object”?  Martin and Runzo offer a 
clue when they observe that the study of the Torah “occasions a free emotional 
expression of love directed at the text itself.”267  Here the text as the word of God serves 
as the indexical symbol of ultimacy and as the proximate object of religious love. This 
symbol structure, while necessary to engender the passions, is also, in part, what lends 
religious emotions generally and religious love particularly their potential for harm.  
Martin and Runzo note that “in spite of the intense love enjoined in the Torah, care must 
be taken not to let the love of the Torah displace the love for God, who is its source.”268  
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As Aquinas states, “Love of a suitable good perfects and betters the lover; but love of a 
good which is unsuitable to the lover wounds and worsens him.”269  
 The Jewish mystical traditions of Kabbalah and Hasidism often describe love, 
both of others and of God, in terms of union.  The Kabbalah love of neighbor that is to be 
cultivated before entering a synagogue is described as a “sense of communal and 
interpenetrating identity.”270  Hasidic Rabbi Shneur Zalman of Lyady speaks of the 
experience of love as the softening of the boundary between individual identity and God.  
This love, according to Zalman, takes place in two phases. The first phase is one of 
“wonderous delight in God, with a great, a mighty joy, the joy of the soul to the very 
limits of its strength.”271  The second stage is one of longing where the soul yearns “to 
cleave to God, to be included in the source of life.”272  Here we see the quest for the love 
of God resulting in phases of joy and longing.  Like Aquinas, the Rabbi understands love 
to be at the root of religious longing and joy, but interestingly disrupts the order such that 
longing follows joy rather than vice versa.  
 Part of the reason for this disruption has to do with the nature of religious symbols 
such that we might expect a similar disrupted pattern across religious traditions that 
conceive ultimacy as a transcendent ontological reality.  On Neville’s theory, religious 
symbols are “broken.”  Drawing on Paul Tillich’s idea of “broken myth,” Neville 
introduces the phrase “broken symbol” to indicate the fact that religious symbols, while 
engaging the interpreter with what they symbolize, also separate the interpreter from that, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
269 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 28, a. 5, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province 
(New York: Benzinger Bros., 1948). 
270 Nancy M. Martin and Joseph Runzo, “Love,” 316. 
271 Shneur Zalman of Lyady, “Iggeret haKodesh,” in The Jewish Mystical Tradition, trans. Ben Zion 
Bokser (New York: Pilgrim Press, 1993), 218. 




given the radical difference between the finite symbol and the infinite symbolized.  As 
Neville writes, God is not “really a person like an old wise enthroned king, nor like a 
lusty mother, not a disembodied spirit with a voice like the Cheshire cat’s smile.”273  Our 
symbols, whether particular and concrete like a statue of Durga and the narrative of the 
Exodus or abstract like God and Emptiness, are creatures of creatures not Lords of Lords.  
However, interpreters of religious symbols are not always conscious of this brokeness.  If 
I naïvely took the divine to be the imposing statue of Durga before me, joy might be an 
expected response.  But this joy might give way to longing as I become aware of the 
broken nature of the symbol.  But even for a devotee who is not so naïve, the dialectic of 
engagement and separation in the use of devotional symbols produces an oscillation 
between longing and joy.  
 We can detect a similar pattern of hope and despair in the Psalms, which may be 
due to symbols particular to the Jewish tradition.  Commenting on the Adam and Eve 
banishment narrative, Stephen Prothero writes that “it sets into motion the two great 
contrapuntal themes in the Jewish story: a rhythm of wrongdoing, punishment, and exile; 
and a rhythm of covenant, breach, and new covenant.”274  The recurring symbols of exile 
(from God, from Zion, from one another, etc.) and covenantal promise produce patters of 
despair and hope.   The Psalmist writes, “As a deer longs for flowing streams, so my soul 
longs for you, O God.  My soul thirsts for God, for the living God.  When shall I come 
and behold the face of God?”275  While the language is of longing, the last question 
assumes the possibility of encountering God and the images of search and thirsting 
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illustrate the arduous nature of reaching this end.  Here the Psalmist places hope in the 
promise of God.  But the Psalmist also offers beautiful pictures of despair: “By the rivers 
of Babylon—there we sat down and there we wept when we remembered Zion.  On the 
willows there we hung up our harps.  For there our captors asked us for songs, and our 
tormentors asked for mirth, saying, “Sing us one of the songs of Zion.”276  Of course, this 
is also an expression for sorrow, for the absence of Zion is apprehended as evil.  But 
insofar as the object is Zion (a symbol of the covenant), rather than the absence of it, it is 
religious despair.  Of course, this despair is not permanent.  God restores hope through 
the pattern of covenant, breach, new covenant.  In a term borrowed from John Hick, this 




 In Orthodox Islam, the Qur’an and the Hadith emphasize God’s love for creation. 
The Fatihah, a prayer to God which opens the Qur’an and is referred to as the very 
essence of the Qur’an, emphasizes the loving mercy of God: “In the Name of God, the 
merciful Lord of mercy.  Praise be to God, the Lord of all being, The merciful Lord of 
mercy.”278 The emphasis on God’s love of creation over human love for God in the 
Qur’an is a consequent of its form.  Whereas the Hebrew Bible contains multiple genres 
including narratives, history, and poetry, all of which lend themselves to expressions of 
human love for the divine, the Qur’an, with the one exception of the Fatihah, is written in 
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the form of direct divine speech.  However, through this direct divine speech comes 
striking, concrete images which serve as symbols of ultimacy.  Detailed descriptions of 
paradise, for instance, illicit passionate responses of longing.  Such images of paradise 
include soft couches, pomegranate trees, virgins, fine carpets, silk robes, temperate 
climates, silver goblets with ginger flavored water served by boys graced with eternal 
youth.  The Qur’an promises that “when you gaze upon that scene, you will behold a 
kingdom blissful and glorious.”279   
 Neville remarks on the need for such concrete images in a devotional, as opposed 
to a theological, context  Abstract concepts at the level of theological thought are likely to 
be inefficacious in terms of spiritual transformation.  For the sake of spiritual 
transformation, symbols on the devotional levels are embellished, complex, and 
interwoven in a way that they are not at the theological level and its goal of 
communicability.280  Particular and imagistic symbols in religion are needed in order to 
engage individuals on an emotional level, and thus to be able to direct one’s love, 
longing, and joy toward the religious object.  And this is true for devotees at various 
levels of spiritual maturity, including those who can intellectually grasp abstract symbols.  
It is often assumed that particularistic imagery is associated with earlier stages of spiritual 
development.  However, there is often profound depth in particularistic imagery that is 
only grasped by more religiously adept individuals.  As Neville observes, “The issue is 
not so much what symbols are appropriate at each stage, but how symbols are 
appropriated.”281 However, as we saw with Judaism, concrete symbolism, while 
necessary, is not without its dangers.  The symbol itself can become the object of ultimate 
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concern.  This danger led 8th century Islamic mystic Rabi’a Al-Adawiyyah of Basra to 
run through the streets with a torch in one hand and a bucket of water in the other.  She 
aimed to pour water on the flames of hell and to torch paradise so that no one might 
mistakenly follow Islam out of fear of punishment or hope of reward, but simply for the 
sake of God.  Interestingly, her own symbols of bucket and torch were as striking as those 
she needed to destroy, thus testifying to the need of such symbols.  If the Thomistic 
understanding of religious emotions is correct, imagistic symbols are necessary if part of 
the transformative goal of a religious tradition is to transform passionate desires into love 
of the divine.  As Miner writes, “Amor sensitivus cannot be neglected by the rational 
creature in its motion toward God. . . . Lacking the energy of the sensitive appetite, the 
amor intellectualis Dei will be weak.”282   
 In Islam, transforming one’s desires into the love of God is particularly 
pronounced in the mystical Sufi tradition where poetry is filled with themes of 
transformative love, longing, and joy.  Rabi’a, for example, asks her readers to imagine 
God as an erotic lover.  “The doors of kings are locked and guarded by their henchmen, 
but your door is open to those who call upon you.  My Lord, each lover is now alone with 
his beloved.  And I am alone with you.”283  The 13th century mystic Jelaluddin Rumi 
emphasizes that the longing of separation is a necessary corollary of love for the divine.  
His parable “Completely Cooked” illustrates this emphasis: 
A certain person came to the Friend’s door and knocked.  “Who’s there?” “It’s Me.”  The Friend 
answered, “Go away.  There’s no place for raw meat at this table.”  The individual went 
wandering for a year.  Nothing but the thirst of separation can change hypocrisy and ego.  The 
person  returned completely cooked, walked up and down in front of the Friend’s house, gently 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
282 Thomas Miner, Thomas Aquinas on the Passions, 122. 




knocked.  “Who is it?” “You.” “Please come in, my Self.  There’s no place in this house for 
two.”284 
 
For Rumi, the transformative process of deification and the Sufi goal of union with God 
only occurs through the erosion of ego via longing and separation.  The symbol of the 
self as raw meat in need of transformation and the symbol of wandering in separation 
elicit the very longing prescribed.  But Rumi presents the journey of transformative love 
not only as a one of longing, but also as one of joy.  “Come, come, whoever you are, 
Wanderer, worshiper, lover of leaving, it doesn’t matter.  Ours is a caravan of endless 
joy.  Even if you’ve broken your vows a hundred times—Come, come, yet again 
come!”285  In this final line, Rumi directs the reader away from despair to hope.  The 
soteriological end is difficult, as the hundred broken vows suggest.  But Rumi’s hope is 
rooted in his awareness that the agency of pursuit is not only at the human end.  In a 
particular hadith, God says, “if [my servant] draws nearer to Me by handsbreadth, I draw 
nearer to Him by an armslength; and if he draws nearer to Me by an armslength, I draw 
nearer to him by a fathom; and if he comes to me walking, I come to him running.”286  
This symbol of God’s agency, as in Judaism, restores hope of union and produces 
gratitude toward God.   
 
Bhakti Hinduism 
 The cultivation of religious love in Hinduism is most visible in the bhakti 
tradition.  According to this tradition, June McDaniel observes that “emotion is the path 
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to God and is thus sacred.  Rather than trying to eliminate emotion, the goal is to 
intensify emotion until it becomes powerful, over-whelming, the center of the devotee’s 
being. . . . Human emotion is transformed into divine emotion; it is boiled, thickened, 
purified, and redirected.”287  In order to achieve this thickening and purification, the 
bhakti tradition symbolizes the divine in various relationships to the devotee in order to 
direct all forms of human love toward the divine.  In the bhakti tradition, the devotee 
attempts to develop an multifaceted relationship with the divine.  The devotee is brought 
into contact with the divine through various types of love relationships and through every 
form of sensation.288  For example the god Krishna  is iconically depicted as a child, as a 
friend, and as an erotic lover.  The North Indian Vishnu saint Surdas speaks of taking on 
the persona of Yashoda, the adoptive mother of Krishna, in order to direct parental love 
to the divine.289  Readers of the Bhagavad-Gita are offered a depiction of the divine 
Krishna as a trusted advisor and friend.  The Bhagavata Purana paints Krishna as the 
object of loving adoration by the gopi girls.  The use of multiple relational symbols 
serves to direct the devotee’s entire love toward the divine.  But as we saw in Judaism 
and Islam, a dialectical tension between love’s longing and love’s joy persists.  Nancy 
Martin remarks, “From a devotional point of view, we are fundamentally lovers of God, 
and our life is a journey of ever-deepening love, marked also by intensified longing.  
Separation between self and God is absolutely essential for love and relationality to be 
possible, but it leaves us pining for complete union.”290   
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 Thus far, I have considered emotions in the religious life of traditions that 
emphasize ultimacy as a transcendent (even if also immanent) ontological reality.  
However, the category of ultimacy itself proves difficult with many forms of Buddhism.  
As Malcolm David Eckel notes, “[Madhyamika Buddhists] are not out to uncover a 
secure and stable reality behind the changeable world of appearances; they want to 
demonstrate that there is no stable, ultimate reality.”291  So, perhaps we could understand 
the Buddhist conception of ultimacy in terms of Emptiness.  But according to Eckel, it is 
not Emptiness that is ultimate in Buddhism, but the awareness of Emptiness: “The 
Madhyamikas took the word ultimate (paramartha) as having a double reference: it could 
refer to the nature of reality (to Emptiness as the object of cognition) or to a person’s 
awareness of the nature of reality.  Of these two possible meanings, the second was 
considered the more important.”292  From this perspective, it is the awareness of 
Emptiness (nirvana) that is ultimate in Buddhism.  Thus, indexical religious symbols in 
Buddhism would be objects of sensory apprehension which point the subject toward this 
awareness.  This could include a wide range of objects including stories of the Buddha, 
mandalas and other meditative aids, statues of the Buddha, stupas, and, as we will see, 
other sentient beings.  
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 The clearest expression of the model of the saint in Mahayana Buddhism is the 
bodhisattva.  The bodhisattva is one who has attained enlightenment, but out of 
compassion finds it appropriate to remain in the world of duality and illusion in order to 
assist all sentient beings toward the same goal of ending suffering through wisdom. Thus, 
on one level the bodhisattva can be considered an indexical symbol as some bodhisattvas,  
most notably Guanyin and Amida Buddha, serve as objects of devotion.  But the 
bodhisattva is also the ideal end of Mahayana Buddhist transformation. The necessary 
corollary of the awareness of Emptiness (wisdom) is compassion.  As Martin and Runzo 
note, “compassion complemented by wisdom forms the heart of the Buddhist path.”293  
The transformation toward the ideal saint in Buddhism involves not simply the 
cultivation of compassion, but the cultivation of sympathetic joy.  The following is a 
description of a priest of a Lotus Sect who was posthumously recognized as a 
bodhisattva: “He chanted the Lotus Sutra day and night.  He had no fixed home but 
drifted from place to place.  His heart was full of compassion; when he witnessed 
another’s suffering, he felt it as his suffering, and when he witnessed another’s joy, he 
felt it as his own happiness.”294  
 It is clear from this description that friendship love is a necessary precondition for 
the bodhisattva’s compassion and joy.  It is not a disinterested love, for it is in the interest 
of the bodhisattva to do what she can to eliminate the suffering of others.  But it is a love 
for the sake of the other.  It is the union of interests that make sympathetic joy and the 
longing of compassion possible, for the bodhisattvas feel the joy and suffering of others 
as their own.  But one might ask why the sympathetic joy or the compassionate longing 
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of the Bodhisattva should count as a religious emotion on my framework.  Is the 
emotion’s object, the good of other sentient beings, a religious symbol of ultimacy?  
Malcolm Eckel describes a lecture the Dalai Lama gave at Harvard on the Buddhist 
concept of the self.  Eckel writes that “He began speaking in English about the 
importance of compassion.  If you want to know who you are, he said, learn to be 
compassionate toward your neighbor.”295  The Dalai Lama then proceeded to give a more 
esoteric lecture on Emptiness in Tibetan.  But the point here is that focusing on others, 
presumably both in the sufferings and joys, can point, attune, and conform the Buddhist 
toward what is ultimate—the awareness of the ‘no-self’ which just is the awareness of 
Emptiness.  Or, as John Hick puts it, “liberation from [dukkha] is achieved by 
transcending the ego point of view in order to participate in a more universal 
perspective.”296  By transcending their ego and focusing on others, the bodhisattva opens 
herself to the religious oscillations of compassionate longing and sympathetic joy. 
  
Conclusion 
 While I have focused here on using the Thomistic framework to identify common 
emotional patterns, I hope the reader can also glean other ways in which the framework 
could be put to use.  For example, by analyzing expressions of religious emotions, the 
religious scholars can spot incongruences between the normative, orthodox meaning of 
some symbol and the way the symbol is interpreted by ordinary devotees.  It can also 
help in the study of the history of symbolic meaning by tracing changes in emotional 
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response to the same symbol or motif.  But I hope what I have done, by focusing on 
emotional patterns across religious traditions, at least illustrates how the theory of 
religious emotions can begin to frame the rich subtlety of emotional experience in the 




AN ANALYSIS OF RELIGIOUS EMOTIONS OF REPULSION 
 
Introduction 
 In chapter three, I offered an analysis of the religious emotions of attraction—
particularly love, longing, joy, hope, and despair.  In this chapter, I will offer an analysis 
of the religious emotions of repulsion.  For Aquinas, these passions include hate, 
aversion, sorrow, fear, daring, and anger.  While this completes Aquinas’s list of the 
eleven basic passions, we must remember that this framework allows for the analysis of 
other emotional states.  For example, last chapter we saw that wonder can be analyzed 
either as a type of longing, a type of joy, or both.  Similarly, compassion includes both an 
element of sorrow and an element of longing.  So the Thomistic theory is able to handle 
more than the eleven basic passions by further specifying the object of the passion or the 
narrative context in which the passion occurs.   
 In chapter three, I was interested in illustrating how the model of religious 
emotions could be used to illustrate common emotional patterns in the devotional and 
spiritual life across religious traditions.  This required me to begin by covering the 
generic forms of the all the basic passions of attraction before illustrating the religious 
patterns.  In this chapter, I will continue to operate from a definition of religion as a set of 
interrelated and traditional human practices performed in response to perceived ultimacy 
with the end of individual, social, and/or global transformation.  I will also again focus on 
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Neville’s model of the saint to explore how religious traditions use religious symbols to 
transform the sensitive appetite to better conform to perceived ultimacy.  However, my 
objective in this chapter is not to show how the Thomistic framework can be used to trace 
common patterns of religious emotional experience, but to illustrate how it can be used to 
illuminate the diversity of saintly ideals both across and within religious traditions.  
Given the focus is not on emotional patterns, but the role each emotion plays in the 
devotional life, I will not need to cover all the generic emotions first.  Instead, I will 
begin by offering an analysis of Aquinas’s account of hatred and then explore some of 
the various roles this emotion plays in the religious life.  This pattern will continue for the 
remaining five passions of repulsion before concluding with some general reflections.  
My hope is that by highlighting the potential for the framework to shed light on nuanced 
differences in various saintly ideals (in addition to its ability to bring to light common 
emotional patterns), I will further illustrate the frameworks promise in comparative 
religion projects. 
 
The Passion of Hatred 
 For Aquinas, hatred is the dissonance of the sensitive appetite with that which is 
apprehended as unsuitable in some way (repugnant, harmful, dangerous, etc.).  In this 
sense, it is the contrary of love.  As love is the harmony of the appetite with that which is 
perceived as good, so hatred is the dissonance with what is perceived as evil.297  As love 
is the principle of movement toward that which is perceived as suitable, so hate is the 
principle of movement away from that which is perceived as harmful in some way.  It is a 
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principle that we mist presuppose of we are to account for other motions of aversion in 
relation to what is perceived as evil or bad in some way.298  While hatred might often lead 
toward aversion, fear, anger, or sorrow (and perhaps occur simultaneously with these 
emotions), it must be distinguished from other negative passions.  Diana Fritz Cates 
explains that for Aquinas, hatred is “the simple act of being pained at the apprehension 
that one stands (in a particular respect) in relation to an object that is poised to actualize 
(more of) its potential at one’s expense—and one is thus poised to be (further) hurt.”299   
   As in the case of love, Aquinas distinguishes hate as a passion from the 
analogous usages of the term in relation to the natural and intellective appetite.  Just as 
plants are naturally attuned and adapted toward that which is suitable such that we can 
analogously say, ‘The plant loves the sun,’ so things are naturally averse toward that 
which is harmful such that we can say, ‘The plant hates this excessive heat.’  But hate as 
a passion belongs to the sensitive appetite and is the natural inclination away from what 
is sensorily apprehended as harmful.  It follows from this analysis that the concept of 
hatred, by itself, does not necessarily have a negative moral connotation.  Every sensible 
being is vulnerable in relation to certain objects or situations, and hate, in its simplest 
form, in just the initial dissonance of the appetite with that which is perceived to impinge 
on one’s well-being.  This very general definition of hatred allows Aquinas to capture a 
wide variety of our usages of the term.  When we think of hatred, the immoral and 
irrational forms of racism and sexism may spring to mind, but, as Cates observes, we 
might also “speak of hating the conditions that lead to the rampant sexual abuse of 
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women and girls around the world.  On a lighter note, we might speak of hating rush-hour 
traffic, certain forms of music, mosquitoes, or the cold of winter.”300 
 Aquinas also distinguishes the passion of hate from purely intellectual hate.  
Aquinas continues to draw on his distinction between the passions and the non-passionate 
affections to argue that as a sensitive passion, hatred cannot be directed at universal 
concepts “because the universal is obtained by abstraction from individual matter, on 
which every sensitive power is based.”301  It is only by an analogous use of the term that 
the prophet hates injustice as such. However, Aquinas also notes there is another sense in 
which the passion of hate can be and often is directed toward the universal.302  “Hatred in 
the sensitive faculty can regard something universally: because this thing, by reason of its 
common nature, and not merely as an individual, is hostile to the animal—for instance, a 
wolf in regard to a sheep.  Hence a sheep hates the wolf universally.”303  Of course the 
sheep cannot apprehend the universal.  Rather, it is qualities in common to all wolves that 
activate the passion of hatred in the sheep.  Aquinas is more concerned with human 
emotions, and he makes this observation to help distinguish hate from anger.  “On the 
other hand, anger is always caused by something in particular: because it is caused by 
some action of the one that hurts us; and actions proceed from individuals.”  As we shall 
see, one aspect of the object of anger for Aquinas is some perceived slight. Thus anger is 
always anger at some particular action by some particular person.  But hatred often arises 
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in response to the type of person/thing one is, rather than some particular action.  As 
Robert Roberts remarks, “unlike anger, hatred does not necessarily construe its object in 
terms of some culpable offense.  The only ‘reason’ for the evil look of the hated object 
may be that it is the object that it is.”304  Likewise, Keith Green explains, “Precisely 
because whole classes of objects and persons can have a consistent relationship to 
specific wants and interests, hatred, . . . may have whole classes or general kinds as its 
object.”305  My hatred for celebrity reality television shows in general is not directed at 
some perceived injustice.  They simply get on my nerves in virtue of being the type of 
show they are.  Or, in more Thomistic language, my sensitive appetite is in dissonance 
with such programing.  Aaron Ben-ze’ev, in his discussion on hate and anger, also 
notices the tendency in hate to be directed toward universals: “Hate is often directed at 
different groups regardless of the personal differences between their individuals.”306  But 
both Aquinas and Ben-ze’ev also recognize that the object of hate must have some degree 
of specificity in order to account for its emotional intensity.307  Thus, the universal as 
such cannot be the object of passionate hatred, but the universal as instantiated in the 
particular can be.   
 While the object of hate is some perceived evil, Aquinas also argues that hate, like 
all other passions, is rooted and grounded in love.  Aquinas writes that “a thing disagrees 
with another, through destroying or hindering that which agrees with it.  Consequently . . 
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. nothing is hated, save through being contrary of a suitable thing which is loved.”308  In 
the last chapter we saw that love both gives rise to and persists in longing and joy such 
that love is both a cause and a necessary condition of longing and joy.  Likewise, Aquinas 
claims love is a cause and a necessary condition of hate.  My love for one object disposes 
me to hate some other object that threatens the beloved.  Keith Green summarizes 
Aquinas’s principles on the relationship between love and hate as follows: “For any 
rational creature: If one loves A, then one is thereby predisposed . . . to hate whatever 
impedes obtaining or harms A.”309 But in claiming that love persists in hate, Aquinas 
does not mean that I experience love when I experience hate.  The relationship is logical 
rather than phenomenological.  As Aquinas states, “Now love and hatred are naturally 
simultaneous, logically but not really.”310   
  
Religious Hatred 
 When one hears the term ‘religious hatred,’ perhaps what immediately comes to 
mind is the long history of hate-filled violence promoted by religious ideologies and 
institutions.  Whether such instances should be included in the category of religious 
emotions as psychosomatic forms of concern toward devotional religious symbols is an 
interesting one. Certainly people can be profoundly mistaken in their perception of 
ultimacy such that the conformity of concern to this misunderstanding may lead to 
horrific violence.  Robert Neville remarks that “a small mistake in saintly reasoning can 
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unleash a mighty power for harm.  If a misdirected solider is dangerous, a mistaken saint 
is close to Satan!”311  However, we must remember the broadness of Aquinas’s 
understanding of hatred.  Given this account, Aquinas’s does not advocate an a priori 
rejection of hatred in all its forms.  Whether a particular instance of hatred is healthy 
depends upon the open question of what is, in fact, good for human beings both 
individually and collectively.312  My hatred for celebrity reality television shows is only 
irrational or immoral if watching such programing is a necessary constituent of the good 
life.  If watching such programming is counter to the conduciveness of human 
flourishing, such hatred should be consented to and perhaps even cultivated.  Similarly, 
religious traditions which offer a vision of the fully realized saint, junzi, or mensch may 
advocate hatred of that which is perceived to run counter to the spiritual quest.  Luke’s 
Jesus informs the crowd that discipleship requires a hatred toward the attachments of 
family and even life itself.313 The apostle Paul commands his readers to hate sin and what 
is evil.314   In his Religious Affections, Jonathan Edwards lists hatred and abhorrence of 
sin as a necessary corollary of the love of God.315  The writer of Ecclesiastes speaks of a 
time to love and a time to hate.316  In the Bhagavad Gita, Arjuna declares his hatred for 
triumph, domination, wealth, and ease.317   Thus, the object of religious hatred is 
whatever is perceived as unsuitable to proper conformity with perceived ultimacy. As a 
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result, the objects of sin, wealth, power, etc. serve as indexical symbols comporting the 
heart of the devoted to what is of highest value.  But we can distinguish religious hate 
from other religious emotions of repulsion.  I may feel guilty about some particular sin I 
have committed, but guilt is a form of sorrow at some particular evil action that has 
already been committed.  But I may hate adultery only because I see it as potentially 
harmful toward achieving some spiritual ideal.   
 However, the notion of a virtuous hatred is foreign to certain saintly ideals.  In her 
discussion of the saintly arhat in Therevada Buddhism, Maria Heim notes that the great 
thinker “Buddhaghosa finds no value whatsoever in hatred: There are no instances of 
righteous or legitimate hatred or anger in these sources.”318  Hatred in this tradition is 
included with greed and delusion as the root of all pain and suffering.  Accordingly, the 
conformity of the heart in response to perceived ultimacy would involve eliminating all 
forms of hate.  Buddhaghosa advises a number of practices to help one achieve this 
transformation.  First, there are meditative techniques designed to break down the barrier 
between self and other.  According to Heim, this practice begins by generating loving-
kindness toward oneself. Once this is achieved, one begins to extend such feelings to 
friends, then to neutrals, and eventually even to enemies.319  Here, the thoughts of self, 
friends, neutrals, and enemies serve as indexical symbols connecting and attuning the 
interpreters with the ultimacy of enlightenment.  In other practices, stories of the Buddha 
serve as devotional symbols for similar purposes.    “One may take inspiration from the 
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previous lives of the Buddha when he was a Bodhisattva and practiced forbearance, such 
as the story of when he was torn limb by limb by a king and did not feel the slightest 
anger.”320  Other practices include using the concept of samsara, the wheel of rebirth, to 
alter one’s construal of the object of hatred.  Given that we have lived innumerable lives, 
we have all been in various relationships with others such that it is quite possible that the 
object of hatred had once been the subject’s mother.  Thus one should construe the object 
of hate as someone who has “carried me in her womb for ten months and removed from 
me without disgust, as if it were yellow sandalwood, my urine, excrement, spittle, snot, 
etc., and played with me, nourished me, carrying me about on her hip.”321  This is a vivid 
example of the way abstract concepts, such as samsara, can, through the imagination, 
shape our sensory apprehension of others such that they serve as indexical symbols 
attuning the subject with perceived ultimacy.    
 
The Passion of Aversion 
 Aversion is the only basic passion that Aquinas does not address specifically in 
questions 26-48 when he addresses the particular passions.  Rather, Aquinas simply notes 
the structure of aversion in his account of the passions generally.  Here, he speaks of 
aversion as the contrary of desire: “If the good be not yet possessed, it causes in the 
appetite a movement towards the attainment of the good beloved: and this belongs to the 
passion of desire or concupiscence: and contrary to it, in respect of evil, is the passion of 
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aversion.”322  Given that aversion is the contrary of desire, we can glean Aquinas’s 
understanding of aversion from his account of longing.   Just as longing was a craving for 
some type of union with some particular object which is apprehended as good in some 
way (pleasant, suitable, etc.), so aversion is an appetitible movement away from some 
particular which is perceived as bad in some way (painful, unsuitable, etc.).  Aquinas 
further defines aversion by contrasting it with fear.  The distinction between aversion and 
fear is rooted in a broader distinction between the concupiscible and irascible appetitible 
powers.  Aquinas writes that “the object of the concupiscible power is sensible good or 
evil, simply apprehended as such, which causes pleasure or pain.  But, since the soul 
must, of necessity, experience difficulty or struggle at times, in acquiring some such 
good, or avoiding some such evil, . . . this very good or evil, inasmuch as is of an arduous 
or difficult nature, is the object of the irascible faculty.”323  While fear is also an 
appetitive movement away from that which is perceived as bad in some way, the object 
of fear is perceived as difficult to avoid, which is not the case with simple aversion.  Thus 
we might classify forms of disgust or repugnance as forms of aversion rather than fear.  
Finally, given its parallel structure to longing, we can make a distinction between natural 
and non-natural aversion much as Aquinas made explicit in the context of longing.  The 
object of natural aversion is an object which is naturally unsuitable due to the biology of 
the organism (the disgust of rotten food, perhaps), while the object of non-natural 
aversion is something which is understood (correctly or incorrectly) to be evil or 
unsuitable (such as sexual taboos).   
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Religious Aversion 
 The Theravada Buddhist practice of corpse meditation serves as a good example 
for an analysis of religious disgust.  In The Path of Purification, Buddhaghosa outlines 
“foulness as a meditation subject” by listing ten forms of corpse meditation: the bloated, 
the livid, the festering, the cut up, the gnawed, the scattered, the hacked and scattered, the 
bleeding, the worm-infested, and the skeleton.324  Buddhaghosa offers rather detailed 
instruction on how meditation on these various types of corpses should occur in order to 
ensure safety and effectiveness.  The immediate purpose of such meditation is to conquer 
various forms of bodily lust and desire.  For example, meditation on the bloated is 
prescribed for those who are easily aroused by the shape of the body; the livid is for those 
who are aroused by skin color; the festering helps those who are aroused by perfume.325  
But, according to Buddhaghosa, there are other benefits to deliberately inculcating 
disgust than just taming sexual desire.  “And repulsive as this object is, still it arouses joy 
and happiness in him by his seeing its advantages thus, ‘Surely in this way I shall be 
liberated for aging and death.’”326  The point is not only to eliminate particular lusts and 
desires, but selfish desires in general which lie at the heart of the suffering needed to be 
overcome.  Additionally, focus on the disgusting aspects of the body help to eliminate 
unjust social distinctions.  After describing the entrails of the body in gory detail, 
Buddhaghosa concludes that in terms of the “universal repulsiveness of the body . . . even 
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a king, if he wandered from village to village with his hair in its natural wild disorder, [is] 
no different from a flower-scavenger or an outcaste or what you will. So there is no 
distinction between a king’s body and an outcaste’s in so far as its impure stinking 
nauseating repulsiveness is concerned.”327  Thus the benefits of such meditation is not 
simply transformation of individual desires, but social transformation as well. 
 There are also examples of prescriptions to deliberately inculcate disgust in the 
Jewish mystical tradition, although for quite different spiritual ends.  Sixteenth century 
Palestinian Rabbi Elijah de Vidas wrote a Kabbalistic ethical treatise entitled Reshit 
Hochma (The Beginning of Wisdom), which is still widely studied by Orthodox Jews 
today.  In this work, de Vidas identifies anger as a religious vice because it is rooted in a 
pride that is incompatible with submission to God.  “Anger is a result of pride since if a 
person’s heart was broken and crushed most certainly he would not become angered and 
would not respond to insult.”328  De Vidas offers various methods to eliminate anger in 
order to better conform to the saintly ideal he envisions: “If an individual will be despised 
in his own eyes and will consider himself to be disgusting, he will not respond to his 
being shamed.  The way in which to consider himself disgusting is to think about the 
defects and lowliness of his soul, such that he is disgusting in the eyes of the Creator by 
virtue of his evil deeds.”329  Like Buddhaghosa, de Vidas prescribes a religious disgust as 
a means for transformation. In this example, the subject’s sinful soul serves as the 
indexical symbol that initiates the transformation.  Solomon Schimmel explains the 
offended subject is instructed construe the wrongs as but a tiny fraction of his or her own 
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sins against the divine realm, such the extent of his or her injury pails in comparison to 
the damage wrought by the subject.330  De Vidas encourages not only cultivation of moral 
disgust, but also bodily disgust.  He exhorts his reader to “think about his vileness both in 
life and in death; while alive that his head is covered with worms and lice and in death 
man is a worm that is disgusting in virtue of its stench and the foul odor of his 
intestines.”331  This imaginative exercise will reduce anger, for such a man “will say to 
himself ‘does a rotten corpse respond to insult?’ Surely he will not respond as it would be 
irrational to do so.”332   While both Buddhaghosa and de Vidas advocate religious disgust 
as a means of transformation, they envision quite different religious ends.  For de Vidas, 
the disgust is not advocated as a means to reduce the desire that is at the root of suffering, 
but to reduce the pride that is at the root of sin and rebellion against the Torah.  
Additionally, for de Vidas, this elimination of pride and anger has eternal ramifications.  
Solomon explains that according to de Vidas, “just as in life, he, through his anger, cast 
out the Divine Presence from its natural terrestrial residence, the human soul, so upon his 
death, the Holy One, blessed be He, will prevent his soul’s entry into the realm of the 
divine.”333 
  
The Passion of Sorrow  
 Of all the passions, Aquinas dedicates the most extended treatment to sorrow.  He 
begins by distinguishing bodily pain from sorrow.  According to Aquinas, pain (dolor), in 
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the broadest sense of the term, is a passion and sorrow (tristitia) is one form of pain.  We 
do not typically think of pain as an emotion, as it is associated with the body rather than 
the mind.  Likewise, Aquinas’s objectors argue that pain is not a passion “because no 
passion of the soul is in the body.”334  However, Aquinas argues that “we speak of the 
body, because the cause of pain is in the body. . . . But the movement of pain is always in 
the soul; since ‘the body cannot feel pain unless the soul feels it.’”335  Thus, for Aquinas, 
the consciousness of pain is a change in the sensitive appetite to some perceived present 
evil.  However, Aquinas distinguishes physical pain from sorrow on the grounds that 
physical pain arises “from the apprehension of an exterior sense” while sorrow arises 
“from the interior apprehension of the intellect or of the imagination.”336  For Thomas, 
the ‘exterior senses’ are the five senses of touch, taste, smell, hearing, and sight.  Physical 
pain is the change in the sensitive appetite to evil perceived simply though the external 
senses.  This would presumably include not just the pain of touch (for example a paper 
cut), but also noise irritation, blinding lights, bitter tastes, etc.  Sorrow, on the other hand, 
involves a change in the sensitive appetite to evil perceived through the imagination, 
where imagination is understood in the broad sense as the ability to perceive objects or 
images and such objects and images may, for humans, be informed by the ideas of the 
intellect.337 
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 The fact that objects of sorrow are images of the imagination explain how the 
objects of sorrow can include objects of memory and anticipation.  Aquinas writes that 
the “external sense perceives only what is present; but the interior cognitive power can 
perceive the present, past and future. Consequently sorrow can regard present, past and 
future: whereas bodily pain, which follows apprehension of the external senses, can only 
regard something present.”338  At first glance, this might seem at odds with Aquinas’s 
placement of sorrow in relationship to aversion.  Since aversion is distinguished from 
sorrow by the fact that, in aversion, the evil is not present while sorrow is identified as an 
appetitive response to some present evil, how can sorrow regard the future?  Part of the 
answer has to do with the nature of the appetitive response.  Aversion involves some sort 
of striving away from the absent evil, much as longing is a craving for the absent good.  
However, Aquinas describes the appetitive response of sorrow in terms of rest, as a kind 
of “violent repose.”339  Diane Fritz Cates explains that “sorrow is a cessation of the 
motion of withdrawing from and trying to avoid the unsuitable union. . . . Sorrow is, in 
other words, a motion of being-weighed-down, crushed, or ‘depressed.’”340  So, sorrow 
occurs when the striving away (if the opportunity to strive away even presented itself in 
the first place) gives up, so to speak.  For example, Aquinas classifies worry as a kind of 
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sorrow rather than a form of fear.  Worry “weighs on the mind, so as to make escape 
seem impossible.”341  Fear involves the apprehension that the evil object can be avoided.  
The central question in worry is not so much, “how can I avoid this evil?” but “what am I 
going to do given this evil will befall me?”  Thus, there is a certain acceptance of the evil 
involved in sorrow, and in that sense the evil is present.   
 In his second question dedicated to sorrow, Aquinas considers whether it is better 
to understand the object of sorrow as a lack of good rather than a present evil, which 
leads naturally to a discussion of the relationship between longing and sorrow.  
Regarding the first issue, Aquinas observes that while a lack of good is the cause of 
sorrow, the object of sorrow is a present evil.  On Aquinas’s metaphysics of value, evil 
simply is lack of good.  Thus Aquinas writes that “if privations, as considered by the 
mind, were what they are in reality, this question would seem to be of no importance. . . . 
But sorrow is a movement of the appetite in consequence of an apprehension: and even a 
privation, as apprehended, has the aspect of being.”342  Whether or not we agree with 
Aquinas’s axiology, his observation is still important.  The subject must apprehend the 
loss of good as an evil in order for sorrow to occur.  For instance, to the extent that one 
sees their loss of employment as an opportunity for positive change, sorrow will be 
replaced by hope.  Thus, while a cause of sorrow is necessarily a lack of good, the object 
of sorrow is a perceived present evil. 
 In addition to lack of good, Aquinas also identifies desire and longing as possible 
causes of sorrow.  He explains that “whatever hinders a movement from reaching its end 
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is contrary to that movement.  Now that which is contrary to that movement of the 
appetite, is a cause of sorrow.  Consequently, desire becomes a cause of sorrow, in so far 
as we sorrow for the delay of a desired good, or for its entire removal.”343  Due to the fact 
that a couple desires children, they experience sorrow at the news of infertility.  Because 
the athlete wants to win, she sorrows at the loss.  But Aquinas also claims that desire is 
not a universal cause of sorrow, because we often sorrow more for the loss of an already 
possessed good than we do for not being able to obtain some good in the first place.344  
For example, the parent’s grief at the death of a child is greater than the sorrow resulting 
from the frustrated desire to have children.  So while love and attachment is a universal 
cause of sorrow, desire is not. 
 Having considered both the causes and object of sorrow, Aquinas next considers 
the effects of sorrow.  At first glance, it may appear that, given the effects of sorrow he 
concentrates on, Aquinas views the value of sorrow in a purely negative light.  He argues 
that pain deprives one of the power to learn, that sorrow is a burden to the soul, that it 
weakens activity, and is the passion that is most harmful to the body.  However, a closer 
reading suggests that sorrow, when rationally appropriate, is necessary for human 
flourishing.  For example, Aquinas observes the obvious when he notes that acute pain 
draws the mind’s attention to itself such that “man is prevented at the time from learning 
anything: indeed it can be so acute, that, as long as it lasts, a man is unable to give his 
attention even to that which he knew already.”345  But Aquinas does not state that such an 
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effect is negative in the sense that it is not conducive to one’s well-being.  The ability to 
ignore my toothache in order to contemplate whether an a priori/synthetic proposition is 
possible might not be in my self-interest.  Additionally, Aquinas claims that “moderate 
sorrow, that does not cause the mind to wander, can conduce to the acquisition of 
learning especially in regard to those things by which a man hopes to be freed from 
sorrow.”346  Aquinas recognizes that extreme depression often is counter to the 
flourishing of the subject.  In this extreme form, “the soul, through being depressed so as 
to be unable to attend freely to outward things, withdraws to itself, closing itself up as it 
were.”347  But in Aquinas’s view, not all forms of sorrow are so debilitating, for “the 
uplifting of the soul ensues from the sorrow which is according to God.”348 
 Aquinas addresses the value of sorrow more explicitly in the final question 
dedicated to the topic.   He begins by distinguishing two ways in which an emotion can 
be considered to be good or evil.  An emotion might be evil in the sense that no one 
would want to experience it.  But the same emotion might be good in the sense that it is a 
sign of the subjects proper rejection of evil.349  For Aquinas, sorrow is evil in the sense 
that no one desires to be sorrowful or to be united with the evil that is a precondition to 
sorrow.  But sorrow is a good in the sense that it can be a sign of virtuous character and 
can assist human flourishing and moral/spiritual maturity.  It is good “inasmuch as it 
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denotes perception and rejection of evil.”350  In fact, sorrow can be a virtue when the 
perception of evil is due to a right judgment of reason and the rejection of evil is rooted in 
the will.  This should not be taken to mean that the virtue is passionless.  Rather, “all the 
passions of the soul should be regulated according to the rule of reason, which is the root 
of the virtuous good.”351  So for Aquinas, sorrow is not only useful for human survival 
and flourishing, but can also be constitutive of virtuous character.  As we will now 




 In his article on religious melancholy, Julius Rubin contrasts the role of sorrow in 
evangelical pietism and Christian mysticism.352  After noting the deep concern for the 
assurance of election in 17th and 18th century Calvinist pietism, Rubin remarks that the 
“spiritual itinerary from sin to salvation (ordo salutis) provided devotional exercises 
where the faithful would experience an initial godly sorrow for sin that progressed in 
severity by means of the ‘inquisition of self-examination’ into despair and the desired 
state of selfless ecstasy—holy desperation.”353  The symbol of sin attunes and transforms 
the pietist to ultimacy by way of sorrow in the form of guilt.  Such sorrow is saintly in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
350 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 39, a. 2, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province 
(New York: Benzinger Bros., 1948). 
351 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 39, a. 2, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province 
(New York: Benzinger Bros., 1948). 
352 Julius Rubin, “Melancholy,” in The Oxford Handbook of Religion and Emotion, ed. John Corrigan 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 290-309. 
353 Julius Rubin, “Melancholy,” in The Oxford Handbook of Religion and Emotion, ed. John Corrigan 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 294. 
 
	   127 
that it, in Aquinas’s words, “denotes perception and rejection of evil.”354  It allows the 
Calvinist to apprehend the total depravity of humanity and the sovereignty of God thus 
resulting in a holy desperation.  Peter Iver Kaufman explains that “the pietists wanted to 
structure character and desire and took a special interest in the therapeutic value of 
despair.”355  The value of guilt over one’s sins, according to this evangelical pietism, is 
that it leads to despair in one’s own power to transform the self, which, in turn, leaves 
room for the redemption and healing of Christ’s work.   
 Drawing on Max Weber’s distinction between “the active asceticism that is a 
God-willed action of the devout who are God’s tools [Calvinism] with the contemplative 
possession of the holy as found in mysticism,”356 Rubin proceeds to contrast pietistic 
sorrow with Christian mystical sorrow. However, his initial description of mystical 
sorrow sounds similar to the pietistic sorrow analyzed above: “The mystic viewed the 
melancholy dark night as an indispensable spiritual exercise that was essential to wean 
the soul from worldliness and sin and prepare the soul for the ultimate and complete 
assimilation to God.”357  The role of sorrow in Christian mysticism is structurally similar 
to its role in pietism in that it is an essential step of preparation for the religious end.  
However, in pietism, sorrow results in the despair of one’s will so that this will may be 
submitted to God’s.  In Rubin’s language, the individual is a tool of God’s will in 
pietism.  However, in Christian mysticism, the sorrow of the dark night allows for an 
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experiential union with the divine.  Here, “the individual is not a tool, but a vessel.”358   
Sorrow of worldliness and sin is thus a necessary prerequisite for the experience of God’s 
love and the goal of the unitive life and deification. 
 In chapter three, I explored the Buddhist ideal of the bodhisattva primarily 
focusing on the compassionate longing/sympathetic joy dialect of this path.  But the 
transformation of the Bodhisattva involves not only sympathetic joy (mudita in Pali and 
Sanskrit), but also karuna, or the compassionate feeling of another’s suffering and the 
longing to extinguish it.  This form of sorrow is welcome in the Bodhisattva path not only 
because it amounts to the erosion or the transcendence of the ego, but also because it is 
necessary for more social, global, and even cosmic transformation.  The Bodhisattva 
vows to “take upon myself the burden of all suffering. . . . And why? . . . My endeavors 
do not merely aim at my own deliverance. . . . I must rescue all beings from the stream of 
samsara. . . . So I will help all beings to freedom, in all the states of woe that may be 
found in any world whatsoever.”359  Here, the suffering of other sentient beings serves as 
an indexical symbol that conforms not just the Bodhisattva, but all sentient beings, to the 
ultimacy of the awareness of Emptiness.  So while the sorrow of the Calvinist weakens 
the will to the end of submission to a sovereign ontological Other and the sorrow of the 
Christian mystic is a necessary step toward union with an ontological Other, the 
bodhisattva endures the sorrow of samara to help others toward awareness that there is no 
ontological permanence—an awareness that will free others from the desire-rooted dis-
ease and sorrow of the human condition. 
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The Passions of Fear and Daring 
 Aquinas’s treatment of fear is similar in structure to his treatment of other specific 
passions.  He begins by specifying fear in contrast to other passions by paying close 
attention to the object of fear.  For Aquinas, three necessary conditions of the object of 
fear are 1) that it be a perceived evil, 2) that the evil is perceived as a future evil, and 3) 
that the future evil be perceived as difficult to avoid.  Aquinas devotes an entire question 
to drawing out the ramifications of these conditions to further clarify the logic of fear.   
He begins by addressing objections which state that the object of fear may be some good.  
His objectors note that the object of fear is often some perceived good, particularly 
power, God, and the loss of good things.  Aquinas responds that fear can “regard good 
also, in so far as referable to evil.”360  For example, fear may regard health insofar as one 
fears the loss of health.  But the object of fear is the loss of health (an evil) rather than 
health itself.  Also, fear may regard some perceived good as the cause of evil.  While 
power may be good in itself, it can be a cause of some perceived evil.  Aquinas writes 
that “one fears to be over another, i.e. to lean on another, so that it is his power to do us a 
harm: thus a man fears another, who knows him to be guilty of a crime, lest he reveal it to 
others.”361  We do not fear power in itself.  Rather, we fear the power of others insofar as 
it leaves us vulnerable.  Likewise, Aquinas notes that people do not fear God as God, but 
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the punishments of God when such punishments are perceived as evil in some way.362  
Thus, the proper object of fear is always some perceived evil. 
 Aquinas’s objectors also note that certain evils, like death and illness, are always 
threatening.  If such evils were an object of fear, then we would always be in a state of 
fear.363  Aquinas responds that since fear arises from the imagination of a future evil, 
“whatever removes the imagination of the future evil, removes fear also.”364  If our own 
death is not present to our imagination as a future event, it cannot serve as the object of 
fear.  We can distract ourselves from the imagination of our own death by directing our 
attention elsewhere.  When we do contemplate our own deaths, we often think about it 
abstractly and not as a real possibility.  As Aquinas writes, by thinking of our own death 
as remote and far off, “such a thing is considered as though it were not to be.”365  Aquinas 
also notes that fear ceases when hope of escape ceases.   When there is no hope of escape, 
the object is not perceived as a future, threatening evil, but a present, fulfilled evil.  The 
object of fear is considered to be probable rather than certain.  Thomas Miner’s offers an 
analogy: “like the object of a photographer’s lens that comes into focus, the threatening 
evil can be neither too close nor too far away.  What makes something threatening, 
however, is not simply related to time.  If no hope of escape exists, the evil loses its 
threatening character; it is perceived as virtually present, even if some time must pass 
before its actual arrival.”366 
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 Aquinas notes that the conditions of the object of fear entail that the object of fear 
be perceived as something outside the direct control of the will.  From the fact that the 
object of fear is a future evil which is difficult to avoid, “we may gather that whatever is 
entirely subject to our own power and will, is not an object of fear; and that nothing gives 
rise to fear save what is due to an external cause.”367  So, the kind of anxious vertigo that 
Sartre describes is not, as Sartre maintain, an awareness of our own freedom, but an 
awareness that we might slip. This awareness of our limits would seem to be an element 
not just of fear, but of all irascible emotions (hope, despair, fear, daring, and anger).  In 
distinguishing the concupiscible and irascible emotions, Aquinas says that while the 
concupiscible passions involve the simple inclinations to seek the suitable and avoid the 
harmful, through the irascible passions, “the animal resists these attacks that hinder what 
is suitable, and inflict harm. . . . Whence we say that its object is something arduous, 
because its tendency is to overcome and rise above obstacles.”368  Diana Fritz Cates 
explains that the irascible passions arise “when one apprehends an obstacle to attaining 
what one wants, or avoiding what one wants to avoid.”369  This observation is a central 
thesis in Philip Fisher’s work on the vehement passions.  Fisher argues that the vehement 
passions (fear, anger, shame, etc.) mark “the contours of the limited radius of our will by 
means of the injuries and humiliations of that will that are signaled to us by moments 
when we find ourselves in a state of vehemence—that is, in an impassioned state.”370  
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Thus, for an object to be an object of fear, it must be a future evil that is perceived to be 
out of the control of one’s will. 
 Aquinas also discusses the varieties of fear, based upon the varieties of possible 
objects of fear.  Fear can vary both in terms of intensity and form.  Regarding the former, 
Aquinas argues that, all other things being equal, sudden evils are feared with greater 
intensity.  Aquinas notes that difficulty as a necessary condition of fear “is due to one of 
two causes: to the greatness of the evil, or to the weakness of him that fears; while 
unwontedness and suddenness conduce to both causes.”371  Sudden evils are perceived to 
be greater evils and the suddenness deprives the subject of resources to overcome or 
forestall the evil. Aquinas cites an example of a rich man who suddenly becomes poor.  
The poverty is all the more disagreeable due to its suddenness.  The fear of a rich man 
who fears he will lose all his savings in a recent gamble is more vehement then the fear of 
a rich man who fears his expenses will slowly erode his wealth.  The intensity of fear is 
also affected by whether the subject perceives there to be any remedy to the evil he/she 
fears. “The object of fear is evil: consequently whatever tends to increase evil, conduces 
to the increase of fear.  Now evil is increased not only in its species of evil, but also in 
respect of circumstances. . . . And of all the circumstances, longlastingness, or even 
everlastingness, seems to have the greatest bearing on the increase of evil.”372  Thomas 
Miner offers fear of chemical and nuclear warfare as examples of fear of an evil with no 
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remedy. The fact that the suffering associated with chemical and nuclear warfare last for 
many years makes these events particularly terrible.373   
 In addition to intensity, Aquinas also delineates various forms of fear based on the 
circumstances of the object of fear.   In this context, he attempts to defend the traditional 
list of species of fear given by Damascene as “laziness, shamefacedness, shame, 
amazement, stupor, and anxiety.”374  Thomas Miner suggests that the unusual amount of 
objections to this traditional list that Aquinas offers shows he recognizes the tradition 
involves some difficulty. Nonetheless, Aquinas defends the tradition by analyzing 
laziness as fear of work that burdens one’s nature; shamefacedness as fear of social 
disgrace as a result of a deed yet to be done; shame as fear of social disgrace as a result of 
a deed already done; amazement as fear of a great evil the outcome of which the subject 
is unable to gauge; stupor as fear of some unusual, strange, or unwonted evil; and anxiety 
as fear of some evil under the aspect of unforseeability.  While we might question the 
details of these analyses or wish for more specification, the important point here is that 
Aquinas’s basic framework can be used to analyze emotions not included in the eleven 
basic passions.   
 Aquinas concludes his treatment of fear by considering its causes and effects. 
Aquinas argues for two necessary causes of fear: love and defect.  Aquinas begins by 
recalling the distinction between the object and cause of a passion.  The object of a 
passion is the formal properties of any possible target of fear (a perceived, future evil that 
is difficult to avoid).  The cause of a passion, on the other hand, is whatever serves as a 
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cause of the object of the passion.375  Aquinas then distinguishes between the efficient 
and material causes of fear.  Since the object of fear is some future evil, “that which can 
inflict such an evil, is the efficient cause of the object of fear, and, consequently of fear 
itself.”376  In the case of an adolescent who fears being grounded on the night of the 
party, his/her parents would serve as an efficient cause. The material cause, on the other 
hand, is “that which renders a man so disposed [such that the object] is such an evil to 
him.”377  If I fear being bitten by some particular dog, the owner who just let the dog off 
the leash might be an efficient cause of the fear, while some dramatic childhood 
encounter with another dog might be a material cause.  As Robert Miner expresses it, a 
material cause of fear is anything that “dispose[s] a person to construe something as 
possessing features that inspire fear, that is, to perceive the thing as an obiectum 
timoris.”378 For Aquinas, love is a necessary material cause of fear “since it is through his 
loving a certain good, that whatever deprives a man of that good is an evil to him, and 
that consequently he fears it as evil.”379  Thus, the adolescents’s love for someone at the 
party might serve as a material cause of the adolescent’s fear of being grounded.  Love of 
myself serves as a material cause of my fear of the dog.  Fear, like all other emotions, is 
grounded in love.  Defect is also a necessary material cause of fear “for it is owing to 
some lack of power that one is unable easily to repulse a threatening evil.”380  Given the 
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object of fear must appear as threatening, it must limit our will to some extent.  So, our 
limited will disposes us to perceive objects as threatening. 
 In addressing the effects of fear, Aquinas gives due attention to the feeling aspect 
of fear.  Aquinas reiterates his view that the passions are necessarily psychosomatic.  The 
movement of the sensitive appetite is the formal element of the passion, while the bodily 
change is the material element.  Aquinas claims these two elements are generally 
proportionate in degree and that the bodily transmutation resembles the appetitive 
movement in some way.381  Since the motivational component of fear involves a kind of 
retreat, Aquinas suggests there is a similar somatic effect of contraction.  More 
specifically, “a similar contraction of heat and vital spirits towards the inner parts takes 
place in regard to the body.”382  While this is obviously outdated physiology, Thomas 
Miner notes a certain value in Aquinas’s remarks.  “The conviction that motivates 
[Aquinas’s claim] retains its validity.  The conviction is that different motions of the 
sensitive appetite will produce corresponding different somatic effects.  Feeling hot with 
anger or cold with fear are experiences grounded in nature.  While the explanans may 
change as natural science changes, the explanandum will remain the same.”383  Given 
Aquinas’s view that the body and soul are fundamentally integrated, he avoids the view 
that the somatic effects are simply ‘added-on’ to the essential cognitive, evaluative, and 
motivational components.  The formal and material aspects of the passions are closely 
intertwined.  As Peter Goldie argues, “our entire mind and body is engaged in the 
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emotional experience, and all the feelings are ‘united in consciousness’ in being directed 
toward its object: united ‘body and soul,’ ‘heart and mind.’”384 
 Aquinas devotes considerably less space to the passion of daring than he does to 
fear.  Aquinas is content to briefly discuss the relationship of daring to both fear and hope 
and then quickly note its causes and effects.  Aquinas argues that daring is the contrary of 
fear in the sense that “fear turns away from the future hurt, on account of its victory over 
him that fears it; whereas daring turns on threatened danger because of its own victory 
over that same danger.”385  As this quote illustrates, there is a parallel between daring and 
despair.  Just as despair retreats from the good because it seen as impossible to obtain, so 
daring approaches evil because it is seen as possible to overcome.  This observation leads 
Aquinas to the position that daring proceeds from hope “since it is in the hope of 
overcoming the threatening object of fear, that one attacks it boldly.”386  So, just as 
despair presupposes a fear of losing some good, so daring presupposes the hope of 
overcoming some evil.  Aquinas’s analysis of daring is similar to Aaron Ben-Ze’ev’s 
analysis of courage (considered simply as an affective state rather than a virtue).  Ben-
Ze’ev writes that “the most significant difference between fear and courage concerns the 
motivational component: whereas in fear flight is the typical behavior, in courage the 
agent usually confronts the threat, as the agent believes she can successfully overcome 
it.”387  As Ben-Ze’ev’s final clause suggests, the object of daring is construed differently 
than the object of fear.  In fear, the object is perceived as evil and unlikely to be avoided, 
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whereas in daring, the object is perceived as likely to be overcome.  Whereas the object 
of fear is perceived to be outside the control of one’s will, the object of daring is 
perceived to be at the very limit, but not beyond the limit, of one’s will.  So whereas 
weakness and defect dispose one to construe an object as fearful, strength, previous 
experiences of danger, and external assistance predispose one to view an evil as worth 
trying to overcome.388 
 
Religious Fear and Daring 
 In the Christian tradition, perhaps there is no more paradigmatic symbol of fear 
than the symbol of hell.  The object of the fear of hell is a future state which one 
apprehends as profoundly unsuitable and nearly impossible to avoid without divine grace.  
Diane Fritz Cates observes that “the object of this fear can become increasingly abstract 
as one moves, say, from the image of being burned in a fire . . . to the thought that this 
image . . . is but a way of trying to imagine what it would be like to live in complete 
absence of goodness . . . to the thought that repeated acts of wrong doing give rise to 
habits that destroy one’s capacity to function well as a human and destroy one’s capacity 
even to recognize that this destruction is taking place.”389  But however one understands 
the object of the symbol of hell, the symbol itself remains one of the sensory imagination.  
And this sensory quality of the symbol is necessary to engender the passion of fear.  As 
Cates notes, the abstract idea of evil or the ideal that moral violation is its own 
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punishment does not cause a human being to fear or panic apart from concrete sensory 
representation.390 
 Cates’s observation is one that Jonathan Edwards was clearly aware of when 
writing his (in)famous sermon Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God.  Edwards creates 
vivid images of hell in the attempt to awaken the congregation from their spiritual 
slumber.  The language and theology of Edwards stresses the complete vulnerability of 
unbelievers: “the Pit is prepared, the Fire is made ready, the Furnace is now hot, ready to 
receive them, the Flames do now rage and glow.  The glittering Sword is whet, and held 
over them, and the Pit hath opened her Mouth under them.”391  Edwards emphasizes that 
it is only because of the will of God that unbelievers are not already burning in hell, 
adding to the sense of the precarious nature of their situation.  It is only the hand of God, 
which He could at any moment remove, that prevents the unbelievers from slipping into 
the Devil’s pit.  The presentation of hell at any moment is entirely outside the will and 
control of the unbeliever.  Edwards explicitly address the ability of the unconverted to 
distract themselves from this possibility by redirecting their imagination.  “You probably 
are not sensible of this; you find you are kept out of Hell, but don’t see the Hand of God 
in it, but look at other Things, as the good State of your bodily Constitution, your Care of 
your own Life, and the Means you use for your own Preservation.  But indeed these 
Things are nothing.”392 Edwards forcefully returns hell to the imagination of his 
congregation to awaken them to the danger of their condition and orient their attitudes 
and concerns in a salvifically productive manner.  
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 Edwards elicits fear initially as a means of cognitive transformation.  He writes 
that “whatever some have imagined and pretended about Promises made to natural Men’s 
earnest seeking and knocking, ‘tis plain and manifest that whatever Pains a natural Man 
takes in Religion, whatever Prayers he makes, till he believes in Christ, God is under no 
manner of Obligation to keep him a Moment from eternal destruction.”393  An admirer of 
St. Augustine, Edwards would have been aware of his claim that the process of holiness 
is the transformation of fear of God into love of God.  But belief, for Edwards, seems to 
be an intermediary.  Here, transformation of belief is salvifically prior to practice such as 
prayer.  In other traditions, however, symbols of fear are most directly intended to shape 
practice or other affections.  Diane Fritz Cates offers an example of a Tibetan Buddhist 
nun who cites her biggest fear, when she is tempted to neglect her duties, is that she will 
be reincarnated into a much lower life form such as an ant.394  The image of being 
reincarnated into some particular lower life form serves as an indexical symbol attuning 
the nun toward ultimacy.  Instead of a cognitive transformation, the most immediate 
purpose of the symbol of reincarnation in this case is practical—to keep the nun from 
neglecting her sacred obligations.   In his classic work on male initiation rituals in New 
Guinea, social anthropologist Donald Tuzin observes how rites of terror can be used to 
inspire feelings of love, gratitude, and “deep identification” in the novice for the 
initiators.395  He identifies similarities between the novice-initiator relationship and 
Stockholm syndrome where hostages express empathy toward their captors.  In such rites, 
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the rituals serve as indexical symbols which attune the passions to certain religiously 
normative standards.  In this case, the affective transformation is most immediate and 
prior to the cognitive and the practical.  In the following chapter, we will explore the 
relationship between religious beliefs, practice, and emotion.  But for now, we can note 
how symbols of fear can be put to different immediate purposes.   
 Hebrew scriptures are filled with religious symbols of daring.  Any narrative 
describing someone who obeys the will of God in the face of danger can serve as such a 
symbol.  Moses raising his staff; Rahab keeping her secret; David picking up his stones; 
Esther entering into the king’s presence; and Daniel praying in the den all serve as heroic 
ideals.  Similarly, the Christian New Testament is permeated with symbols of daring.  
The prodigal son risks rejection and humiliation in his return home.  The author of Acts 
writes of the boldness of Peter and John in the face of the threats of the elder council.  
Anna M. Gade notes that in the Islamic tradition, Muhammad serves as a “beautiful 
model.” “Through an affective focus and devotion to the prophet, as developed in the 
‘middle period’ (1270-1700) of Islam, Muslims may in effect achieve a radical 
internalization of the idea of sunnah,”396 a guide for normative behavior based on the life 
and practice of the Prophet.  Like Peter and John, Muhammad dares to follow the divine 
command to recite to a Meccan community unwilling to hear.  What all of these 
narratives have in common is that, at least on a prima facie reading, the danger to be 
faced with daring is quite real, but the daring necessary for the task at hand is secured by 
a confidence in a divine plan or divine external assistance.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
396 Anna M. Gade, “Islam,” in The Oxford Handbook of Religion and Emotion, ed. John Corrigan (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2008), 43. 
 
	   141 
 However, in other religious hero narratives, the courage necessary to meet a threat 
is gained when the threat is put into its proper perspective.  It is not the assurance of 
divine power by which the hero moves from fear to daring, but in the awareness of the 
danger’s weakness. In the Bhagavad Gita, the saintly warrior Arjuna, who is profoundly 
disturbed at the prospect of civil war, is faced with his social duty as a warrior to protect 
his family.  The Divine Lord, Krishna, offers the following advice to the fear stricken and 
wary general: “What is this weakness?  It is beneath you.  Is it for nothing men call you 
the foe-consumer?  Shake off this cowardice Arjuna.  Stand up.  Your words are wise, 
Arjuna, but your sorrow is for nothing.  The truly wise mourn neither for the living nor 
the dead.  There was never a time when I did not exist, nor you, nor any of these kings.  
Nor is there any future in which we shall cease to be.”397  In this case, the evil Arjuna 
feared and grieved over was ultimately illusory.  “Just as the dweller in this body passes 
though childhood, youth, and old age, so at death he merely passes into another kind of 
body.  The wise are not deceived by that.”398 Krishna summons Arjuna’s daring by 
helping him realize the Eternal Self within.  Krishna proceeds with a lengthy teaching on 
the ways of the illumined person, one who is not longer enslaved to action and dragged 
on by selfish desire.  Krishna reminds Arjuna the real foe he must dare to consume is 
himself.  Of the two wars Arjuna is facing, the war against his own ego is, as the Muslim 
would say, the greater jihad. 
    
The Passion of Anger 
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 The nature of anger among the passions is unique and complex in many ways 
according to Aquinas’s account.  First, anger is caused by a concurrence of several 
emotions “because the movement of anger does not arise save on account of some pain 
inflicted, and unless there be desire and hope of revenge.”399 Anger only arises when the 
endurance of sorrow is combined with a desire for vindication.  Secondly, anger is 
complex in the sense that its object is twofold.  Aquinas insists that it is not entirely 
correct to say that the object of anger is some evil, for anger consists in both a desire for 
vengeance (a perceived good) upon some person or for some slight that bears the 
character of evil.400  So, while in ordinary language it is common to express the object of 
anger as some evil, Aquinas holds that desire and hope, in addition to the sorrow of some 
slight, are necessary preconditions for anger.  Finally, anger is unique in that is has no 
contrary.  From the fact that anger is a complex emotion including elements of desire, 
hope, and sorrow, “it includes in itself contrariety: and consequently it has not contrary 
outside itself.  Thus also in mixed colors there is no contrariety, except that of the simple 
colors from which they are made.”401  However, this color analogy should not be taken 
too far.  Aquinas later explains that “anger is said to be composed of sorrow and desire, 
not as though they were its parts, but because they are its causes.”402  It is for this reason 
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that Aquinas holds anger to be a basic passion as opposed to a species or form of either 
desire, sorrow, or both.  Aquinas is fairly explicit about his commitment to the eleven 
passions as being basic and the only basic passions: “Consequently, there are all together 
eleven basic passions differing specifically; six in the concupiscible, and five in the 
irascible; and under these all the passions of the soul are contained.”403  I believe 
Aquinas’s insistence on both the complex nature of anger and its status as a basic passion 
leads to some difficulties.  But before I can address these difficulties, we must first 
examine Aquinas’s view on the relationship between anger and reason. 
 Yet another unique feature of anger, according to Aquinas, is that it is not only 
possible for anger to participate in reason, but “anger, in a fashion, requires an act of 
reason.”404  On Aquinas’s line of thinking, the desire for vindication implies a 
comparison between the offense and the punishment.  Since such a comparison is an 
inference, which is an act of reason, anger requires an act of reason.  This would seem to 
imply that anger is a uniquely human emotion.  Aquinas responds that animals have 
something analogous to anger by virtue of a “natural instinct imparted to them by the 
Divine Reason.”405  I agree with Aquinas that paradigmatic cases of anger involve the 
desire for vindication.  As Ben-Ze’ev observes, “In anger, we want to personally punish 
the other person who is seen as deserving punishment.”406  The desire for vindication 
seems to be an essential feature of the object of anger, for anger generally subsides if we 
come to view the once offensive action as unintentional.  We might speak of getting 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
403 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I-II q. 23, a. 4, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province 
(New York: Benzinger Bros., 1948). 
404 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I-II q. 46, a. 4, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province 
(New York: Benzinger Bros., 1948). 
405 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I-II q. 46, a. 4, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province 
(New York: Benzinger Bros., 1948). 
406 Aaron Ben-Ze’ev, The Subtlety of Emotions (Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 
2000), 384. 
 
	   144 
angry at inanimate objects when they thwart our will, but in such cases we can more 
carefully distinguish frustration or annoyance from anger.  However, I have trouble 
attributing the desire for vindication to non-rational animals, even with the aid of divine 
assistance.  Similarly, Thomas Miner suggests that “for animals, the [distinction between 
daring and anger] comes close to breaking down.”407  So, I suggest we step fully into the 
view toward which Aquinas leans—that anger is peculiar to rational beings. 
 However, this position of anger as a rational emotion might be devastating to 
Aquinas’s insistence on its status as a basic emotion.  Terruwe and Baars remark that it is 
odd that an emotion of the sensory appetite would derive its distinguishing characteristic 
from reason.  Additionally, they argue that it is not clear how animal rage could have 
anything to do with revenge, rather that a defense against further evil.408  This leads 
Terruww and Baars to suggest that anger and daring should not be seen as separate 
emotions, but differing forms of the same emotion. While anger always presupposes a 
present or past evil, “it is also possible for a threatening danger to bring about all the 
symptoms of anger and rage.  And when the manifestations are the same, one should 
assume the emotions are one and the same.”409  Aquinas would rightly disagree with this 
last statement.  It is the object that differentiates emotions, not the expressions.  Joy and 
embarrassment might both manifest in a smile, but these are certainly not the same 
emotions.  And there is a difference in object between daring and anger.  Daring’s object 
is a future, threatening evil which is perceived as worth trying to overcome, while the 
object of anger is necessarily, in part, a present or past evil.  It is not clear to me, 
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however, why Aquinas insists on anger being a basic passion when other emotions which 
are similar in terms of their complex nature are not.  We saw, for instance, how 
Aquinas’s analyzes compassion in terms of both sorrow at another’s misfortune or 
suffering and a desire to alleviate such suffering.  One could offer a similar analysis of 
anger such that anger is sorrow at one’s own unjust suffering and a desire for vindication.  
Thus, contra Aquinas, I think it makes more sense to consider anger as a complex 
emotional state involving both longing and sorrow.410  But the rationale for Aquinas’s 
insistence on anger as a basic passion is not crucial for my purposes here.  Basic or not, 
anger is an important emotion in religious contexts. 
 
Religious Anger 
 According to many saintly ideals, the emotion of anger is one to be eliminated 
rather that purposively inculcated.  This is perhaps due to the common observation that 
anger can be a particularly powerful and consuming passion.  Just as there is no such 
thing as virtuous hatred in Theravada Buddhism, the same is true for virtuous anger.  
Many Buddhist meditative techniques are designed to ameliorate negative emotional 
experiences such as anger.  For example, Maria Heim explains that in mindfulness 
meditation, “a part of the mind can learn to stand back and observe the rage arise, noting 
it conditions, its arc, and its dissipation. . . . To observe mental episodes and habits in this 
way does much of the work of liberating us from them; one is no longer swallowed whole 
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by anger.”411   We also observed in the section on disgust that according to some Jewish 
mystical traditions, anger is a symptom of pride that must be at least tightly controlled if 
not eliminated altogether.   
 However, there are examples of anger directed at symbols of ultimacy as a means 
of soteriological transformation.  One good example occurs in the Hebrew narrative of 
King David and the prophet Nathan.  After David commits adultery with and impregnates 
Bathsheba, he murders her husband in order to quickly marry her.  God sends Nathan to 
confront the King.  Nathan purposively awakens David’s anger by telling him a story of 
injustice symbolizing David’s own actions.  A rich man, with many sheep, steals the sole 
lamb of a poor man and prepares it for a feast in honor of a visitor.  “Then David’s anger 
was greatly kindled against the man.  He said to Nathan, ‘As the Lord lives, the man who 
has done this deserves to die; he shall restore the lamb fourfold, because he did this thing, 
and because he had no pity.”412  Nathan’s story serves as an indexical symbol awakening 
David to his own injustice.  “Nathan said to David, ‘You are the man! . . . Why have you 
despised the word of the Lord, to do what is evil in his sight?”413  While the prophet 
succeeds in arousing David’s anger, the narrative is somewhat ambiguous as to whether 
David’s pattern of concern was conformed to God’s care and concern.  Whereas David 
may have previously felt entitled to Bathsheba such that the feeling of guilt could not 
arise, David now recognizes his own sin.  But it is not clear whether David now feels 
genuine contrition and anger at his own deeds, or only regrets the consequences of divine 
punishment. Nathan prophecies future political conflicts, the death of the child, and the 
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fact that one of David’s own wives will be given to his neighbor before his own eyes.  In 
response, David displays outward forms of contrition such as fasting in the hopes of 
avoiding the death of the child.  But he quickly abandons these displays once the child 
dies, suggesting his concern was for his own future loss of fortune rather than his 
violation of God’s law.  While the narrative within the narrative may not have been 
successful in appropriately attuning David’s heart, the larger narrative can serve as a 
devotional symbol for the contemporary reader.  It reminds the reader how easily one can 
deceive oneself into thinking that that they are genuinely contrite, when in fact they 
simply fear punishment or are ashamed of their external disgrace. 
 We also can find examples in theistic traditions where, in certain circumstances, 
anger at God is deemed to be religiously/ethically valuable.  In a film interview, Elie 
Wiesel describes a trial of God performed by three learned men in Auschwitz.  After 
describing the solemnity and seriousness of the trail and the guilty verdict, Wiesel added 
that “I would like to do a story on that one day . . . but I will introduce a new character 
who defends God, the only one who defends God, the only one who says that God’s ways 
are justified even in Auschwitz.  And I would say that that character is Satan. . . . For a 
Jew to believe in God is good.  For a Jew to protest against God is still good.  But simply 
to ignore God—that is not good.  Anger, yes.  Protest, yes.  Affirmation, yes.  But 
indifference?  No.  You can be a Jew with God.  You can be a Jew against God.  But not 
without God.”414  If affirmation of God’s sovereign will is no longer possible in the 
twenty-first century, perhaps anger is.  In this theodicy of protest, the image of God on 
trail with a Satan defense attorney serves as a symbol of ultimacy toward which anger is 
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directed.  In this context, it is of ultimate importance not to succumb to the evil of 
indifference and the symbol attunes the concern of interpreter appropriately. 
 
Conclusion 
 The account of religious emotions offered in these pages can illustrate not only 
common patterns of characteristic emotional experience across religious boundaries, but 
can also shed light on the diversity and uniqueness of emotional-religious life both across 
and within religious traditions.  Viewing religious emotions as forms of concern toward 
symbols of ultimacy in a devotional context can help clarify the function of symbols in 
the religious life and how they are used in various patterns of transformation.  However, 
religion as a set of interrelated and traditional human practices performed in response to 
perceived ultimacy has as its goal not merely emotional transformation and attunement, 
but a transformation of the entire self—heart, mind, and strength.  In the next and final 
chapter of this project, we will explore the relationship between religious emotions, 
beliefs, and practice in order to illustrate the role of the emotions in the broader religious 
life.   
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CHAPTER FIVE 
RELIGIOUS EMOTION, COGNITION, AND PRACTICE 
 
Introduction 
 In the previous two chapters, I applied my account of religious emotions generally 
to an analysis of particular religious emotions and emotional patterns in order to illustrate 
the promise of the framework in comparative religious studies.  In this final chapter of the 
project, I want to broaden my focus back to religious emotions generally in order to 
explore the relationship between emotion, cognition, and practice in the religious life.  
David Morgan notes that “the academic study of religion in the modern West has been 
shaped by the idea that a religion is what someone believes, which consists of a discrete, 
subjective experience of assent to propositions concerning the origin of the cosmos, the 
nature of humanity, the existence of deities, or the purpose of life.”415  While this 
overemphasis on belief may be loosening in religious studies generally, Morgan’s 
statement is still largely true of contemporary analytic philosophy of religion.  Whether 
religious beliefs are epistemically justified/warranted or whether certain religious 
concepts are coherent still occupies a central place in the philosophical agenda.416  But as 
Leszek Kalokowski reminds us, “Religion is not a set of propositions, it is the realm of 
worship wherein understanding, knowledge, and the feeling of participation in the 
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ultimate reality and moral commitment [all] appear as a single act, whose subsequent 
segregation into separate classes of metaphysical, moral and other assertions might be 
useful, but is bound to distort the sense of the original act of worship.”417   Similarly, Paul 
Tillich observes that “faith as being ultimately concerned is a centered act of the whole 
personality.  If one of the functions which constitute the totality of the personality is 
partly or completely identified with faith, the meaning of faith is distorted.”418  The aim 
of this chapter is to show how Neville’s understanding of religious symbols can help 
illuminate the relationship between emotion, cognition, and practice in a religious context 
that respects the integrity of the religious life that Kalokowski and Tillich mention.  This 
chapter is divided into two sections.  The first section explores the relationship between 
emotion and cognition in religious life.  Here, I will make an important distinction 
between what I will call “mystical feelings” and religious emotions and explore the 
relationship between mystical feelings, religious understanding, and religious emotions.  
By religious understanding, I am referring to the broadly cognitive dimension of religion, 
which includes religious beliefs, doctrines, worldviews as well as objects of the 
imagination such as religious symbols (myths, icons, etc.).  I will argue that while 
mystical feelings have a logical priority to religious understanding, they do not 
necessarily have a practical priority.  While religious myths, beliefs, and doctrines arise 
historically out of the impulse provided by mystical feelings, individuals often experience 
mystical feelings after and through objects of religious understanding and with the aid of 
religious emotions. The second section will build off the first by discussing the role of 
religious practice in relation to religious emotions and understanding, arguing for what 
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John Cottingham refers to as the “primacy of praxis.”419  According to this view, it is of 
the very nature of religious understanding that it is rooted in and arises out of religious 
practice.  I will add to Cottingham’s point by further developing the concept of religious 
practice and show how religious emotions sustain the practices at the center of religious 
life.  I will conclude by showing how this account of the relationship between religious 
understanding, practice, and emotion has the added advantage of squaring nicely with 
Aquinas’s understanding of faith. 
 
Mystical Feelings, Religious Understanding, and Religious Emotions 
 In his work The Felt Meanings of the World, Quentin Smith offers an interesting 
distinction between what he calls “the metaphysics of reason” and “the metaphysics of 
feeling.”  The metaphysics of reason is metaphysics as traditionally taught in philosophy 
departments.  It is concerned with providing an explanation of the world as a whole. Why 
is there something rather than nothing? The metaphysics of feeling, on the other hand, “is 
concerned with the value or importance of the world, rather than with its causal or 
explanatory ground.”420  Moreover, the most basic way of registering such value of the 
world as a whole is through what Smith calls “intuitive feelings of global importances.”  
Smith explains that these intuitive, immediate registerings may vary in feeling from a 
kind of awesome fear to a marveling attraction.  But in any case, there is a direct sense of 
a meaningful whole with a response of feeling.421 
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 The feeling Smith describes is at least similar to what Wittgenstein labels the 
mystical.  “It is not how things are in the world that is mystical, but that it exists. . . . To 
view the world sub specie aeterni is to view it as a whole—a limited whole.  Feeling the 
world as a limited whole—it is this that is mystical.”422  In another writing, Wittgenstein 
describes this feeling as a sense of wonder, or what Smith labels a captivated marveling.  
“I believe the best way of describing [this experience] is to say that when I have it I 
wonder at the existence of the world.  And I am then inclined to use such phrases as ‘how 
extraordinary that anything should exist’ or ‘how extraordinary that the world should 
exist.’”423  Martin Heidegger expresses a similar sentiment of mystical contemplation.  
“‘Why are there beings, why is there anything at all, rather than nothing?’ . . . Many . . . 
never encounter this question, if by encounter we mean not merely to hear and read about 
it [but] to feel its inevitability.”424  One finds similar accounts of mystical feelings in 
Friedrich Schleiermacher’s notion of “the feeling of absolute dependence” and Rudolf 
Otto’s “mysterium tremendum.”  While much academic ink has been spilt on such 
mystical feelings, without getting mired in interpretative details we can say that such 
feelings have as their “object” either that which transcends finite particularities (the world 
as a whole) or the relationship between the self and that which transcends all existence. 
Additionally, such feelings are generally presented as non-discursive, non-conceptual, 
and immediately grasped.  In his analysis of the mysterium, Otto writes that such an 
experience “strikes us dumb” for the mysterium is “that which is quite beyond the sphere 
of the usual, the intelligible, and the familiar, filing the mind with blank wonder and 
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astonishment.”425  Again, as Wittgenstein reminds us, “there are indeed things that cannot 
be put into words.  They make themselves manifest. They are what is mystical.”426 
 It is important to distinguish mystical feelings from what I have been referring to as 
religious emotions.  Mystical feelings do not have as their object a religious symbol, but 
the world as a whole, the transcendent, or the relationship between the self and the 
transcendent. This is not to suggest that such states have nothing to do with the religious 
life.  To the contrary, there is a long philosophical tradition of understanding such states 
to be the foundation of the religious life.  In his 1830 edition of The Christian Faith, 
Friedrich Schleiermacher famously identified the basis of religion in a feeling of absolute 
dependence.  “The piety which forms the basis of all ecclesiastical communions is, 
considered purely in itself, neither a Knowing nor a Doing, but a modification of 
Feeling.”427  Otto identifies the basis of religion in the feeling of coming into contact with 
the  “the numinous,” or the non-rational aspect of the Holy which cannot be apprehended 
conceptually, but only immediately intuited through feeling.428 William James writes that 
religious beliefs must “be classed as over-beliefs, buildings-out performed by the intellect 
into directions of which feeling originally supplied the hint.”429  But James also noticed 
the distinction between pre-conceptual mystical feelings and what he referred to as 
religious sentiments, which are conceptual in the sense that they are simply ordinary 
emotions with reference to some type of religious object.  James explains that “there is 
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religious fear, religious love, religious awe, religious joy, and so forth.  But religious love 
is only man’s natural love directed to a religious object.”430 Thus, religious fear is natural 
fear directed at a religious image of divine retribution; religious joy is the natural joy one 
might feel at receiving a gift, but directed at the perception of God’s grace in one’s life. 
These religious emotions must be distinguished from mystical experiences, for, as we 
saw earlier, James claims that mystical feelings serve as the ground and impetus for 
religious ideas, whereas the religious ideas (God’s grace, divine retribution, etc.) serve as 
the ground for religious emotions.  On these accounts, mystical feelings have a logical 
priority to religious concepts, symbols, and doctrines.  Mystical wonder provides the 
impetus for the creation of religious myths, doctrines, and worldviews.   
 In his recent work, Mark Wynn develops this theme of the relationship between 
mystical feeling and religious understanding with the aid of contemporary developments 
in the philosophy of emotion.431  Wynn draws on various contemporary philosophical 
models of the emotions in order to establish the relationship between emotion and 
religious understanding.  Given that, according to some of these models, certain 
intellectual content is not otherwise available except through the emotional experience, 
Wynn argues that feeling is not just constructive, but indispensable to religious 
understanding.  While the various models differ in important respects, Wynn maintains 
that each can contribute to an overarching account of the relationship between feeling and 
religious understanding.   
 One such model is based on the work of John Deigh who argues that the emotions 
can be thought of as pre-conceptual forms of sensibility.  Deigh distinguishes between 
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sensibility of differences from the ability of conceptual predication. Sensibility involves 
being able to detect properties and discriminate those things that have the property from 
those that do not, while conceptual predication involves being able to grasp general 
concepts and use them in propositional thought.  For example, beagles are able to detect 
the smell of rabbit and discriminate those things that have it from those that do not, even 
though they lack the concept of rabbit and the ability to locate it in a system of 
propositional thought.432  Deigh then argues that sensibility is sometimes achieved 
through the emotions.  For instance, the emotion of fear is the perception of an object’s 
scariness, which is distinct from predicating the dangerousness of the object.  On Wynn’s 
interpretation of this model, the emotions are an immediate (non-conceptual) 
apprehension of some quality or a non-conceptual grasp of the world’s character.  
However, these pre-conceptual emotions can then be shaped and educated by conceptual 
thought.  For instance, Deigh notes that children begin to acquire the concept of the 
dangerous and can then distinguish the dangerous from what is sensibly scary.  This 
conceptual ability often weakens the impact of the sensory phenomena.  For example, a 
child with the ability to distinguish the harmful from the perceptually scary can recognize 
that the movie, while perceptually scary, is not harmful or dangerous and this will 
weaken the emotional impact of the film.  So, the child’s emotional susceptibilities 
change with this conceptual ability.433  However, as any fan of horror films knows, this 
conceptual ability may shape our emotional responses, but it does not always deaden 
them.  Thus, Wynn suggests that in addition to the ‘primitive’ non-conceptual emotions 
and the conceptual temper of these emotions, there are also cases where an object can 
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continue to excite perceptual-like response, but where this response is permeated with a 
conceptually informed understanding.434  Wynn then applies this model of the emotions 
as pre-conceptual forms of sensation to religious understanding.  “Perhaps there are 
certain primal, affectively toned responses to the world which can be taken up into larger 
affective complexes which are structured by concepts and by the work of the 
imagination; and perhaps it is in this way that affects can contribute to an affectively 
toned perception of God.”435  
 Next, Wynn develops a second model based on Peter Goldie’s understanding of 
emotion.  Goldie gives an example of someone who, having fallen on ice, may come to 
think of the dangerousness of the ice in a new, emotionally relevant way.  Goldie 
observes that this new understanding is not simply the old understanding with a feeling 
added on.  Rather, the whole way of being aware of the ice changes, even if this 
awareness cannot be articulated in words.436  Like Deigh, Goldie insists that emotional 
experiences have content beyond propositional content.  Additionally, for Goldie, the 
emotions are not responses of concern toward perceptual or conceptual content such that 
the new fear of ice is a response to a new understanding.  Rather the fear is itself a new 
understanding.  Wynn then relates this model to Deigh’s account.  On Deigh’s model, 
emotions can involve an initial, concept-independent affective response which is then 
infused with conceptual thoughts to produce an affectively toned awareness of the world.  
Goldie’s model works in the reverse direction.  For Goldie, feeling builds non-conceptual 
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content onto a previously achieved conceptual understanding.   This is not to suggest that 
there are two understandings, one conceptual and one non-conceptual, running alongside 
each other.  Rather, the two form one unitary understanding.  There is an initial 
conceptual understanding of the world which the emotions build upon to allow for a new 
and deeper appreciation.   In his example, the feeling allows for a deepening 
understanding of the dangers of the ice.437 On Deigh’s model, feeling is penetrated by 
conceptual understanding.  In Goldie’s model, conceptual understanding is penetrated by 
feeling.   
 With these two models in place, Wynn combines them to build on his view 
regarding the relationship between feeling and religious understanding.  “In the style of 
[Rudolf] Otto, we can say that a certain kind of religious understanding is available only 
in affective experience. . . . [This] primitive affective responsiveness . . . can help 
generate new doctrinal reflections, which in turn can help to produce new possibilities of 
religious feelings, and so on. . . . The spiral may also involve feeling, which has its own 
content, being penetrated by discursive thought (following Deigh’s model) and feeling 
taking further (while remaining infused with) the understanding achieved in discursive or 
doctrinal thought (as Goldie proposes).”438   Wynn admits that, due to intrinsic features of 
the subject matter, the Deigh-Goldie model is somewhat messy,439 but I think he has 
something like the following account in mind.  First, a certain kind of non-conceptual 
feeling is explanatorily fundamental to religious understanding.   Wynn explicitly notes 
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that if it were not for this non-conceptual religious feeling, religious movements and 
doctrines would not have developed.440 I take it that Deigh’s distinction between the 
ability to be sensible of differences from the ability of conceptual predication explains 
how such non-conceptual feeling is possible, even if it often later becomes shaped and 
controlled by conceptual thought.  It allows for, as Wynn puts it, “the possibility of a 
‘primitive’ affectively toned sense of God.”441 Goldie’s model is designed to show how 
such non-conceptual feeling can deepen pre-existing conceptual thoughts.  It “allows for 
the possibility that feeling may be infused by prior doctrinal commitments while building 
upon and deepening those commitments.”442  For Wynn, the emotions as perceptions of 
value can contribute to a religious epistemology, for while they are non-conceptual, they 
are not non-cognitive if we understand cognition broadly to include perceptual-like 
content in addition to propositional content.    
 Wynn draws on two further models of the emotions to contribute to this account of 
the relationship between feeling and religious understanding.  However, the second two, 
like Aquinas, stress the conative aspect of emotion.  First, Wynn turns toward Ronald de 
Sousa’s view of the emotions as constituting patterns of salience.  De Sousa does not 
view the emotions as particular modes of perception or understanding, but as a 
framework for cognitions.  In this sense, they are like Kuhn’s notion of scientific 
paradigms.  De Sousa explains that “paying attention to certain things is a source of 
reasons but comes before them.  Similarly, scientific paradigms . . . are better at 
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stimulating research than at finding compelling and fair reasons for their own adoption.  
They are too ‘deep’ for that, too unlike specific, easily formulated beliefs.”443  De 
Sousa’s point is that the emotions, like paradigms, set the agenda for our thinking by 
fixing our concerns and interests. They make certain features of our experience more 
prominent and salient, giving these features an import that they would have otherwise 
lacked.  Given the amount of information we receive in our experience of the world, we 
need some way to direct our attention, and the emotions provide this direction, for they, 
as Wynn explains, “constitute patterns of salience, lighting up some matters as deserving 
attention and leaving others at the periphery of our awareness.”444 
 Applying this to religious life, Wynn suggests that by setting the agenda for our 
thinking, the emotions can pave the way for the formation of certain kinds of religious 
understanding.  For example, pre-conceptual religious feelings of the kind identified on 
Deigh’s model shapes and sustain discursive religious reflection.445  Wynn draws on the 
work of French philosopher and historian Pierre Hadot to illustrate this point.  Hadot is 
famous for arguing that ancient philosophy was not “philosophical discourse” or abstract 
theories about the world, but spiritual ways of life designed to transform the student.  
Instead of offering an abstract metaphysical view from which an ethic is derived, Hadot 
suggests the reverse was the case in ancient philosophy. The metaphysics is created in 
order to justify the existential attitude.  But the metaphysical discourse alone is not the 
philosophy, but simply one element of it and an element that is secondary to and derived 
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from the more basic attitude toward life.446  According to Hadot, Epicureanism 
represented the attitude of relaxation, serenity, and the joy of existing, while Stoicism 
exemplified a feeling of tension, duty, and moral consciousness.  Their respective 
metaphysics were created to justify this basic attitude.  For example, the Epicurean 
doctrine that the gods are indifferent to human affairs justifies the attitude of serenity, 
since it implies that we need not fear their capricious punishments.  On Wynn’s 
interpretation, Hadot is suggesting we can have an intuitive, pre-theoretical affective 
appreciation of the kind of life that befits a human being, which can then be articulated in 
and reinforced by a religious worldview.   
 Building on his theme of feeling having priority over religious conceptualization, 
Wynn seems to be suggesting the de Sousa’s model offers a way of accounting for how 
religious doctrines both get off and stay off the ground, so to speak.  The pre-conceptual 
feelings set the agenda for religious and spiritual reflection.  “And in this way,” writes 
Wynn, “an affective state may propel a person quite properly to think about certain 
issues, and to examine those issues in the light of certain concerns, and thereby arrive at 
one kind of worldview rather than another.”447  Wynn recognizes that this way of 
accounting for religious understanding might seem like a kind of wish fulfillment.  The 
emotional paradigms serve as a kind of template in terms of which experience is 
construed.  He notes that “a pervasive interpretive strategy of this kind may leave a 
person locked in an illusory world, unable to see the force of genuine counter-evidence, 
because of their predisposition to read the evidence in ways that conform to their prior 
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assumptions.”448  But he argues that while it might be tempting to set aside the existential 
attitudes and “approach the world free from any overarching preconception of its 
sense,”449 this is neither psychologically possible nor practically rational.  
Psychologically, the pre-conceptual existential attitudes are too deeply engrained to set 
aside.  Additionally, given that according to most religious worldviews the religious 
object is beyond the comprehension of the human mind and is intimately wrapped up in 
human concern, an attempt to evaluate religious worldviews from a detached perspective 
is, as John Cottingham notes, “to evade them.  A different strategy, a strategy of 
involvement, . . . is required by the nature of the material.”450 
 Wynn’s final model is derived from Geoffrey Madell’s work on emotion and 
music.  Arguing that music can arouse emotions (as opposed to objectless moods), 
Madell writes that “hearing the dominant seventh evokes a desire, and sometimes 
something akin to a longing, for its resolution.  That is a state of consciousness directed 
to an intentional object; it is also an affective state of consciousness. . . .  It is a mode of 
‘feeling towards’ its intentional object.”451  On this view, the object of the emotional 
tension upon hearing a dominant seventh chord is the resolution on the tonic.  But here 
the intentionality is primarily conative.  The mind is cast forward in desire toward an 
anticipated resolution.  Applying this to a religious context, Wynn suggests that such 
longings and desires point to whatever it would take to satisfy them.  “If so, this provides 
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a further way in which an understanding of God may be embedded in feeling.”452  
 To take stock, Wynn offers an account of emotional feeling as a mode of value 
perception and then considers various ways in which mystical feelings relate to religious 
understanding.  Wynn is in agreement with Schleiermacher, Otto, and James that 
mystical feelings are the grounds of religious conceptualization.   As a mode of value 
perception, Wynn argues that [on the Deigh-Goldie model] such feelings can carry 
religious import.  Additionally, while such feelings themselves are non-discursive, they 
may serve to direct the development of discursive religious understanding [on the de 
Sousa model].  Finally [following Madell’s model], they may point toward the divine as 
an object of longing. 
 While I do not always agree with the details of each of Wynn’s models, I can grant 
his broader point that mystical feelings such as the wonder at the existence of the world 
provide the impetus for the creation of religious imagination and thought.  However, the 
priority of mystical feeling should only be understood as a logical priority rather than a 
practical priority.  It is not the case, for instance, that individuals create religious 
worldviews wholesale out the promoting of mystical feelings.  While religion may have 
historically developed out of mystical wonder and the like, as a practical matter, people 
are generally born into religious communities with pre-existing traditional symbols, 
beliefs, and practices and become fluent in the network meaning of these inherited 
symbols long before they have transcendent experiences.  For instance, Neville writes 
that “childhood vests one with a host of . . . symbols of religious matters.  These symbols 
are picked up from the media, from school, perhaps from participation in a religious 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
452 Mark Wynn, Emotional Experience and Religious Understanding: Integrating Perception, Conception, 
and Feeling (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 143. 
 
	   163 
community, and from friends who have their own religious communities.”453  One often 
becomes acquainted with the network meaning of religious symbols to some degree in 
community and only later has an experience that, as Neville phases it, “shocks the person 
suddenly to see the limits, the particularity, the finiteness of the life-world”454 (content 
meaning).  Neville notes that there is a difference between simply interpreting one’s life 
within the play of religious symbols— a merely network understanding of the symbols 
typically learned in religious community and practice—and using the symbols to engage 
the divine.   Wynn may be correct that mystical feelings are logically prior to religious 
symbols and doctrines such that the symbols and doctrines are created in response to such 
mystical feelings.  But Neville reminds us that the symbols are often practically prior to 
mystical feeling.   
 Given the symbolic character of the object of religious emotions, these religious 
emotions can be transformed into mystical feelings once it is grasped that this particular 
object or concept symbolizes that which lies beyond all finite particularities.  A child or 
hopelessly naïve believer may believe that God really is an old man with a white beard 
seated on a throne (or whatever else the infinite is symbolized as in one’s culture).  
However, this image, or an image of Christ dying on a cross, or of Durga wielding her 
arms, or a cathedral pointing one’s gaze skyward can suddenly evoke a sense of one’s 
limits in contrast to the infinite. Religious symbols are expressions of mystical feeling, 
but they are also a means by which such feelings are evoked.  But without an initial form 
of concern toward the symbol itself (perhaps in the form of gratitude or compassion), the 
symbol could not evoke such a response.   
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 There are, for example, instances in which a symbol cannot work because, due to 
contingent circumstances of the interpreter, it cannot elicit an appropriate form of 
concern.  The effectiveness of symbols is relative to the spiritual state and stage of the 
interpreter.  For example, Neville notes that for the Romans in antiquity, Jesus was 
dressed as a philosopher.  For the seventeenth century Dutch, the disciples were burghers.  
For many white Americans, Jesus is blond and dressed in a choir robe. While none of 
these presentations are historically accurate, it would have been impossible for these 
groups to relate to a wandering, Aramaic-speaking, Galilean teacher.455  Of course, a 
person’s devotional state can grow in order to accommodate a more historically accurate 
image, but, in a devotional context, the symbol must meet the devotee where they are and 
certain symbols cannot be effective given one’s contingent circumstances. A historically 
accurate representation of Jesus would not be able to transform someone who does not 
speak Aramaic.  On the other extreme, a white, blond, blue-eyed Jesus is likely to strike 
many more sophisticated believers as false.  The Calvinist symbol of total depravity will 
likely not be able to effectively transform a victim of sexual abuse who sees guilt in only 
psychological terms.  If a symbol cannot evoke a religious emotion/concern, it cannot 
transform this concern to mystical feeling.   
 
Religious Practice and Religious Emotion 
 The religious life, however, is not simply about evoking mystical feelings or 
experiences.  Huston Smith famously said in an interview that “the important thing [in 
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the spiritual life] is not altered states, but altered traits of life.”456  I cannot argue for such 
a position here, but it is an important aspect of the working definition of religion I offered 
in chapter two.  According to this definition, religion as a set of interrelated and 
traditional human practices performed in response to perceived ultimacy with the end of 
individual, social, and/or global transformation.  A part of this transformation involves 
approaching the saintly ideals discussed in chapter four.  This account of religious 
emotions can also shed light on the relationship between religious practice and religious 
emotion in this process of transformation.   
 It will be helpful at this point to remind the reader of the devotional context in 
which symbols that serve as objects of religious emotions are situated.  Symbols serve 
different purposes in different contexts and whether or not a particular symbol will be 
effective is relative to, in part, the context.   The devotional context “is dominated by the 
purposes of conforming the soul or self to the religious object [ultimacy in the 
anthropological sense]457 in whatever respects the symbols can represent the object.”458   
Given the purpose in this context is not to come to a theoretical understanding of the 
divine, as it is in the theological context, the symbols can be much more fantastic.  One 
need not believe in a literal Inferno for Dante’s narrative to awaken one to moral 
deficiencies in their life.  As a result of this clear difference in contexts, the way in which 
symbols are evaluated vary from context to context.   The criteria by which symbols are 
evaluated are in terms of whether they serve their contextual purpose.  Neville explains 
that “because the nature of devotion is to be radically transformative, the [symbolic] 
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carryover is something like the realization of the divine in the person.  But of course 
different symbol systems express this differently, both regarding the nature of the divine 
and the kind of human state thought to realize this.”459   For Neville, part of what it means 
for a symbol to be “true” in the devotional context is that it helps conform the interpreter 
to the transformative end.   
 With this context of the object of religious emotions in mind, we can begin to make 
some initial observations about the relationship between religious practice and religious 
understanding.  Echoing a point I made in the previous section, there is a sense in which 
religious practice is prior to religious understanding (and therefore religious emotion).  
Grasping the network meaning of religious symbols occurs through participation in 
religious community.  Again, I do not mean that it necessarily requires involvement in a 
religious institution, but simply that religious symbols are socially acquired and culturally 
embedded.  Like any language, fluency in symbols of ultimacy requires social 
participation.  But while having a grasp of the network meaning of religious symbols is 
necessary in order for such symbols to be appropriately transformative, it is not 
sufficient.   
 To see this, we need to develop the concept of religious practice a bit more, which I 
would like to do by drawing on the work on Alasdair MacIntyre.  For MacIntryre, 
practice is a technical term referring to “any coherent and complex form of socially 
established cooperative human activity through which goods internal to that form of 
activity are realized in the course of trying to achieve those standards of excellence which 
are appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of activity, which the results that 
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human powers to achieve excellence, and human conceptions of the ends and goods 
involved, are systematically extended.”460 I want to suggest that we can understand the 
religious life as a practice in this sense.  By “internal goods,” MacIntrye means goods 
that can only be identified, recognized, and achieved by the experience of participating in 
the practice in question.  To clarify, MacIntyre offers his famous example of the practice 
of chess and the chess-playing child. 
Consider the example of a highly intelligent seven-year old child whom I wish to 
teach to play chess, although the child has no particular desire to learn the game.  
The child does however have a very strong desire for candy and little chance of 
obtaining it.  I therefore tell the child that if the child will play chess with me once a 
week I will give the child 50 cents worth of candy; moreover I tell the child that I 
will always play in such a way that it will be difficult, but not impossible, for the 
child to win and that, if the child wins, the child will receive an extra 50 cents 
worth of candy.  Thus motivated the child plays and plays to win.  Notice however 
that, so long as it is the candy alone which provides the child with a good reason for 
playing chess, the child has no reason not to cheat and every reason to cheat, 
provided he or she can do so successfully.  But, so we may hope, there will come a 
time when the child will find in those goods specific to chess, in the achievement of 
a certain highly particular kind of analytical skill, strategic imagination and 
competitive intensity, a new set of reasons, reason now not just for winning on a 
particular occasion, but for trying to excel in whatever way the game of chess 
demands.  Now if the child cheats, he or she will be defeating not me, but himself 
or herself.461 
 
Notice that the goods internal to chess (acquisition of particular kinds of skills and the 
experience of particular types of appreciative enjoyments), as opposed to the external 
good of candy, can only be understood and achieved though participation in the game.  
But participation in the game does not guarantee that the internal goods will be achieved.  
Here we can make an analogy with religious practice.  One may participate in the 
symbolic rituals of a particular tradition, without ever even appreciating the good of the 
saintly ideal within that tradition.  One may even have a terrific grasp of the network 
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meaning of the symbols involved and know, for example, that the bread and wine refer to 
the body and blood of Christ, which in turn refers to the God’s grace, etc., without ever 
seeing the value of having their concerns conformed to the ideal end of the tradition, 
much like the child may know how to move the pieces around board, without ever 
gaining an appreciation for the game of chess.  There may come a time when the 
participant in the religious tradition does have their emotional concerns shaped by the 
symbols toward the religious end, but much like no one fully appreciates, much less 
acquires, the goods internal to chess before they play it, so religious practice comes prior 
to seeing the value of religious practice.   
  This raises an important epistemological point.  Given that the religious life is 
primarily about embarking on a path of self-transformation, it is not practically rational to 
expect impartial, rational grounds for participating in the religious life.   For Cottingham, 
this primacy of praxis explains the “strange sense of distortion, or wrong focus, which 
one has when confronted with many of the classic debates on philosophy of religion in 
the academic literature—the sense that despite the grandeur and apparent centrality of the 
issues raised, they do not capture what is at the heart of the religious enterprise.”462  
Cottingham’s point is not simply that we learn religious language (network meaning) 
through participation in a religious community, a point that seems obvious enough.  
Rather it is that it is in the very nature of religious understanding (content meaning) that it 
characteristically stems from practical involvement rather than rational analysis.  The 
religious life requires, as Cottingham phrases it, a “strategy of involvement.”463   
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 The notion that it is not practically rational to expect impartial reasons to serve as 
epistemic grounds for religious participation and that those who lack participatory 
experience are inadequate judges should not be construed as implying support for an 
uncritical religious fideism.  To illustrate this, we can draw on MacIntryre’s concept of a 
narrative quest.   MacIntyre argues for a narrative concept of selfhood such that “like 
characters in a fictional narrative we do not know what will happen next, but nonetheless 
our lives have a certain form which projects itself towards our future.  Thus the narrative 
which we live out has both an unpredictable and a partially teleological character.”464   
Moreover, if this narrative is to be intelligible, it must be conceived of in terms of some 
ultimate telos.  “When someone complains . . . that his or her life is meaningless, he or 
she is often and perhaps characteristically complaining the narrative of their life has 
become unintelligible to them, that it lacks any point, any movement towards a climax or 
a telos.”465  Thus, MacIntyre distinguishes between particular internal goods recognized 
and achieved through various practices and “a telos which transcends the limited goods 
of practices by constituting the good of a whole human life.”466  This quest for an 
ultimate telos provides a unity to the narrative of life and it is precisely at this level of the 
good, of ultimacy, that we meet the religious life in its various forms.  MacIntrye 
observes two important characteristics of this final telos.  First, this telos must be at least 
partially determinate if it is to serve as the final goal of one’s narrative life.  However, 
and secondly, the final telos is never fully determinate.  The life in pursuit of some final 
telos “is not at all that of a search for something already adequately characterized, as 
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miners search for gold of geologist for oil. . . . A quest is always an education both as to 
the character of that which is sought and in self-knowledge.”467  Precisely because the 
final telos is never fully determinate, MacIntyre emphasizes the importance of rational 
criticism within traditions.  “When a tradition is in good order it is always partially 
constituted by an argument about the goods the pursuit of which gives that tradition its 
particular point and purpose. . . . A living tradition then is an historically extended, 
socially embodied argument, and an argument precisely in part about the goods which 
constitute that tradition.”468 
 Framing the religious life as a quest for some good where the good and the self in 
pursuit of that good are never fully understood can illuminate the relationship between 
religious practice, religious emotion, and religious understanding.  I grant Cottingham’s 
and Neville’s basic point regarding the primacy of practice and the fact that network 
understanding of religious symbols is prior to the experience of the divine through those 
symbols.  However, religious emotions, when properly ordered in terms of the saintly 
ideals discussed in the previous two chapters, can help sustain religious practice.  
MacIntryre notes a similar point in his discussion of the virtues, which are, in part, a 
proper ordering of the emotions.  “The virtues therefore are to be understood as those 
dispositions which will not only sustain practices and enable us to achieve the goods 
internal to practices, but which will also sustain us in the relevant kind of quest for the 
good, by enabling us to overcome the harms, dangers, temptations and distractions which 
we encounter, and which will furnish us with increasing self-knowledge and increasing 
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knowledge of the good.”469  We saw in the previous two chapters how religious symbols 
help engender certain transformations of the heart.  The point I want to make here is that 
these emotional responses—these transformations of the heart—then serve to sustain 
further engagements with religious symbols designed to produce an experiential 
awareness of the divine.  For example, a Muslim child may participate in the daily 
prayers without any understanding of the goods internal to that practice.  He or she may 
simply participate in order to achieve certain external goods, perhaps in search of some 
reward or the avoidance of punishment from his or her parents.  However, there may 
come a time when the practice of repetitive prayer and bodily prostrations, along with a 
whole host of other symbolic practices, engender some experience of dependency and an 
emotional response of pious submission.  This transformation of the heart can then begin 
to sustain further devotional practices, which, in turn, results in further experiential 
understanding and transformation.  The transformation of the Muslim’s cares, concerns, 
and interests are always mediated through various symbolic engagements, but also serve 
to support further symbolic engagement, and, thus, further transformation. 
 Mark Wynn attempted to show that the emotions carry unique cognitive evaluative 
content, a move he found necessary to secure an important epistemic contribution of the 
emotions in the religious life.  While the model religious emotions I have offered would 
not suggest that the emotions themselves carry cognitive content, it still provides an 
important epistemic role to the emotions.  Religious emotions sustain the religious 
practices which are the precondition for deepening religious understanding.  Just as the 
detached scrutiny of the scientist would be inappropriate when applied to personal 
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relationships, so the religious life requires a “strategy of involvement”470—a strategy that 
can only be maintained in concert with the emotions. Religious emotions sustain the 
religious practices that are so fundamental to the transformation at the heart of the 
religious and spiritual life.  
 Understanding the religious life in this way has the added advantage of squaring 
well with Aquinas’s account of faith.  Aquinas writes that “believers assent to what they 
believe not because their minds see it to be true, either directly or by reduction to self-
evident premises, but because their wills command their minds to assent.  And this is . . . 
because believing is willed as a good.”471  For Aquinas, in cases of faith, the mind does 
not grasp the object.  Paul MacDonald explains that according to Aquinas, the will moves 
the intellect to assent to the propositions of faith “not as an object to be understood but as 
good (as of yet not possessed) to be desired,”472 and so in this sense the intellect does not 
fully understand or “see” what it is that it assents to. The primary purpose of the religious 
life for Aquinas is not to gain a correct worldview, but to be transformed.  The “infused 
virtues [faith, hope, and love] dispose man in a higher manner and towards a higher end, 
and consequently in relation to some higher nature, i.e. in relation to a participation of the 
Divine Nature.”473 
 This chapter has presented the relationship between mystical feelings, religious 
understanding, religious emotions, and religious practice.  Mystical feelings must be 
distinguished from religious emotions on the basis that the object of mystical feelings is 
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not a religious symbol, but that which transcends finite particularities.  Mark Wynn 
shows how mystical feelings can form the basis of religious symbols.  The account of 
religious emotion offered in this project contributes to this discussion by showing that 
this priority of mystical feeling is not a practical priority, for it is often through such 
symbols that religious seekers engage with that which transcends all finite particularities.  
Given the symbolic nature of the objects of religious emotions, such emotions can be 
transformed into mystical feeling.  Finally, I further developed John Cottinghams’s 
position regarding the primacy of praxis.  It is through practical participation in the 
religious life that one acquires both a network understanding of religious symbols and an 
increasing awareness of and appreciation for the goods internal to religious practice.   
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CONCLUSION 
  
 The underlying thesis of this dissertation has been that my model of religious 
emotions can help explain and illuminate the nature of religious emotions and their 
integration with religious understanding and practice. I have shown that the Thomistic 
theory of emotion is robust and nuanced enough to account for the facts that any good 
theory of emotion needs to explain.  By conceiving of the emotions as psychosomatic 
forms of transformational concern, one is able to account for the fact that emotions are 
intentional — that they take “objects” and that the emotions are distinguished based on 
the type of object they take.  The emphasis on the conative aspect of emotion also allows 
one to account for the fact that emotions are paradigmatically motivational.  They move 
us to tears, to laughter, to contemplation, to action.  Aquinas also explains how we have 
some, but not full, voluntary control over our emotions.  The fact that emotions come in 
degrees of intensity can be explain both in terms of the formal appetitive aspect and the 
material feeling aspect.  Aquinas also accounts for the fact that our emotions are subject 
to rational assessment.  
In addition to being a comprehensive account of the passions generally, Aquinas’s 
taxonomy of basic emotions, while perhaps not ontologically grounded or the only way 
of organizing the emotions, provides an excellent framework for seeing connections 
between various religious emotions and for comparing common and distinctive emotional 
patterns both within and across religious boundaries.  Aquinas’s organization of the 
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passions of attraction (love, longing, joy, hope, and despair) allows one to see the 
commonalities in the emotional lives of the ideal saints (the model of the perfection of 
impulses of the heart) across religious traditions.  For example, one can detect a common 
emotional dialectical pattern, an oscillation of religious joy and religious longing, across 
many religious traditions. Moreover, this pattern often transforms into a similar 
oscillation of religious hope and despair.  Aquinas’s close attention to the relationship 
between various emotions helps bring these connections to the surface. 
In addition to illuminating commonalities in the religious versions of ideal saints, 
the theory of religious emotions also brings distinctive features of various saintly ideals 
to light.  For example, we saw certain traditions valuing the hatred of whatever is 
perceived as unsuitable to the proper conformity with perceived ultimacy (sin, 
attachments, etc.), while the notion of a virtuous hatred is foreign to other saintly ideals.  
We saw examples of religious disgust being used as a means to quite different religious 
ends.  Concerning sorrow, the Calvinist’s guilt (a form of sorrow) weakens the will to the 
end of submission to a sovereign ontological Other. The sorrow of the Christian mystic, 
on the other hand, is a necessary step toward union with an ontological Other.   
Viewing religious emotions as emotions that have religious symbols as their 
objects allows one to resist the temptation to limit religious emotions to some distinctive 
experience.  On the framework presented here, any emotion can be religious.   While 
mystical feelings (which are often taken to be paradigmatic religious emotions) are of 
great importance to the religious life, limiting one’s attention to these experiences fails to 
do full justice to the role of emotions in religious life.  It was also necessary to have a 
theory of religious symbolism as nuanced as Neville’s to make important distinctions.  
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For example, the triadic structure of Neville’s account of interpretation as involving not 
just a signifier and signified, but also an interpreter, allows one to account for why the 
feeling of wonder at the craftsmanship of the representations of the gods by a tourist in a 
Japanese temple is not (necessarily) a religious wonder.  If the symbol is not interpreted 
in a devotional context—in the context of conforming one’s self to ultimacy—it fails to 
be a religious emotion because the gods fail to signify one’s ultimate concern.  Also, 
Neville’s distinction between the theological and devotional context, as well has his 
distinction between iconic and indexical symbolism, allows us to see how extremely 
fantastic images—images of devil, hells, lush paradises, etc.—can nevertheless 
symbolize the divine and serve as objects of religious emotions. 
Finally, this account of religious emotions also provided a way to explore the 
relationship between emotions, cognition, and practice in the religious life.  It allowed for 
the important distinction between mystical feelings and religious emotions, and to see 
how religious emotions sustain religious practices at the heart of the religious path of 
transformation and can themselves be transformed into mystical feelings given the 
symbolic nature of their object.  The relationship between emotions, cognition, and 
practice also has important epistemological significance.  Given the fact that religious 
practice characteristically precedes religious understanding and that the goal of the 
religious quest, while never fully determinate, comes to be appreciated through religious 
practice, it is not practically rational to expect impartial justification for religious 
worldviews prior to religious participation.  Religious emotions, therefore, provide an 
important epistemic role in that they motivate and sustain the practices so fundamental to 
religious understanding.  Emotions can move the religious person to activities of prayer, 
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prostration, giving, weeping, pilgrimage, confession, meditation, etc.  It is through such 
practices that the religious seeker begins to realize the goods internal such practices. 
	   This	  thesis	  has	  broad	  significance	  for	  the	  phenomenological/comparative	  
study	  of	  religion.	  	  David	  Morgan	  notes	  that	  “the	  academic	  study	  of	  religion	  in	  the	  
modern	  West	  has	  been	  shaped	  by	  the	  idea	  that	  a	  religion	  is	  what	  someone	  believes,	  
which	  consists	  of	  a	  discrete,	  subjective	  experience	  of	  assent	  to	  propositions	  
concerning	  the	  origin	  of	  the	  cosmos,	  the	  nature	  of	  humanity,	  the	  existence	  of	  deities,	  
or	  the	  purpose	  of	  life.”474	  The	  problem	  with	  this	  tendency	  is	  that	  it	  reduces	  religion	  
to	  a	  body	  of	  assertions	  demanding	  assent.	  	  Morgan	  argues	  that	  in	  order	  for	  scholars	  
to	  compare	  accounts	  of	  different	  religions	  in	  a	  way	  that	  allows	  for	  both	  their	  
similarities	  and	  differences	  to	  surface,	  religious	  life	  must	  be	  understood	  broadly	  in	  
somatic	  and	  material	  terms.	  	  “People	  report	  the	  reality	  of	  UFOs,	  the	  presence	  of	  
angels,	  hearing	  the	  voice	  of	  God,	  the	  power	  of	  spirits	  to	  work	  for	  good	  or	  ill,	  the	  
ability	  of	  Quranic	  text	  to	  bestow	  baraka	  [blessing],	  of	  passages	  of	  Torah	  bundled	  in	  a	  
mezuzah	  to	  do	  the	  same,	  of	  the	  Bible	  opened	  randomly	  to	  reveal	  a	  pertinent	  
scripture	  verse.	  	  Describing	  these	  as	  beliefs	  in	  the	  thin	  sense	  of	  affirmed	  dogmas	  
fails	  miserably	  to	  help	  us	  understand	  what	  is	  happening	  in	  the	  lives	  of	  those	  in	  
which	  these	  practices	  may	  be	  observed.”475	  	  In	  addition	  to	  belief,	  Morgan	  cites	  
memory,	  imagination,	  sensation,	  emotion,	  and	  material	  objects	  as	  important	  
elements	  of	  study.	  	  In	  many	  ways,	  the	  study	  of	  religious	  emotions	  provides	  an	  entry	  
point	  into	  the	  study	  of	  these	  more	  somatic	  and	  material	  elements	  of	  the	  religious	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life.	  	  For	  as	  we	  have	  seen,	  imaginings,	  memories,	  sensations,	  and	  material	  objects	  
serve	  as	  symbolic	  objects	  of	  religious	  emotion.	  	  The	  comparative	  study	  of	  religious	  
emotion	  is	  miniscule	  compared	  to	  the	  attention	  worldviews	  and	  practices	  receive	  in	  
academic	  literature.	  	  This	  project	  begins	  to	  fill	  this	  gap	  in	  academic	  research	  and	  
provides	  a	  framework	  for	  further	  research.	  
	   Finally,	  there	  are	  further	  steps	  one	  could	  take	  with	  the	  theory	  that	  has	  been	  
developed	  in	  this	  thesis.	  	  The	  recent	  renewal	  of	  philosophical	  interest	  in	  the	  
emotions	  has	  led	  to	  much	  research	  in	  ethical	  and	  aesthetic	  emotions.	  	  One	  potential	  
development	  could	  be	  to	  compare	  the	  logic	  of	  religious	  emotions	  with	  that	  of	  ethical	  
and	  aesthetic	  emotions.	  	  For	  example,	  one	  might	  naturally	  distinguish	  moral	  and	  
aesthetic	  emotions	  based	  on	  the	  distinction	  between	  moral	  and	  aesthetic	  value.	  	  For	  
instance,	  a	  movie	  may	  be	  aesthetically	  beautiful	  but	  morally	  corrupting.	  Thus,	  one	  
might	  take	  aesthetic	  delight	  in	  the	  sensuous	  forms	  of	  the	  film,	  but	  be	  disgusted	  by	  
the	  violent	  and	  immoral	  content.	  	  But	  whether	  or	  not	  this	  is	  an	  appropriate	  way	  of	  
distinguishing	  moral	  and	  aesthetic	  emotions,	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  whether	  religious	  
emotions	  can	  be	  distinguished	  from	  moral	  and	  aesthetic	  emotions	  in	  the	  same	  way.	  	  
For	  it	  is	  often	  the	  aesthetic	  quality	  of	  religious	  symbols	  that	  give	  them	  their	  
symbolic	  character.	  	  Writing	  on	  Orthodox	  icons,	  David	  Brown	  writes	  that	  “it	  is	  that	  
very	  lack	  of	  realism	  which	  .	  .	  .	  will	  enable	  [the	  viewer]	  to	  acknowledge	  an	  immaterial	  
world	  beyond	  its	  own.”476	  	  This	  thesis	  has	  discussed	  what	  makes	  an	  emotion	  a	  
religious	  emotion,	  but	  it	  still	  remains	  to	  be	  seen	  whether	  an	  emotion	  can	  be	  both	  
aesthetic	  and	  religious—or	  moral	  and	  religious.	  	  Given	  the	  close	  interaction	  between	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
476 David Brown, God and Enchantment of Place: Reclaiming Human Experience (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2004), 41. 
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the	  moral,	  aesthetic	  and	  religious	  sphere,	  this	  theory	  might	  be	  able	  inform	  and	  be	  
informed	  by	  work	  in	  these	  other	  fields.	  
	   There	  are	  many	  ways	  of	  approaching	  the	  topic	  of	  religion	  and	  emotion.	  	  
Neuroscience,	  social/behavioral	  sciences,	  history,	  theology,	  and	  philosophy	  can	  all	  
make	  important	  contributions	  to	  this	  field.	  	  The	  emotions	  are	  constitutive	  of	  the	  
religious	  life	  and	  in	  order	  to	  better	  understand	  the	  phenomenon	  of	  religion,	  we	  need	  
to	  better	  understand	  the	  emotions	  and	  their	  role	  in	  this	  context.	  	  Willem	  Lemmens	  
and	  Walter	  Van	  Herck	  note	  that	  “the	  philosophical	  study	  of	  religious	  emotions	  has	  
only	  just	  begun.”477	  	  My	  hope	  is	  that	  this	  project	  contributes	  to	  this	  emerging	  




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
477 Willem Lemmens and Walter Van Herck, “Introduction,” in Religious Emotions: Some Philosophical 
Explorations, ed. Willem Lemmens and Walter Van Herck (Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 
2008), 10. 
 
	   180 
REFERENCES 
 
Alston, William. Perceiving God: The Epistemology of Religious Experience. Ithaca, NY: 
  Cornell University Press, 1993. 
Aristotle. Physics, translated by R. P. Hardie and R. K. Gayle. The Internet Classics  
Archive. Accessed April 12, 2013. 
http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/physics.3.iii.html 
Bedford, Errol. “Emotions.” In The Philosophy of Mind, edited by V. C. Chappell 110- 
 126. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1962. 
Ben-Ze’ev, Aaron. The Subtlety of Emotions. Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology Press, 2000. 
Brown, David. God and Enchantment of Place: Reclaiming Human Experience. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2004. 
---. God and Grace of Body: Sacrament in Ordinary. Oxford: Oxford University Press,  
 2007. 
Buddhaghosa, Bhadantácariya. The Path of Purification, translated by Bhikku Ñáóamoli.  
 Kandy, Sri Lanka: Buddhist Publication Society, 2011. 
Carroll, Noel. “Art and the Moral Realm.” In The Blackwell Guide to Aesthetics. Edited  
 by Peter Kivy. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2004. 
Casey, John. Pagan Virtue: An Essay in Ethics. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990. 
Cates, Diana Fritz. “The Religious Dimension of Ordinary Human Emotions.” Journal of 
 
 181	  
the Society of Christian Ethics 25 (2005): 35-53. 
---. Aquinas on the Emotions: A Religious-Ethical Inquiry. Washington D. C.:  
 Georgetown University Press, 2009. 
Cottingham, John. The Spiritual Dimension: Religion, Philosophy, and Human Value. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. 
Damasio, Antonio. Descartes’ Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain. New  
 York: Putnam, 1994. 
---. Looking for Spinoza: Joy, Sorrow, and the Feeling Brain. Orlando: Harcourt, 2003. 
---. Self Comes to Mind: Constructing the Conscious Brain. New York: Pantheon, 2010. 
Davidson, Arnold. “Introduction.” In Philosophy as a Way of Life: Spiritual Exercises  
from Socrates to Foucault, by Pierre Hadot, translated by Michael Chase. Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1995. 
Deigh, John. “Cognitivism in the Theory of Emotions.” Ethics 104 (1994): 824-854. 
Delaney, Neil. “Romantic Love and Loving Commitment: Articulating a Modern Ideal.”  
 American Philosophical Quarterly 33 (1996): 339-356. 
Dixon, Thomas. From Passions to Emotions: The Creation of a Secular Psychological 
Category. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. 
Dupré, Louis. Religious Mystery and Rational Reflection. Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B.  
 Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1998. 
---. Symbols of the Sacred. Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company,  
 2000. 
Eckel, Malcolm David with John J. Thatmanil. “Cooking the Last Fruit of Nihilism:  
 Buddhist Approaches to Ultimate Reality.” In Ultimate Realities, edited by Robert 
 
 182	  
Cummings Neville, 125-150. Albany, State University of New York Press, 2001. 
Edwards, Jonathan. The Religious Affections in Three Parts. Grand Rapids, Michigan:  
 Sovereign Grace Publishers, 1971. 
Edwards, Jonathan. Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God. Boston: S. Kneeland and T.  
 Green, 1741. 
Elster, Jon. Alchemies of the Mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. 
Fisher, Philip. The Vehement Passions. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press,  
 2002. 
Frankfurt, Harry. “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person.” The Journal of  
 Philosophy 68 (1971): 5-20 
Fuller, Robert C. Wonder: From Emotion to Spirituality. Chapel Hill: University of North  
 Carolina Press, 2006. 
Gade, Anna M. “Islam.” In The Oxford Handbook of Religion and Emotion, edited by  
 John Corrigan, 35-50. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008. 
Gereboff, Joel, Keith Green, Diana Fritz Cates, and Maria Heim. “The Nature of the  
Beast: Hatred in Cross-Traditional Religious and Philosophical Perspective.” 
Journal of the Society of Christian Ethics 29 (2009): 175-205. 
Goldie, Peter. The Emotions. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000. 
---. “Intellectual Emotions and Religious Emotions.” Faith and Philosophy 82 (2011): 
93-101. 
Green, Keith. “Aquinas on Attachment, Envy, and Hatred in the Summa Theologica.” 
 Journal of Religious Ethics 35 (2007): 403-428. 
Heidegger, Martin. An Introduction to Metaphysics, translated by Ralph Mannheim.  
 
 183	  
 Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, 1961. 
Helm, Bennett. “Freedom of the Heart.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 77 (1996): 71- 
 87. 
Helm, Bennett. “Love.” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2009 Edition).  
Edited by Edward N. Zalta, URL = 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2009/entries/love/>. 
Hick, John.  An Interpretation of Religion: Human Responses to the Transcendent (New  
 Haven, Yale University Press, 2004. 
--- “The Religious Meaning of Life.” In The Meaning of Life in the World  
Religions, edited by Joseph Runzo and Nancy M. Martin, 269-288. Oxford: 
Oneworld Publications, 2000. 
Hjort, Mette and Sue Laver, ed. Emotion and the Arts. Oxford: Oxford University Press,  
 1997.  
James, Susan. Passion and Action: The Emotions in Seventeenth Century Philosophy.  
 Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997. 
James, William. “What is an Emotion?” In What is an Emotion?, edited by Robert C.  
 Solomon, 66-76. New York: Oxford University Press, 2004. 
---. The Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study in Human Nature. New York: The  
 Modern Library, 1929. 
---. The Varieties of Religious Experience. Glasgow: Collins, 1960. 
Järveläinen, Petri. “What are Religious Emotions.” In Religious Emotions: Some  
Philosophical Explorations, edited by Willem Lemmens and Walter Van Herck, 
12-26. Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2008. 
 
 184	  
Kalalowski, Leszek. Religion. South Bend: St. Augustine’s Press, 2001. 
Kaufman, Peter Ivan. Prayer, Despair, and Drama: Elizabethan Introspection. Urbana:  
 University of Illinois Press, 1996. 
Kenny, Anthony. Action, Emotion, and Will. London: Routledge and Kegan-Paul, 1963. 
---. Aquinas on Mind. New York: Routledge, 1993. 
Kerr, Fergus. Theology After Wittgenstein. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986. 
King, Peter. “Aquinas on the Emotions.” In The Oxford Handbook to Aquinas, edited by  
Brian Davies and Eleonore Stump 209-226. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 
1962. 
Koran. Translated by N. J. Dawood. New York: Penguin, 1990. 
Lane, Richard. The Cognitive Neuroscience of Emotion. New York: Oxford University  
 Press, 1999. 
Leemens, Willem and Walter Van Herck, ed. Religious Emotions: Some Philosophical 
Explorations. Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2008. 
Lombardo, Nicholas E. The Logic of Desire: Aquinas on Emotion. Washington D. C.:  
 The Catholic University of America Press, 2011. 
Lugo, Luis, Director.  “‘Nones’ on the Rise: One-in-Five Adults Have No Religious  
Affiliation.” The Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life.  Washington, D.C.: 
Pew Research Center, 2012, accessed February 10, 2013, 
http://www.pewforum.org/uploadedFiles/Topics/Religious_Affiliation/Unaffiliate
d/NonesOnTheRise-full.pdf. 
Lyons, William, Emotions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980. 




MacIntyre, Alasdair. After Virtue. Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame University Press, 2007. 
Madell, Geoffrey. “What Music Teaches About Emotion.” Philosophy 71 (1996): 63-82. 
Maimonides, Moses. “The Guide for the Perplexed.” In The Jewish Mystical Tradition,  
 translated by Ben Zion Bokser. New York: Pilgrim Press, 1993. 
Martin, Nancy M. and Joseph Runzo. “Love.” In The Oxford Handbook of Religion and  
 Emotion, edited by John Corrigan, 310-332. Oxford: Oxford University Press,  
 2008. 
---. “Love and Longing in Hinduism.” In The Meaning of Life in the World Religions,  
edited by Joseph Runzo and Nancy M. Martin, 187-202. Oxford: Oneworld 
Publications, 2000. 
McDaniel, June. “Emotion in Bengali Religious Thought.” In Religion and Emotion:  
Approaches and Interpretations, edited by John Corrigan, 249-270. New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2004. 
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. “The Spatiality of One’s Own Body and Motility.” In  
 Phenomenology of Perception, 112-170. London: Routledge, 2002. 
Milbank, John and Catherine Pickstock. Truth in Aquinas. London and New York:  
 Routledge, 2001. 
Miner, Robert. Thomas Aquinas on the Passions: A Study of Summa Theologiae, 1a2ae  
 22-48. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011. 
Morgan, David. The Sacred Gaze: Religious Visual Culture in Theory and Practice.  
 Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005. 
---. “The Matter of Belief.” In Religion and Material Culture: The Matter of Belief,  
 
 186	  
 edited by David Morgan, 1-17. New York: Routledge, 2009. 
---, ed. Religion and Material Culture: The Matter of Belief. New York: Routledge, 2009. 
Murdoch, Iris. Existentialists and Mystics: Writings on Philosophy and Literature.  
 London: Chatto & Windus, 1997. 
Neville, Robert C. On the Scope and Truth of Theology: Theology as Symbolic  
 Engagement.  New York: T&T Clark International, 2006. 
---. “A Peircean Theory of Religious Interpretation.” In Pragmatism and Religion, edited  
 by Stuart Rosenbaum, 277-302. Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois, 2003. 
---. Religion in Late Modernity. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press,  
 2002. 
---. Soldier, Sage, and Saint. New York: Fordham University Press, 1978. 
---. The Truth of Broken Symbols. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press,  
 1996. 
---. Realism in Religion: A Pragmatist’s Perspective (Albany, State University of  
 New York Press, 2009). 
Neville, Robert C. and Wesley J. Wildman. “Introduction.” In Ultimate Realities, edited  
by Robert C. Neville, 1-8. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 
2001. 
Nietzsche, Friedrich. The Gay Science: With a Prelude in Rhymes and an Appendix of  
 Songs. Translated by Walter Kaufman. New York: Random House, 1974. 
Novak, Philip. The World’s Wisdom: Sacred Texts of the World’s Religions. New York:  
 HarperOne: 1994. 
Nussbaum, Martha. The Therapy of Desire. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996. 
 
 187	  
---. Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions. Cambridge: Cambridge  
 University Press, 2001. 
Otto, Rudolf. The Idea of the Holy. Translated by John W. Harvey. London: Oxford 
University Press, 1950. 
Pieper, Josef. Faith, Hope, Love. San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1997. 
Plato. Philebus. Translated by Dorothea Frede. In Plato’s Complete Works, edited by  
 John M. Cooper, 398-456. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1997. 
Prothero, Stephen. God Is Not One: The Eight Rival Religions That Run the World—and  
 Why Their Difference Matter. New York: HaperOne, 2010. 
Riis, Ole and Linda Woodhead. The Sociology of Religious Emotions. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2011. 
Roberts, Robert C. Emotion: An Essay in Aid of Moral Psychology. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003. 
---. “Emotions Research and Religious Experience.” In The Oxford Handbook of Religion  
and Emotion, edited by John Corrigan, 490-506. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2010. 
---. Spiritual Emotions: A Psychology of Christian Virtues. Gran Rapids, MI: Wm. B.  
 Eerdmans Publishing, 2007. 
---. “Thomas Aquinas on the Morality of Emotions.” History of Philosophy Quarterly 9  
 (1992): 287-305. 
Robinson, Jenefer. Deeper Than Reason. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005. 
Rorty, Amelie, ed. Explaining Emotions. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980. 
Rubin, Julius. “Melancholy.” In The Oxford Handbook of Religion and Emotion, edited  
 
 188	  
 by John Corrigan, 290-309. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008. 
Rumi, Jelaluddi. “Completely Cooked.” In The World’s Wisdom: Sacred Texts of the 
 World’s Religions, edited by Philip Novak, 326-327. New York: HaperOne, 1994. 
Santideva. “Sikshasamuccya.” In Buddhist Texts Through The Ages, edited by Conze et  
 al, 119-145. New York: Harper & Row, 1964. 
Schleiermacher, Friedrich. The Christian Faith. Translated by H. R. Mackintosh and J. S.  
 Stewart. Edinburg: T. & T. Clark, 1999. 
Schimmel, Solomon. “Education of the Emotions in Jewish Devotional Literature: Anger  
 and Its  Control.” Journal of Religious Ethics 8 (Fall 1980): 259-276. 
Scruton, Roger. Sexual Desire: A Philosophical Investigation. London: Continuum, 2006. 
Shneur Zalman of Lyady. “Iggeret haKodesh.” In The Jewish Mystical Tradition,  
 translated by Ben Zion Bokser. New York: Pilgrim Press, 1993. 
Singer, Irving. The Pursuit of Love. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1994. 
Smith, Huston. The World’s Religions: Our Great Wisdom Traditions. San Francisco:  
 HarperCollins, 1991. 
Smith, Quentin. The Felt Meanings of the World: A Metaphysics of Feeling. West  
 Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 2005. 
Solomon, Robert C. The Passions. Garden City, NY: Anchor Press, 1976. 
---. “What is a ‘Cognitive Theory’ of the Emotions?” In Philosophy and the Emotions,  
 edited by Anthony Hatzimoysis, 1-18. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,  
 2003. 
---. “Emotions, Thoughts, and Feelings: Emotions as Engagements with the World.” In  
 
 189	  
Thinking About Feeling, edited by Robert Solomon 76-90. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2004. 
---. True to Our Feelings: What Our Emotions Are Really Telling Us. Oxford: Oxford  
 University Press, 2006. 
---. “The Many Dimensions of Religious Emotional Experience.” In Religious Emotions:  
Some Philosophical Explorations, edited by Willem Lemmens and Walter Van 
Herck, 230-246. Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2008. 
de Souse, Ronald. The Rationality of Emotions. Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology Press, 1987. 
---. “The Rationality of Emotions.” In Explaining Emotions, edited by Amelie Rorty.  
 Berkley, CA: University of California Press, 1980. 
Stocker, Robert with Elizabeth Hegeman. Valuing Emotions. Cambridge: Cambridge  
 University Press, 1996. 
Stump, Eleonore. Aquinas. London and New York: Routledge, 2003. 
---. “Love, By All Accounts.” Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical 
 Association 80 (2006): 25-53. 
---. “The Non-Aristotelian Character of Aquinas’ Ethics: Aquinas on the Passions.” Faith  
 and Philosophy 82 (2011): 29-43. 
Taylor, Charles. Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity. Cambridge,  
 MA: Harvard University Press, 1989. 
Terruwe MD, Anna A. and Conrad W. Baars MD. Loving and Curing the Neurotic: A  
 New Look at Emotional Illness. New Rochelle, NY: Arlington House, 1972. 
Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologiae. Translated by Fathers of the English Dominican  
 
 190	  
 Province. New York: Benziger Brothers, 1948. 
Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologiae: A Concise Translation. Edited and Translated by  
 Timothy McDermott. Notre Dame, IN: Ave Maria Press, 1991. 
Thomas Aquinas. Questiones Disputatae de Veritate, translated by Robert W. Mulligan,  
 S. J. Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1952. 
---. Truth. Translated by James V. McGlynn. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1994. 
---. “Emotions and Love.” In An Aquinas Reader. Edited by Mary T. Clark. New York:  
 Fordham University Press, 2000. 
Tillich, Paul. The Dynamics of Faith. New York: Harper Row, 1957. 
Tunzin, Donald F. The Voice of Tambaran: Truth and Illusion in Ilahita Arapesh  
 Religion. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980. 
de Vidas, Elijah. Reshit Hochma. Poland: Beyozefof, 1868. 
Wiesel, Elie. “The Holocaust: Elie Wiesel on the Trail of God.” In The World’s Wisdom,  
 edited by Philip Novak, 224. New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1994. 
Wittgenstein, Ludwig. “A Lecture on Ethics.” The Philosophical Review 74 (1965): 3-12. 
Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, translated by D. F. Pears and B.  
 F. McGuiness. London and New York: Routledge, 1961. 
Wolterstorff, Nicholas. “Art and the Aesthetic: The Religious Dimension.” In The  
Blackwell Guide to Aesthetics. Edited by Peter Kivy. Malden, MA: Blackwell 
Publishing, 2004. 
Wynn, Mark. Emotional Experience and Religious Understanding. Cambridge,  
 Cambridge University Press, 2005. 





John K. Dryden, Jr. 
	  
4003	  Massie	  Ave.	  






EDUCATION   
	  
Ph.D., Humanities, University	  of	  Louisville,	  Louisville,	  KY,	  May	  2013	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Dissertation:	  “The	  Feeling	  of	  Faith:	  A	  Thomistic	  Approach	  to	  Religious	  Emotions”	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Advisor:	  Dr.	  Robert	  Kimball	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Committee	  Members:	  Dr.	  Thomas	  Maloney	  and	  Dr.	  Mary	  Ann	  Stenger	  	  	  
	  
M.A., Humanities,	  University	  of	  Louisville,	  Louisville,	  KY,	  December	  2003	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Thesis:	  “The	  Epistemological	  Problem	  of	  Religious	  Diversity:	  A	  Critical	  Analysis	  of	  John	  
Hick’s	  Pluralistic	  Philosophy”	  
	  
B.A., Philosophy,	  University	  of	  Louisville,	  Louisville,	  KY,	  December	  2000	  
  
AREAS OF INTEREST   
	  
Specialization:	  Comparative	  Religion,	  Religion	  and	  Emotion	  
Competence:	  Philosophy	  of	  Religion,	  Ethics,	  Philosophy	  of	  Emotion	  
 
PUBLICATIONS   
  
“The Epistemological Problem of Religious Diversity” in Society for the Advancement of 
American Philosophy Conference Proceedings. (2004). 
 




“The	  Feeling	  of	  Faith:	  Aquinas’s	  ‘Treatise	  on	  the	  Passions’	  and	  Religious	  Emotions,”	  
Wesleyan	  Philosophical	  Society	  Annual	  Conference,	  Trevecca	  Nazarene	  University,	  
Nashville,	  TN,	  March	  1,	  2012.	  
 
“False	  Hope:	  Cognition	  and	  Emotions	  in	  Plato’s	  Philebus,”	  Midsouth	  Philosophy	  Conference, 
University	  of	  Memphis,	  Memphis,	  TN,	  March	  4,	  2011.	  
	  
Commentary	  on	  Lenard	  Ferry’s	  “Pseudo-­‐Passions:	  Needless	  Categorization	  or	  Insightful	  
Distinction?,”	  Midwest	  Conference	  of	  the	  Society	  for	  Christian	  Philosophers,	  Hope	  
College,	  Holland,	  MI,	  February	  25,	  2011.	  
	  
“Gathering	  the	  Waters:	  An	  Ecocritical	  Comparison	  of	  John	  Calvin’s	  Theology	  of	  Creation	  and	  
Shakespeare’s	  The Tempest,”	  Massachusetts	  Center	  for	  Renaissance	  Studies	  Graduate	  
Conference,	  University	  of	  Massachusetts,	  Amherst,	  MA,	  October	  2,	  2010.	  
	  
“Revisions	  of	  Pragmatism:	  Truth	  in	  Virginia	  Woolf’s	  To The Lighthouse,”	  Humanities	  
Graduate	  Student	  Colloquium,	  University	  of	  Louisville,	  Louisville,	  KY,	  April	  16,	  2010.	  
	  
“Good	  Grief:	  The	  Value	  of	  Sorrow,”	  Graduate	  Research	  Symposium,	  University	  of	  Louisville,	  
Louisville,	  KY,	  March	  5,	  2010.	  
	  
“Religious	  Experience,	  Expression,	  and	  Mystery	  in	  The Violent Bear It Away”	  Humanities	  
Graduate	  Student	  Colloquium,	  University	  of	  Louisville,	  Louisville,	  KY,	  April	  3,	  2009.	  
	  
“Aquinas’	  Theory	  of	  Faith:	  Advantages	  and	  Challenges	  of	  a	  Thomistic	  Religious	  
Epistemology,”	  Graduate	  Research	  Symposium,	  University	  of	  Louisville,	  Louisville,	  
KY,	  March	  6,	  2009.	  
	  
“The	  Epistemological	  Problem	  of	  Religious	  Diversity,”	  31st	  Annual	  Conference	  of	  the	  Society	  
for	  the	  Advancement	  of	  American	  Philosophy,	  University	  of	  Alabama	  Birmingham,	  
Birmingham,	  AL,	  March	  4-­‐6,	  2004.	  
	  
“The	  Epistemological	  Problem	  of	  Religious	  Diversity,”	  Intermountain	  West	  Student	  
Philosophy	  Conference,	  University	  of	  Utah,	  Salt	  Lake	  City,	  UT,	  February	  26-­‐28,	  2004.	  
	  
	  
TEACHING EXPERIENCE   
 
Instructor,	  Philosophy/Religious	  Studies,	  Elizabethtown	  Community	  and	  Technical	  College,	  
2012-­‐present. 
Graduate	  Teaching	  Assistant	  in	  Humanities,	  University	  of	  Louisville,	  2010	  -­‐	  2011.	  
Adjunct	  Professor	  of	  Philosophy,	  Spalding	  University,	  2006	  -­‐	  present.	  
Adjunct	  Professor	  of	  Humanities,	  City	  Colleges	  of	  Chicago,	  2004-­‐2006.	  
	  
AWARDS   
	  
Graduate Teaching Assistant, University of Louisville. 2010-2012. 
  




Elizabethtown Community and Technical College 
Comparative Religions, Spring 2012 – Present 
Introduction to Philosophy, Spring 2012 – Present 
Ethics, Spring 2012 - Present 
 
University of Louisville (Graduate Teaching Assistant, 2010-2012) 
Introduction to World Religions, Fall 2010 - 2012 
Introduction to the Study of Religion, Spring 2008 
   
Spalding University (Adjunct	  Professor,	  2006	  -­‐	  present)	  
Introduction	  to	  Ethics,	  Fall	  2006	  -­‐	  Present	  
Logic,	  Fall	  2007	  -­‐	  Present	  
Philosophy	  of	  the	  Person,	  Spring	  2011 
 
City Colleges of Chicago (Adjunct	  Instructor,	  2004-­‐2006)	  
Philosophy, Music, and Drama (Harold Washington College), Fall 2004 - Spring 2006 
Art and Philosophy on the African Continent (Harold Washington College), Spring 2006 
Introduction to Humanities (Harold Washington College), Spring 2006 
Comparative Mythology (Malcolm X College), Fall 2005 
Classical Culture (Malcolm X College), Fall 2005 
Contemporary Culture (Malcolm X College), Fall 2004 - Spring 2005 
  
 
SERVICE AND MEMBERSHIPS  
 
Humanities Colloquium Organizer: University of Louisville, 2010-2011 
Member of American Philosophical Association 
Member of American Academy of Religion 
 
	  	  
 
